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This study seeks to understand the relationship between decentralisation and human 
resource management in Botswana and South Africa. The study is situated within the 
context of the New Public Management (NPM) that has influenced the Human 
Resource Management reforms that the two countries aspire to adopt. This study’s 
main finding is that although strategic human resource management (SHRM) and 
decentralisation are frequently assumed to go together and are both advocated by the 
BrettonWoods institutions, in the cases researched SHRM reforms have been 
accompanied by a tendency towards centralisation. This implies a trade-off between 
SHRM and decentralisation in Botswana and South Africa.  
 
The study used a mixed methods approach consisting of both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, applied to a sample of local authorities in Botswana 
and the neighbouring North West province of South Africa. 
 
In both countries the implementation of HRM reforms in local government has been 
slow due to other considerations – political factors in the case of South Africa and 
professional bureaucratic issues in Botswana, reflecting the different path 
dependencies of the two countries. This study argues that from the cases studied even 
though developing countries may implement similar reforms based on similar policy 
advice or prescription, a combination of factors such as social and organisational 
culture that are not transferable between countries account for the difference in 
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This study seeks to understand more about the relationship between human resource 
management (HRM) and decentralisation in developing countries, specifically Africa. 
Recognising that service delivery is at the core of local governance, many developing 
nations have responded in different ways to enhancing the capacity of their local 
governments.  Almost all African countries have addressed this issue by establishing 
HRM mechanisms that largely reflect the prevailing decentralisation policies. It is 
generally agreed that decentralisation and its outcomes are country specific. Beyond 
this national specificity are regional patterns. In Central and Eastern Europe, for 
instance, decentralisation has been associated with ‘local identity, local 
representation, and local decision-making’, whereas in most other developing 
countries decentralisation was inspired by instrumentalist perspectives, from the 
World Bank and other donor agencies, of improving service delivery, poverty 
reduction and prevention of corruption (Devas and Delay, 2006). Other authors also 
share the same opinion on the latter observation (see Smoke, 2003). But why should 
these factors be improved by decentralisation? 
 
The reasons for decentralisation are varied and may include; demand for local level 
democratic control and autonomy, the perceived economic, administrative and 
political advantages of decentralisation, post conflict reconstruction, interests of local 
and national political elites, and demand from the World Bank and other donor 
agencies (Devas and Delay, 2006: 678-79). Popular participation in the development 
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process and decision-making has been cited as one of the main reasons for 
decentralisation (Mawhood, 1983). Whatever the reason(s) for decentralisation and 
the form (e.g. devolution or deconcentration) it may take, the main point is to provide 
efficient and effective local services for human development.  
 
Decentralisation is a complex process and it is a product of the context within which it 
is taking place (Smoke, 2003). In Africa there are many hurdles against meaningful 
decentralization, but quite often it is the legal and institutional aspects that influence 
the eventual outcome of decentralization (Wunsch, 2001). The situation has been 
exacerbated by the weakly conceived decentralization legislation, poorly trained local 
personnel, poorly designed local institutions and limited financial resources 
(Mawhood, 1983; Wunsch, 2001; Olowu and Wunsch 2004). Lately the blame has 
been targeted at the overemphasis of the structural issues to the neglect of human 
resource capacity as the key problem to efficiency and poor performance in service 
delivery (Hussein, 2003). Where studies have been done on HRM in local 
government, it would invariably show that in Africa human resources (HRs) remain 
largely centralized and weak (Wunsch, 2001; Olowu, 2003; Mawhood, 1983). The 
key feature of centralised HRM is the existence of departments in central government 
that manage local authorities’ human resources (HRs) in terms of: appointments, 
promotion, transfers, compensation, and so on. Therefore, the main problem 
associated with poor service delivery and poor performance at local government is, 
but not limited to, the nature of the institutional and policy frameworks in place.  
 
The appreciation of human resources as a key factor in ensuring gains in efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy in service provision has almost become universal. Not 
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only should the numbers of personnel be sufficient but they should also be 
appropriately trained and developed (Hussein, 2003: 11). Globally, the adoption of 
‘Western ideas on “public management” are embraced as instruments for improving 
human resources management’ (Soeters and Tessema, 2003: 624), including in many 
African countries. HRM, and especially Strategic Human Resource Management 
(SHRM), is strongly linked to the New Public Management (NPM), (see Chapter II), 
and NPM-type reforms associated with ‘new approaches to service delivery’ have 
been attempted also in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as well as other developing regions 
of the world - South Asia and South America (Manning, 2001: 301; McCourt, 2001). 
These reforms are more often than not imposed on the developing countries by 
lending and donor institutions (see Adamolekun, 2005; McCourt, 2002). 
 
Managerial decentralisation may be seen as pivotal to the NPM approach. However, 
the extent of decentralisation of HRM responsibilities varies from one country to 
another. Shim (2001) categorised some of the developed nations into three groups 
denoting the level of devolution of HRM responsibilities to line departments and/or 
managers, and these are: 
• Those with more extensive devolution of HRM responsibilities such as New 
Zealand, Australia and Sweden where central involvement in HRM activities 
of departments and agencies has been limited. 
• Those that have significant devolution, e.g. Denmark, UK and the Netherlands 
that have been more circumspect than the other three mentioned above. 
• Countries where decentralisation and devolution are not a priority, such as 




The extent of the decentralisation of HRM in the developed countries is evidently 
varied. However, within this variation in developed countries there is some 
commonality in that they are all at a stage where their HRM systems have matured 
and their main concern is with the refinement of how these systems work. This 
contrasts with the practice in developing countries, a number of which are still 
considered to be in the pre-Weberian stage of public administration, although others 
are perceived as committed reformers. Thus there are substantial differences in the 
context of HRM in developed and developing countries, although there is also a 
significant variation also within these categories.  
Although virtually all sub-Saharan African countries have some form of local 
governance and service delivery is relatively decentralised, HRM responsibilities 
remain largely centralised. Public sector reforms aimed at improving capacity for the 
efficient and effective delivery of services have been undertaken in many African 
countries, but  HRM as such has been neglected. This is highlighted in Section 1.2 
that states the problem that this study seeks to explore.        
 
1.2 The Problem 
While the decentralization of service delivery among developing countries is seen as a 
possible solution to some of the developmental problems, it is doubtful if 
decentralization alone would be adequate. Decentralisation is not a new phenomenon 
in Africa although its history has not been successful. But as interest in Africa on 
decentralization has rebounded it is coming at a time when many African countries 
are undertaking the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed 
public sector reforms and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). According to 
the World Bank and/or IMF funding conditionalities, managerial decentralisation is 
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one of the reforms which countries have to adopt irrespective of their prevailing 
circumstances. But as illustrated in Section 1.4 and also in Table 1.1 below, the 
context within which managerial concepts are applied stands at the core of the success 
of reform.  Many of the sub-Saharan Africa countries have adopted NPM-style 
reforms and some are extending these reforms to their local authorities, in particular 
South Africa and Botswana. Given that there are environmental factors that give 
developing countries their own distinctive context, it is worth investigating the 
implications of these reforms in particular in terms of flexibility in HRM. 
 
Local governments in most developing countries continue to be faced with the 
problem of manpower shortage in the professional and technical fields, which inhibit 
them from adequately meeting the demands for the services they are expected to 
deliver. Coupled with this, in some countries, are the underlying structural and 
capacity problems that are linked to the entire public management systems of the 
developing countries. The efficient and effective delivery of services and programmes 
remain a major challenge in developing countries. The lack of adequate financial and 
other material resources are definitely some of the factors contributing to poor service 
delivery. But these resources, even if they were available, are not enough to solve the 
problems of service delivery and poor performance. 
 
The problem of poor service delivery is more complex than a mere lack of resources. 
Decentralisation of service delivery in developing countries is seen as a solution to 
some of these problems. Some of the factors that prompt developing nations to adopt 
decentralisation are the anticipated ‘improved efficiency, improved governance, 
improved equity and improved development and poverty reduction’ (Smoke, 2003: 9, 
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10). The predominant theoretical orientation concerning decentralisation has been 
premised on the notion that service delivery decisions are made at, or closer to, the 
point of delivery. However, with regard to the management of the HRs that deliver the 
services, many African countries have retained centralised HRM systems. The 
centralisation/decentralisation debate has been raging on for years. While the ideals of 
decentralization may be appealing it is also known that the results may not always be 
what were expected as it can simply spread some of the problems around, for instance 
corruption (see Devas and Delay, 2006). The section below presents the focus of the 
study. 
 
1.3 Focus of the Study 
Most studies on decentralization focus on fiscal, institutional (with limited reference 
to human resource management) and political decentralization. Apparently 
consideration of institutional capacity does not usually deal profoundly with human 
resource capacity solutions. Several scholars have also noted that research in HRM in 
developing countries is scanty (Jackson, 2002; Budhwar and Debrah, 2003). It is even 
more so with research in HRM in local government in developing countries. This 
study is to some degree pioneering the study of Strategic Human Resource 
Management (SHRM) and decentralisation in developing countries.  
 
This study takes as its starting point McCourt and Ramgutty-Wong’s (2002) 
conclusion that strategic human resource management (SHRM) was neither applicable 
nor feasible in Mauritius (and therefore the African context). Their views were based 
on a case study they conducted in Mauritius in which they found that SHRM was not 
applicable because it was not known, there was no strategic management framework, 
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staff management was centralised and political will to support reform was lacking. 
However, McCourt (2006) later found that with the ‘new’ government in Mauritius 
the situation had changed dramatically from lack of commitment to sustained political 
commitment. This points to the effect that contingent factors (e.g. politics, economy, 
etc.) can have on the HRM system of a country.  Nevertheless, McCourt (2006: 66-
67) found that full-blown HRM had not been achieved but instead a modulated 
approach with a mix of emerging strategic elements and centralisation alongside each 
other was emerging. But why do developing countries continue to adopt Western style 
management solutions to their problems? And, are these Western managerial 
approaches applicable in the African context? These are some of the issues that this 
study looks at in the attempt to answer the main research questions. McCourt and 
Ramgutty-Wong used economic growth as the key variable that influenced the 
viability of the application or feasibility of SHRM. Instead this study uses more 
elements such as politics, economy, labour market, social culture, unionisation, 
decentralisation, organisational culture and internal strengths/weaknesses to help 
understand the broader context that influences HRM. What is important to this study 
is to understand how the adoption of SHRM (Western management ideals) affects 
decentralisation or local democracy in developing countries. Also, there is a need to 
comprehend the dynamics of local governance and how its human resources are 
managed in Africa. And lastly, it is demonstrated in Section 1.4 and Chapter II that 
the NPM-style reforms have largely been introduced in developing countries as policy 
advice from the Bretton Woods institutions, donors and international consultants. But 
why would different countries adopting similar policy advice result with different 




SHRM is involved with ensuring that there is congruence between HR strategy and 
organisational strategy (vertical integration/external fit) and also that HR strategies 
are integrated horizontally (internal fit). Armstrong (2006: 29, 30) states that SHRM 
is based on three key points: ‘that human capital is a major source of competitive 
advantage’ and ‘that it is people who implement the strategic plan’, and lastly ‘that a 
systematic approach should be adopted to defining where the organisation wants to go 
and how it should get there’. This approach presupposes that employees have a direct 
impact on the outcomes of an organisation’s strategic plan, and also that they are 
affected by it. SHRM promises better results over other HR approaches by claiming to 
enable organisations to acquire ‘skilled, committed and well-motivated employees it 
needs to achieve sustainable competitive advantage’ (ibid). 
 
The ideals of SHRM sound appealing but in practice the results have not been as easy 
as it appears in the textbooks. Even among the OECD Member countries the 
decentralisation of HRM responsibilities was found not to necessarily guarantee the 
flexibility of human resource management as even where HR authorities were 
delegated to agencies most lacked flexibility as a result of adhering to the same old 
practices (Shim, 2001; 330). The experience of the developed countries with the 
decentralisation of HRM responsibilities indicates the complexity of flexibility in 
HRM. Perhaps this points to a more complex relationship between HRM and 
decentralisation in developing countries given the context in which management 
occurs in these countries.  
 
There is a complication here in that it depends on what is meant by decentralisation – 
bearing in mind the distinction between political decentralisation i.e. the exercise of 
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powers by a local authority and managerial decentralisation i.e. the exercise of powers 
by a local agency of central government. It could be argued that SHRM and NPM 
imply the second type of decentralisation rather than the first. However, in this thesis 
we are not primarily concerned with the issue of local versus central government 
competences but rather with the hierarchical level at which a decision is made i.e. 
how far in organizational terms from the point of service delivery a decision is made. 
In countries where there is a developed system of local state administration in addition 
to elected local authorities this issue would be more complicated. However in the 
countries concerned in this study it could be argued that the distinction between 
political and managerial centralisation is not so significant – centralisation here 
implies taking a decision further up the hierarchy into central government, it does 
usually mean transferring the decision to a territorial state body.  In other words, if 
decentralisation is taken to be an increase in line manager ownership, in this study this 
would also coincide with an increase in local government ownership and 
centralisation would involve a reduction in both line management ownership and local 
government ownership.  It is appreciated that in other contexts SHRM would be 
compatible with managerial decentralisation even if this were accompanied by 
political centralisation. However, in the context of this study the distinction between 
managerial and political decentralisation does not appear to be significant.  
  
This thesis adopts a case study approach and applies the conceptual framework of 
SHRM and decentralisation to analyse the HRM practice in the local governments of 
two African countries, Botswana and South Africa. The SHRM framework consists of 
two parts/phases, first the environment (consisting of both the internal and external 
elements) and its relationship with the HRM philosophy (i.e. the strategy formulation 
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phase). The second part (i.e. the strategy implementation phase) refers to the 
application of the HRM practices, performance management and how information on 
performance outcomes is used. HRM in this study refers to the generic practice of 
employee management, whereas SHRM means a particular practice of HRM distinct 
from traditional personnel management (see Section 2.4.2. for further explanation).  
 
This study seeks to overcome some of the limitations of the other studies by focusing 
on the strategies of how people are employed and managed, assessing how these are 
performed and linked to organisational strategy in the context of local authorities in 
developing countries. Adopting a conceptual framework based on the contingency 
model, the Resource Based View and path dependence (see Section 2.5) to analyse 
HRM at local level. Furthermore, the study examined the local government 
institutional and policy framework for managing human resources, as well as the 
decentralisation systems of the two countries.  The next Section explains why 
Botswana and South Africa were selected for this study from among many African 
countries.  
 
1.4 The Study Area/Countries 
Both Botswana and South Africa are middle-income countries, and this should put 
them in a better position to afford the often costly NPM reforms. It will be shown 
briefly in this Section and in Chapter II that resource availability is one of the 
contributory factors to the success or failure of public sector reforms. Botswana is 
known for its exceptionality in Africa and the developing world for its long tradition 
of local democratic governance and local government’s exceptionality in service 
delivery and performance (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). However, within this 
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exceptionality, weaknesses in human resource management remain (Reilly, 1983; Tsie 
et al, 1998; Phirinyane and Kaboyakgosi, 2001; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). South 
Africa on the other hand is a country in transition from apartheid to democratic 
governance, with a local government that is perceived to have failed historically to 
fulfil its mandate of service delivery (Pycroft, 1999). South Africa, known as the most 
developed and richest country in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix 7), is peculiar in 
that the Government of National Unity in 1994 inherited a flawed, inefficient and 
ineffective organization (Harrison-Rockey, 1999). In spite of the inherited weaknesses 
in South Africa’s public management system there are significant advantages as well, 
in particular the strength of the economy. Economic advantages perhaps are what sets 
South Africa apart from other countries in Africa, in as far as public sector reforms 
and civil service reforms are concerned. The rest of the discussion focuses on these 
differences and the implications these have for reform.   
 
Each of the 54 African countries have their own unique historical and political 
experiences. These experiences have to varying degrees influenced their public 
management approaches. The variance in public management between some African 
countries is illustrated in Table 1.1 in which they are placed in columns denoting 
levels of reform and also showing their placements in a public management reform 

















D. BEGINNERS AND 
NON-STARTERS 
(“VICIOUS CYCLE”) 
    
Botswana Benin Cote d’Ivoire Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Mauritius Burkina Faso Gabon Burundi 
Namibia Ethiopia Guinea Central African Republic 
South Africa Ghana Nigeria Liberia 
 Kenya Togo Sierra Leone 
 Mali Zimbabwe Somalia 
 Mauritania  Sudan 
 Rwanda   
 Senegal   
 Tanzania   
 Uganda    
 Zambia   
 
Public Management Reform Continuum 
 Virtuous        Vicious  
    cycle             cycle 
 
Source: Adamolekun (2005). 
 
However, one should note that some of Adamolekun’s observations are overtaken by 
developments such as the deterioration of the governance situation in Zimbabwe and 
the significant progress in the Sierra Leonean public service reform. Zimbabwe may 
now be classified under ‘Beginners and Non-starters’ and Sierra Leone under 
‘Committed Reformers’. Notwithstanding the changes that may have taken place in 
some of the countries there have not been any significant movements across country 
classifications that could nullify its usefulness.   
 
Adamolekun observed that the advanced reformers, in Group A (i.e. Botswana, 
Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa), are those countries that had maintained a 
viable public administration system and nurtured the merit-based and apolitical civil 
service systems that they inherited from the colonial governments. Also, he observes 
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that these countries have achieved significant progress in their socio-economic 
development and have therefore been able to finance the reforms. Furthermore, the 
Advanced Reformers entrenched the rule of law and a democratic political culture in 
their governance systems, enabling them to attract both local and foreign direct 
investment. Adamolekun characterised these developments as the ‘virtuous cycle’1.  
 
Group B countries are those that experienced setbacks with their public administration 
systems but recommitted to rehabilitating their systems in the early 1990s and also 
democratised. These included: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, 
Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. These countries also 
experienced, albeit to varying degrees, some economic difficulties in the 1970s and 
1980s that led to bilateral and multilateral donors demanding the implementation of 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPS). The SAPS mainly involved: ‘civil service 
staff reduction, freezing of new recruitments, and removal of ghost workers with a 
view to reducing the size of the civil service wage bill’ (ibid, 7). 
                           
The third and fourth groups have also attempted the reforms that Group B countries 
adopted but with very limited success. The countries in Groups C and D experienced 
debilitating civil strife, failing economies and failing or failed states. Adamolekun 
places Group D countries at the extreme end of the public management reform 
continuum, ‘vicious cycle’, because of the protracted civil wars that they experienced. 
 
Although many African governments were still struggling to get a foothold on a firm 
reform agenda there were already notable successes in Group A. In spite of challenges 
                                               
1
 Namibia and South Africa were regarded as virtuous only after the attainment of majority rule. Both 
countries were ruled by the former apartheid regime in Pretoria. 
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experienced in the adoption of the NPM reforms there are at least four cases that 
indicate serious attempts at the adoption of NPM reforms in Africa. However, among 
these four countries, SHRM has been studied at the national level but not how it is 
applied in local government. From the mid-1990s and early 2000s it was Botswana 
and South Africa that showed a keen interest and commitment in rolling out a 
performance management systems (PMS) to local authorities and this makes them the 
most suitable candidates for this study. How PMS and SHRM are related is explained 
in Chapter II where it is also shown that the adoption of a particular public 
management system engenders a particular human resource management system. 
Section 1.5 presents the aim of the study, the research questions and hypotheses.   
 
1.5 Aim of the Study, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The aim of the study is to understand the relationship between decentralisation and 
HRM in developing countries, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa. The research 
questions that this study seeks to answer are as follows:  
The primary research question is:  
• Is there a trade-off (in the sense of an inverse or zero-sum relationship) 
between SHRM and decentralization or local democracy in Botswana and 
South Africa? This is important because there is a perception in the countries 
concerned that international best practice incorporates both decentralisation 
and SHRM. If these two principles are shown to be incompatible these raises a 
fundamental dilemma for policymakers.  
Secondary Questions:  
• What are the main factors/elements that influence the management of human 
resources in local government in Botswana and South Africa?  
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• Why do countries adopting similar policy advice end up with different 
outcomes? 
 
In the attempt to answer these questions, the study focused first on the concepts of 
SHRM, and its application in developing countries. Secondly, the study examined the 
decentralisation and human resource management policies of the two countries and 
their current HRM practices. Thirdly, the study focused on local government 
structures and the centre-local relationships of the two countries. Fourth, the extent to 
which central government is involved in local government HRM, and its impact on 
local government capacity to execute its HRM responsibilities was analyzed.  
 
In the attempt to answer the research questions above the study examined the 
following hypotheses through the use of the two-country case studies:  
• The adoption of SHRM reforms is likely to be driven by the centre rather than 
by local authorities themselves. 
• External contingencies such as wider governmental priorities (for example a 
policy of centralisation) or international donor agendas have a more decisive 
influence on HRM policy in local government than local factors or perceived 
HRM best practice. 
• The ‘inimitable and immobile resources’ (Barney, 1991, 1999) of institutions 
lead to different approaches to the management of human resources in those 
institutions. 
 
To address these hypotheses this study has examined how employees are managed in 
the local government systems of Botswana and South Africa and has also analysed 
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what determines HRM in the two countries. The structure of the thesis is outlined in 
Section 1.6 below.  
 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter I presents the general introduction and 
outlines the background to the problem and discusses the statement of the problem. 
The chapter further presents the aim of the study, research questions, the hypotheses, 
the study area/countries, and the focus and justification for the study. 
 
Chapter II presents the decentralisation concept and illustrates how the different 
public management models influence HRM. The discussion covers key characteristics 
of HRM and decentralisation. The chapter has five sections dealing with 
decentralisation, HRM, the conceptual framework and the analytical framework. 
Related to the analytical framework the Chapter discusses the decentralisation/HRM 
framework which serves as a tool for categorising countries’ HRM systems.   
 
Chapter III presents the methodology, the study design, data collection, sample 
design, data processing and analysis as well as the limitations. The research, as 
already mentioned, adopted a case study approach. The study used a mixed methods 
approach, with emphasis on the qualitative research methods supported by 
quantitative methods, and document research methods. Chapters IV and V present the 
background information about Botswana and South Africa (the North West province) 
respectively. The chapters give detailed and necessary background about each of the 
two countries, discussing their decentralisation and HRM frameworks. However, 
these do not directly answer the research questions. Factors that influence both 
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decentralisation and HRM are discussed, the concept of HRM, HRM practices and 
performance management and reporting mechanisms. The background information 
discusses the elements of the conceptual framework and shows that not all of them are 
relevant to the two case studies, particularly donor role. In both countries donors play 
a limited or negligible role on influencing government policies, perhaps owing to the 
relative strengths of the two countries’ economies compared to other sub-Saharan 
African countries.   
 
Chapters VI and VII present the empirical data, analysis and interpretation of the 
research carried out in Botswana and South Africa respectively. The concluding 







BACKGROUND, THEORY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the introduction to the study and the research 
questions and hypotheses. This chapter reviews the literature on the key concepts of 
decentralisation, new public management (NPM), and strategic human resource 
management, and attempts to clarify the possible linkages between these.   Whilst it 
might be an exaggeration to argue that NPM is automatically associated with 
decentralisation, centralisation is often considered antithetical to NPM (see Mosley, 
2008; Levy, 2002). However, as this chapter demonstrates, the experience of 
decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa has had very mixed results, the implication 
being that NPM reforms in this context might require centralisation rather than 
decentralisation if they are to be implemented successfully.   
 
2.2. The Rationale for Decentralisation 
 
Decentralisation, in its various forms, has been pursued by both developed and 
developing countries alike as a central public sector reform strategy. For developing 
countries decentralisation is not only a reform strategy but it is increasingly seen as an 
integral part or a sine qua non of the development process. Although political or fiscal 
decentralisation is not necessarily associated with New Public Management, 
managerial decentralisation is, and NPM and decentralisation tend both to feature on 
any notional list of the reform agenda for the public services of developing countries. 
From this it might be assumed that the two, whilst by no means inseparable, are 
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closely related – although as the present study will demonstrate this relationship is far 
from simple.  
 
Bardhan (2002) notes that decentralisation has for many decades been seen as a public 
sector reform necessary for invigorating the state. The apparent global popularity of 
decentralisation may be attributed to the perceived failure of centralisation. Some of 
the factors that prompt nations to adopt decentralisation are the anticipated ‘improved 
efficiency, improved governance, improved equity and improved development and 
poverty reduction’ (Smoke, 2003: 9, 10). In Mawhood’s words decentralisation ‘… 
suggests the hope of cracking open the blockages of an inert bureaucracy’, and 
‘curing managerial constipation…’ (1983: 1).  Advocacy of decentralisation as a cure 
for bureaucracy’s ills thus predates New Public Management. However, the 
association between the two concepts may be seen as a result of the emergence of 
privatisation arguably the defining component of NPM, as one of four types of 
decentralisation, according to Lister and Betley’s classification. The four types of 
decentralisation suggested by Lister and Betley (1999) and UNDP (2004) are stated 
below; 
1.  Deconcentration: referring to the dispersal of administrative responsibilities from 
the centre to field offices and/or local authorities. The central government remains 
with supervisory responsibilities to ensure accountability to higher levels of 
government. 
2.  Delegation: decision-making responsibilities being transferred to semi-autonomous 
institutions such as boards and public corporations. These entities would usually enjoy 
less constraining conditions unlike in the civil service. But they are nevertheless 
accountable to central government. 
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3.  Devolution: through which both administrative and political powers are transferred 
to independent local level entities that, on account of their legal status, have 
jurisdiction to exercise authority over a specified geographical area. A municipality or 
local council with devolved powers will be able to raise its own revenue, have 
legislative powers, decide on policy, and investment within the scope of their 
statutory rights. 
4.   Privatisation: referring to a situation whereby responsibility is transferred to a 
private or not-for-profit entity. Privatisation is usually pursued with the objective of 
rolling back the state and ushering the supposedly efficient private sector as a service 
provider.  This form of decentralisation might also take less radical forms such as 
contracting for public services where the provider may still be in-house but is subject 
to competition and commercial imperatives, and the use of decentralised budgets to 
encourage front-line service units to operate more in the style of private firms. This 
form is strongly associated with New Public Management and decentralised 
management (or administration) in public organisations.     
 
Smoke (2003; 8) observes however that decentralisation is ‘invariably complex’ and 
‘has several dimensions’ that ‘are integrated and must be considered together’. ‘[T]he 
fact of decentralization does not constitute local governance’ (Olowu and Wunsch, 
2004: 39). Inversely, local governance is understood to work within the framework of 
decentralisation. This study is principally interested in the devolution type of 
decentralisation as it is the one that is usually applied in the creation of local 





Increasingly, decentralisation has come to be seen as an important aspect of good 
governance defined as ‘… respect for human rights, political openness, participation, 
tolerance, administrative and bureaucratic capacity and efficiency’ (Work, 2002: 3). 
Globalisation (in the sense of the Washington consensus) has increased the pressure to 
demonstrate good governance, especially with donors’ preference for working with 
NGOs rather than the state (Work, 2002). This increases the pressure for 
decentralisation, the more so as decentralisation is also seen as pivotal to the 
achievement of poverty reduction and the realisation of the Millennium Development 
Goals2 (MDGs) in developing countries (UNDP, 2004). In practical terms, of course, 
decentralisation is also very much about the distribution of power as Chapters VII and 
VIII will illustrate. 
 
These various trends – good governance, New Public Management, globalisation – 
may be seen as not only coincident but also as mutually reinforcing, and all tend to 
point towards a greater emphasis on administrative decentralisation. This is not 
always stated explicitly, but, on the other hand, centralisation, is widely seen as being 
as antithetical to good governance, New Public Management and globalisation, and it 
might therefore be assumed that the more decentralisation advances the more this 
would enable other reforms to follow. Ironically, however, NPM reforms have tended 
towards centralisation in some cases. For instance, Bach (2000) states that under the 
Conservative government, the UK adopted, in effect, the model of the multi-divisional 
company in which strategic policy decisions are made at the centre which also 
monitors the financial performance and service standards of separate organisational 
                                               
2
 MDGs are a set of about eight goals that the United Nations Member States have committed 
themselves to achieve by the year 2015. These are: reduction of extreme poverty and hunger; 
achievement of universal primary education; gender equality and empowerment of women; reduction 
of child mortality; maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; environmental 
sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. See http://www.undp.org  
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units, of which their senior managers are responsible for operational efficiency. In 
another observation Mosley (2008: 4) stated that ‘[i]n principle MBO (management 
by objectives) within a national PES (public employment system) organisation 
represents not an abandonment of central direction of the PES organisation but rather 
a refinement.’ 
 
There are therefore ambiguities in the conceptualisation as well as the practice of 
decentralisation; as will be noted in the Botswana and South African case studies 
below. At this point it is useful to look briefly at the experience of African countries 
in terms of decentralisation.  
 
2.2.1. Decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa  
Decentralisation in its present form was introduced in Africa as early as the 1960s but 
by the 1970s the local institutions were plagued by interference from the top, 
infighting, and lack of resources and skills leading to widespread failure (Crook and 
Manor, 1998). In the 1980s interest in decentralisation returned to Africa (Crook and 
Manor, 1998; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). Nevertheless, in spite of the noble 
desires of many African governments to decentralise, their reform efforts achieved 
very limited success. The challenges they experienced persisted for decades even after 
decentralisation ‘accelerated after 1990’ (Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2006: 1). The 
trajectory of decentralisation in Africa has thus been a rather jagged one. Experience 
varies widely, with some having reversed decentralisation during military coups d’etat 
only to reintroduce local governance later, others tending towards centralisation, 
while some are new comers (see Ayee, 2004; Smoke, 2004; Wunsch and Ottemoeller, 




Olowu and Wunsch (2004: 39) classified African countries into three decentralisation 
policy systems: labelling them as old, new and mixed - and the examples were 
presented as:  
• Old/deconcentration: Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia. 
• New/devolution: Mauritius, Botswana, Uganda, Nigeria, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Tanzania. 
• Mixed/partial devolution: (urban areas only) Namibia, Mozambique, Burkina 
Faso.  
 
One intriguing factor about decentralisation is that it can take place under any form of 
national governance system, be it democratic or authoritarian. Undemocratic regimes 
such as those in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda3, China, Pakistan, apartheid South Africa 
and Ghana under Jerry Rawlings’ military rule had decentralised governance (Ayee, 
2004; Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2006; Crook and Manor, 1998; Smoke, 2004; Olowu 
and Wunsch, 2004). The broader national political context plays a major role in 
influencing decentralisation (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). Often the political motive 
for decentralisation is specifically to incorporate local interests into national systems 
of patronage, this is particularly the case in authoritarian regimes. It is also shown in 
Chapters VI and VII that fairly democratic regimes can apply a similar strategy for 
self-preservation.  
 
The incorporation of local interests into national systems of patronage could be 
expressed in a number of ways such as the decentralisation laws, allocation of 
resources (human and fiscal), and in the centre-local relations. How these factors are 
configured is important for local governance. Effective decentralisation and service 
                                               
3
 There have been some notable improvements in the democratic practice of some countries such as 
Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda in spite of their democracies being somewhat unusual.  
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delivery would more specifically be related to ‘… budgeting and fiscal management, 
personnel systems and management’ (Wunsch, 2001: 277), and efficient central-local 
relations (Crook, 2003; Smoke, 2003). In many African governments this has been 
frustrated by the political objectives of the government of the day and the widespread 
tendency of the centre to intervene in local affairs.  
 
These are matters related broadly to institutional design, which is perceived as one of 
the crucial aspects of local governance in Africa.  Olowu and Wunsch insist that it is 
necessary to give pre-eminence to institutional design even where the ‘national 
context is supportive and even if intergovernmental relations are effective’ (2004: 
268). They argue that institutional design is particularly significant in Africa because 
of the high poverty levels, the nascent development of local governance, and the 
placing of much emphasis on central government by both scholars and practitioners. 
Institutions that are poorly designed cannot function efficiently as there will be power 
asymmetry between the centre and local authorities, as well as between the local level 
executive and local political leadership. 
 
Tordoff, (1994) observed about two decades ago that in a number of countries there 
have been tendencies towards centralisation , such as in Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, and 
Botswana. Some of these countries have attempted decentralisation but in practice 
their systems remain largely centralised. Clearly there was no simple relationship 
between democratisation and decentralisation in these countries. Bach (2000: 14) 
argues that immediately after independence centralisation was continued due to 
concerns about ‘poor infrastructure, an underdeveloped private sector and widespread 
poverty,’ and that ‘the State in large parts of Africa and elsewhere needed to take on 
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the task of guiding the economy and establishing public service provision’. Similar 
development problems prevailed even in the 1980s and after, especially where there 
have been wars and other governance problems.  
 
Lack of financial resources as well often proved to be a serious challenge to local 
government reform as in the case of Zambia under the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD) led government (Tordoff, 1994).  Elsewhere, as in Botswana and 
South Africa, the cases being considered here, relative abundance of financial 
resources has been found to make many things achievable (Olowu and Wunsch, 
2004). Nevertheless, sources of revenue for local government in Africa are often 
limited, with taxes that they can administer often difficult and costly to collect which 
has lead to overdependence on the centre (Devas, 2005). Fiscal decentralisation has 
been undertaken in some African countries to address these challenges, but more often 
than not with donor support such as in Tanzania (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000). On 
the other hand the lack of adequately skilled personnel has led to lack of capacity in 
local government, adversely affecting service delivery. Some of the areas that have 
been adversely affected by lack of capacity, for instance, are the collection of taxes 
(see Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000; Devas, 2005) and the maintenance of effective 
accounting systems (Devas, 2005). But successes have been noted elsewhere such as 
in Botswana, Kenya and South Africa, with Botswana lauded for the adoption of 
accrual accounting (Adamolekun, 2005). 
 
Resource scarcity problems pervade all areas of local government and are widespread 
in Africa. As Wunsch (2001) pointed out, decentralisation is more likely to fail where 
the decentralised institutions experience acute lack of funding and appropriate skills to 
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the extent they cannot carry out their functions efficiently. The performance of local 
government is anchored on its ability to acquire and retain well-trained personnel. It is 
the fact that ‘personnel constitute the resource by which inanimate factors of finance, 
land, property and equipment are converted into the delivery of services’ (Fowler, 
1995: 2) that makes them critical at every level of government. Various commentators 
have found human resource constraints to be central to their analysis of the 
management of local government in Africa, as the next section illustrates. 
 
2.2.2. Decentralisation and Human Resource Management in Africa 
Local government in Africa has faced many challenges just as is with its broader 
public sector in general, but lack of capacity is the most cited problem. Grindle and 
Hilderbrand, (1995) identified capacity building for public sector performance as 
essential for an effective development process. Other scholars also share a similar 
opinion and identify managerial and technical capacity, weak institutional 
arrangements, and capacity for fiscal management as the key aspects of capacity 
constraints at local level in Africa (Andrews and Schroeder, 2003: 37; Lister and 
Betley, 1999: 2). Hussein (2003) singles out human resource constraints as the most 
predominant capacity constraints at local level.  
 
However, indications are that African governments have been showing some 
commitment to building local level capacity by increasing both the quality and 
numerical strengths of local level public employment. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) shows that there were numerical increases in some of the selected 
countries for which they had data. For instance, Botswana, Mauritius, and Uganda 
registered positive growth in the number of local government employees while South 
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Africa and Zimbabwe registered a reduction but an increase at federal and central 
levels respectively (ILO, 2001: 85). The proportion of local government employees to 
general government employment was also significant but low in some: Botswana at 
18.4%, South Africa 16.0%, Uganda 12.6%, Zimbabwe 11.2%, Mauritius 9.3% and 
the Gambia 4.1% (ibid, p84). However, it is not only the numbers that matter but the 
whole way in which the human resources are managed. In local government human 
resources management takes place ‘within highly structured and complex set of 
procedures and mechanisms’ (Fowler, 1995: 129), and as for Africa and other 
developing countries in increasingly unpredictable conditions coupled with severe 
resource constraints. In many developing countries local government employment is 
used for patronage purposes than functionality. 
 
The nexus between decentralisation and HRM is in the various human resource 
management systems commonly applied in local government. These are the; 
integrated, separated and unified models (Olowu, 2003; Mawhood, 1983). The 
integrated model is characterised by the deployment of central government officials 
over local governments. Under the separated model local governments are able to hire 
and fire their own staff, as opposed to the unified model in which there is a common 
civil service across local authorities. Olowu (2003) observes that the unified model is 
increasingly becoming popular and it allows local governments to manage their own 
staff with less dependence on central government. Integrated and unified systems are 
found where the centre does not trust local governments to employ strategically rather 
than as patronage (in the case of the unified system, state control is only at the 
appointment stage). These institutional arrangements represent the context within 




The ILO (2001) found several challenges facing local government in developing 
countries. One is that responsibilities are decentralised without corresponding 
resources to local authorities, in what is referred to in South Africa as unfunded 
mandates, as well as the reluctance to decentralise staff to manage these 
responsibilities. Another challenge is associated with lack of adequately trained staff 
to perform requisite financial and personnel responsibilities, thereby opening 
opportunities for corruption and nepotism. These challenges point to the fact that the 
action environment in which human resources operate may exert considerable 
influence on the performance of employees as its impact may be beyond the scope of 
the institutions in which they are employed.  
 
Attempts to improve the functioning of local government have to be seen in the light 
of the above challenges. Is it possible, for instance to improve performance through 
the introduction of modern management practices, such as Performance Management 
(PM)? PM is an important area of HRM. Performance management and performance 
appraisal are different but bound together. Performance management is broader and 
involves, among other things, the measurement of both organisational and individual 
performance in relation to the performance standards tied to the organisation’s 
mission. Performance appraisal on the other hand is limited to the assessment or 
evaluation of individual employee’s performance in relation to the job description and 
performance goals.  
 
However, performance appraisal in the African public services is not universalistic in 
principle as it should be but rather it is based ‘... on rule following, smooth 
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interpersonal relations, and particularistic exchanges rather than goal-directed 
performance’ (Blunt and Popoola, 1985: 109). Some of these factors are still prevalent 
even among Africa’s leading reformers. For instance, the failure of performance 
management schemes in Mauritius and Namibia is blamed on particularistic 
tendencies (McCourt, 2006).  
 
In the pursuit of durable solutions to development challenges African countries have 
joined other countries across the globe in attempting to reform their public services. 
But how far these reforms have penetrated local government is another question 
which can usefully be considered in relation to the particular public management 
reforms that have been adopted. Globally, public management reforms have been 
performed within particular public management models which vary from region to 
region and country to country. The next section reviews current concepts of public 
management and looks at how these have influenced HRM both in Africa and 
globally.  
 
2.3. Public Management Models and their Implications for HRM  
This section sets out current public management models and trends as they apply in 
developing countries and Africa in particular, to assess if there is a shift from public 
administration (PA) to new public management (NPM). To do so it is necessary to 
analyse NPM, in comparison to Public Administration, and to examine its application 
globally and in Africa.  These public management models are discussed in this 
chapter to set the framework within which HRM may be understood as HRM 




The distinctions between the public management models and how these are applied in 
each country will be useful in the later chapters in enabling an understanding of the 
factors that bear upon or influence HRM systems. The following subsection presents 
the public management models.  
 
2.3.1. Public Administration, the Washington Model and New Public 
Management  
There is much debate as to what public management approaches developing countries 
are practising; that is whether they are practising PA, NPM or the Washington Model.  
The impression is given that OECD countries have over recent decades made a 
wholesale shift from PA to NPM. Developing countries have also shown interest and 
some trends in the direction of NPM (Adamolekun, 2005; Hope, 2002; Olowu, 2002; 
Manning, 2001). However, not only is there a danger of exaggerating the degree of 
the shift away from PA in OECD countries,  there are many unresolved issues about 
the appropriateness of these models to the pre-Weberian context of some developing 
countries, where PA may still be essential.  
 
In an African Development Bank (ADB) funded study Adamolekun (2005) found that 
in Africa there are two contrasting types of state development, one consisting of 
countries that were democratising and liberalising their economies and another made 
up of failed and/or failing states.  Soeters and Tessema (2004) take a radical view that 
some developing countries are in the pre-Weberian stage of public management in 
which ‘who you know’ matters the most as opposed to ‘what you know’. Because of 
this, many scholars feel there is a need in Africa to re-establish basic governance 
institutions and that elements of PA are still essential to many countries’ public 
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management systems and stratagems (Adamolekun, 2005; Sindane, 2004; Soeters and 
Tessema, 2004; McCourt, 2002). HRM under PA was denoted by ‘devotion to public 
office’ which includes ‘lifelong employment and stable and certain career 
progression’ (Beattie and Waterhouse, 2007: 5, 6).  
 
The other side of the argument sees these practices, inspired by bureaucratic 
organisational theory, as leading to oversized and inefficient public management 
system. The ‘failure’ of PA ignited the search for alternative approaches to public 
management. Public choice theorists posit that public sector employees are motivated 
by self-interest in their behaviour towards others but not only the good of the public as 
previously thought. Buchanan (1978) argued for the reform of institutions to match 
man’s moral limitations. As a result of the adoption of these ideas ‘[m]anagement 
processes and human resource management practices were re-aligned based on the 
assumption of an individualistic, self-interest motive to job performance’ (Beattie and 
Waterhouse, 2007: 6). NPM reforms started in the West spread to the rest of the world 
including developing countries.    
    
Influenced by these examples and in the new international atmosphere created after  
the collapse of communism and the pressure from globalisation many developing 
countries have moved or are attempting to move away from PA (Soeters and 
Tessema, 2004) albeit slowly (McCourt, 2002).  This trend is generally acknowledged 
but the outcome in terms of the resultant direction they are moving in is disputed. 
Some writers (e.g. Hope, 2002; Manning, 2001) identified some NPM-like reforms 
that have been adopted. On the other hand McCourt (2002) referred to this move as 
the adoption of what he calls the Washington model. The model refers to the civil 
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service reforms instigated by the World Bank and IMF as conditionality for their 
loans. These include cutbacks on the number of staff, salary decompression, reduction 
of corruption, merit-based staffing practices, and generally rectifying their 
administrative fundamentals before moving onto issues of service quality (McCourt, 
2002: 236). This results in a two-phase reform, with the Washington model 
constituting Phase 1 and NPM making Phase 2, in which countries cannot move from 
Phase 1 to 2 without having fulfilled the requirements of the first phase (ibid). 
McCourt identified other public management concerns, the poverty agenda and other 
domestic imperatives that developing countries are still grappling with and find them 
to be more pertinent to deal with than the pursuit of NPM. The Washington Model 
could therefore be seen as a transitory stage from PA to NPM for many developing 
countries, or even an acceptable end stage.  
 
Contrary to PA, NPM distinctly focuses on results, mission, cost cutting, privatisation, 
and decentralisation, with HRM at the core of public management reforms (see 
Hughes, 1998; Shim, 2001; Soeters and Tessema, 2004). NPM has been regarded by a 
significant number of scholars as a new paradigm different from PA and other 
disciplines such as public policy and business management (Gow and Dufour, 2000). 
The shift from PA to NPM is regarded as irreversible and distinctly managerial 
(Hughes, 1998). NPM is discussed in section 2.3.2 below. 
 
2.3.2. New Public Management 
The NPM framework in the public sector is attributed to the adoption of the neo-
classical economic approach to the business of government (Johnston 1998; 195), and 
is advanced as a new approach to managing public sector organisations (Gow and 
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Dufour 2000). This approach presupposes efficient and effective service delivery 
(Johnston, 1998; Daley, 2002) in an economic manner (Campbell, 1998). These 
private sector management techniques have been adopted, and have penetrated deep 
into public sector organisations (de Bruijn, 2001; Batley and Larbi, 2004). In this 
sense, NPM is much more than a public sector reform but a transformation of the 
public sector (Hughes, 1998; 59). Although NPM borrows from the private sector 
management approach it remains different ‘because it is public.’ And ‘[i]ts political 
dimension makes it unique and not assimilated to business management’ (Gow and 
Dufour, 2000: 578). There are key aspects that set NPM apart as a new paradigm 
(Hood, 1991 cited in Hughes, 1998; 61-65) and these are: 
 
1. Hands on professional management 
2. Explicit standards and measures of performance 
3. Greater emphasis on output controls 
4. A shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector 
5. A shift to greater competition in public sector provision 
6. A stress on private sector styles of management practice 
7. A stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use 
 
These reforms had far reaching implications for the public sector values and how the 
sector operates. Governments became more concerned about increasing productivity 
and making the public service more customer-oriented (Shim, 2001). There were 
profound implications for HRM also.  Shim (2001: p. 323) identifies four: 
• HR management in the public sector became similar to its private sector 
counterparts. Economic efficiency was one of the most important standards for 
reforms, for instance, by reducing the size of the public sector. 
• Many efforts were made to give line ministries and/or line managers greater 
flexibility and freedom in HR management through various decentralization 
and devolution policies. 
• In return for providing greater flexibility and freedom to agencies, 
governments tried to secure accountability of line ministries and/or line 
managers in HR management, by stressing performance and ethics of civil 
service. 
• On the other hand, governments also made it their priority to become the 




These reforms meant a move away from focusing on inputs to outputs; a focus on 
performance measurement through the use of performance indicators and standards; a 
shift from hierarchical bureaucracies to marketisation of public services and a shift 
from personnel management values to efficiency and individualism (Beattie and 
Waterhouse, 2007). 
 
How NPM reforms have been applied globally, especially in the OECD countries, is 
well documented. However, a number of African countries as well have adopted some 
of the strategies aimed at performance management and productivity enhancement. 
Some of these strategies are the Work Improvement Teams (WITS) in Botswana and 
quality circles in Mauritius that are fashioned along the Japanese Quality Control 
Circles (Hope, 2002: 221). Performance management systems (PMS) has been tried in 
a number of African countries such as Uganda, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal and 
Botswana (ibid).  PMS involves the use of performance contracts for individuals and 
departments. However, its success has been limited. For instance, in Mauritius its 
implementation has failed due to the fear of its relationship with performance-related 
pay (McCourt, 2006). But failed implementation of reforms is not an end in itself as 
public sector reforms are a continual and an unending process, that can be fine tuned 
on the basis of experience.     
 
Hughes (1998) limits his view of disaggregation to the creation of executive agencies. 
Hope (2002) instead looks at the broader concept of decentralisation within the 
context of NPM, linking all the four modes of decentralisation to NPM. He argues 
that centralisation in Africa has failed and argues that the service delivery modes in 
Africa that are based on decentralisation have led to better governance. Elsewhere, 
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NPM has been proven to profoundly affect service delivery in local government, as in 
the case of New Zealand (see McCourt, 2001: 110). However, the creation of local 
government is not necessarily part of NPM reforms, rather it is the management 
approach applied within these entities that may take the NPM style.  
 
Privatisation has caught up in Africa as well, and has taken various forms. These 
include: ‘commercialisation’; ‘joint ventures’; ‘the sale of some government services 
or functions’; ‘management contracts for government services; the leasing of 
government assets or the granting of concessions to private entities to operate and 
finance some public services delivery’ (Hope, 2002: 217). The commercialisation of 
the Ethiopian Airlines is cited as one of the successful commercialisation attempts in 
Africa (UNECA, 2004).  
 
The adoption of private sector styles of management is widespread under NPM. The 
management of performance is important and ensuring that pay is related to 
performance. In this approach appointments are made on contract with direct 
appointments to top positions common, and poor performers can be easily fired. 
Several African governments have implemented pay and grading reforms in their 
public services: such as Ghana, Mozambique, Guinea, Gambia and Uganda (Hope, 
2002). Hope notes that the pay and grading reforms introduced salary decompression 
for the top echelons and real pay improved phenomenally, making top civil service 
posts attractive. The Botswana government introduced a performance based pay 
system for top bureaucrats in 2004 and extend it to local government in 2006, while 




These public sector reforms usually coincide with a shift away from centralisation 
towards decentralised governance (or at least decentralised administration), 
accompanied by an aspiration towards efficiency, economy and effectiveness in 
service delivery (Hope, 2002). NPM and decentralisation share a common goal of 
achieving the three Es in service delivery including a fourth E, ‘participation and 
empowerment’ (ibid, 219) and as a result they are mutually reinforcing. Hope 
provides strong evidence for the growing trend in Africa in which decentralisation is 
being increasingly used ‘as an instrument of NPM reforms’ and commitment to this 
demonstrated in some countries, such as Ethiopia and South Africa, by including it in 
their constitutions (2002: 219). However, as for NPM, Sindane (2004) argues that it 
has not been included in the South African constitution directly. But surely elements 
of it, especially PMS, have been incorporated in some legislation such as the Public 
Service Act, 1994; the Public Service Regulations, 1999/2001; and the Municipal 
Systems Act (see Chapter VI of this thesis). 
 
In spite of the failings of the majority of African countries to reform their public 
management systems there are exceptions.  There are also indications are that the 
reform agenda in Africa, mostly with donor assistance and a few own initiatives, will 
continue to move on. Most of these reforms are targeted at the civil service with 
particular emphasis on human resource management. But there are inter and intra 
variances between and among the developed and developing nations on the 
implementation of NPM and other public sector reforms. At this juncture the 




2.4. Human Resource Management 
The origins of HRM, its main sources and advocacy, are American (Guest, 1987) but 
have been adopted in the Anglo-Saxon world and Western Europe. HRM was 
developed in the Western private sector to address challenges in that context (see 
Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994; McCourt and Ramgutty-Wong, 2002). The managerialist 
views of public sector reforms in the Anglo-American systems emerged in the early 
1980s in the same time frame with the development of the concept of HRM 
(Campbell, 1998; Johnston, 1998). The HRM concept was to prove radically different 
from the traditional personnel management in a number of ways. The following 
section highlights some of the differences between HRM and personnel management.  
 
2.4.1. The Distinction between Personnel Management and HRM 
The distinction between personnel management and HRM is in the underlying public 
management concepts from which they originate. Table 2.3 below summarises some 
of the differences between HRM and personnel management as understood by Guest 
(1987). The characteristics of personnel management, as indicated in Table 2.3 are 
associated with public administration. On the other hand HRM features are derived 
from HRM’s association with NPM. Personnel management is perceived to be 
characteristically bureaucratic with its tall structures and routine personnel functions 








Table 2.1: The Distinction between HRM and Personnel Management 
Source: Guest, 1987. 
 
The generally agreed principles of human resource management that set it apart from 
traditional personnel administration have been identified as; integration, employee 
commitment, flexibility and adaptability, and quality (Fowler, 1988; Guest 1987; 
Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994; Storey, 1995; Taylor, 2001). It could be argued, 
therefore, that HRM represents a paradigm shift from traditional personnel 
administration, which is perceived to be bureaucratic and not linked to organisational 
strategy (Storey, 1995). Daley (2002), for instance, opines that it is through the 
strategic approach and its linkage with HR that personnel administration has been 
transformed into SHRM. More similarities and differences between personnel 
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While the move from personnel management to HRM was a significant step in 
employee management in the 1980s and is generally agreed, the meaning of HRM 
remains somewhat confusing. There is a debate as to whether HRM and SHRM mean 
the same or different things. This debate is discussed in Sub-section 2.4.2 below.      
 
2.4.2. Distinguishing HRM and Strategic Human Resource Management 
This study sees HRM as a distinct term different from strategic human resource 
management. Price (2003; 1997), states that HRM is seen as an all-embracing term 
that refers to a number of distinctive approaches to people management. HRM is 
viewed as a generic term that refers to the broader employee management, while the 
SHRM model is a distinctive approach different from the mere modernisation of 
personnel management. The theory is premised on the assumption that personnel 
decisions are most effective when linked strategically to the organisation’s mission 
and strategy (McCourt and Ramgutty-Wong, 2002; Freyss, 1999; Wright and 
McMahan, 1992; and Fombrun, et al, 1984). SHRM has emerged in the private sector 
as a paradigm for two main reasons: growing ‘global competition and the 
corresponding search for sources of sustainable competitive advantage’ (Dyer and 
Reeves, 1995: 656). The popularity of SHRM results from the belief that HRs can 
contribute to, and create sustainable competitive advantage (Becker and Gerhart, 
1996; Wright and McMahan, 1992; Lado and Wilson, 1994). However, ‘achieving 
competitive advantage through human resources requires that … activities be 
managed from a strategic perspective’ (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1999: 29).  
 
But since these are private sector concepts it would be worthwhile considering how 




2.5. The Strategic Human Resource Management Concept in the Public 
Sector   
The development of the SHRM concept is linked with the emergence of NPM. Taylor 
(2001; 179) observes that HRM principles correspond in a significant manner with the 
new public management model with regard to their practices and values, and together 
they provide a coherent set of principles. Taylor outlines the key elements of both 
models as follows: 
• Importance of line manager; 
• Emphasis on performance and its measurement; 
• Employee commitment through individualization/incentivization; 
• Strategic integration; and  
• Flexibility. 
 
It is to the linkages of public sector managerialism and the origins of strategic 
management that the introduction of HRM in the public sector can be traced. It should 
be noted that the term HRM as applied by Taylor approximates to the term SHRM as 
used by many other authors cited. Under NPM human resource management is 
usually applied within the framework of management by objectives (MBO), which 
according to Mosley (2008) entails: 
• The definition of a limited number of organisational goals and corresponding 
performance indicators;  
• Delegation of performance targets to subordinate levels of the organisation; 
• Flexibility in the sense of low density of generally binding bureaucratic rules 
and procedures. Managers and operating units at regional and local levels are 
relatively free in their choice of strategies and programmes to achieve the 
agreed performance targets for their units; and 
• Monitoring and controlling of performance against targets. In contrast to 
traditional bureaucratic administration, the emphasis is on outputs/outcomes 





The introduction of NPM reforms has led to more commonalities emerging between 
governments. Mosley (2008) indicates that in OECD countries common national 
frameworks continue to play an important role in the decentralisation of labour market 
policy for instance. Although Mosley attributes these conditions to administrative 
decentralisation, evidence would show that even under political decentralisation, 
organisational goals and performance targets may be used as instruments of control 
(see chapters VII, VIII and IX). And the use of these controls as shown in Section 2.2 
inadvertently ushers in centralisation. In a similar but yet slightly different way 
Mintzberg (1983: 99) applies the term decentralisation to mean three things: vertical 
decentralisation; horizontal decentralisation; and geographical decentralisation or 
deconcentration. Mintzberg applied these concepts of decentralisation to the 
coordination of decision making within the divisionalized firm. As it has been shown 
earlier in this chapter, this decentralised form has been applied in the public sector, 
such as in the UK.  Vertical decentralisation refers to the dispersal of formal power 
down the chain of command, while horizontal decentralisation refers to the dispersal 
of power to non-managers (ibid).  
 
 It is within the scope of the principles outlined by Taylor (2001) and Mosley (2008) 
that HRM policies and practice have to be developed if human resources (HRs) are to 
integrate with public sector organizational strategy. However, the picture portrayed 
about SHRM in developing countries is not positive (McCourt, 2006; Taylor, 2001; 
McCourt and Ramgutty-Wong, 2002; McCourt and Minogue, 2001). Taylor (2001; 




• The weak market mechanisms and contractual relationships that do not auger 
well for employee commitment to the organization, particularly in settings 
where ethnic cleavages are stronger than national loyalty; 
• Underdeveloped labour markets due to shortages of skilled labour. Such a 
situation undermines the flexibility and adaptability that is required; 
• Economic difficulties that render long term planning unrealistic. Low salaries 
that may dampen employee loyalty to the organization; 
• Foreign intervention in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes and 
donor interventions that do not take local conditions into consideration may 
create a lack of ownership to reforms. 
 
However, the case study countries are considered be somewhat different from the 
above description given by Taylor (2001). Taylor’s (2001) and Mosley’s (2008) 
elements that define SHRM have been summed up below to develop criteria to 
determine whether there is a move, or not, to adopt SHRM in the case study countries. 
These are: 
• Strategic integration – guided by, or premised on, organisational vision, 
mission and values; 
• Performance and its measurement (based on performance goals and indicators 
and/or systems and structures for monitoring); 
• Flexibility – for example; decentralisation of decision-making in relation to 
the choice of strategies and programmes; 
• Individualisation/incentivisation – as in performance contracts and 
bonuses/rewards for managers. 
• Importance of line manager 
 
From this definition it can be seen that there is a degree of overlap between SHRM 
and NPM. Whilst not identified as a core element of NPM as such, SHRM in the 
public sector could be regarded either as a vehicle for NPM implementation, or at 
least a by-product of NPM reforms. 
  
Although failures of the SHRM model in Africa are noted, including in some of the 
leading reformers such as Mauritius and Namibia (see McCourt, 2006), data in 
Chapters IV, V, VI and VII indicate that Botswana and South Africa’s civil services 
have shown tendencies towards the adoption of SHRM. SHRM can only be  
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meaningfully understood in the context of the environment in which it is applied. The 
inapplicability of the Euro-centric and Anglo-Saxon HRM approaches universally is 
well noted by several scholars (Kamoche, 2001; McCourt and Ramgutty-Wong, 2002; 
Budhwar and Debrah, 2001; Jackson and Schuler, 1999). Contextualising HRM helps 
explain the ‘applicability of HRM approaches in different regions’ of the world 
(Budhwar and Debrah, 2001: 498).  
 
Countries have responded in various ways to this challenge. Ralston, et al. (1997) 
argue that the national economy rather than politics plays an important role in the 
management culture of a people, therefore making culture a critical factor in 
influencing the concept of HRM in any given country. This is going to be found to be 
important in both of the case studies in this thesis. Organisational culture, which 
according to the resource-based view is an internal resource, gains a pivotal position 
in HRM through its interrelationship with societal culture and the economy (which are 
themselves external factors to local government). This leads to the question: ‘why 
does the management of human resources in local government vary among countries 
of the same region?’ 
 
Although no longer coercively imposed, western culture masquerading under the 
cloak of globalisation is transmitted through the ‘media in the form of pop cultural 
exports’ (Berenson and Cogburn, 2000: 3). However, developing countries have not 
totally abandoned their cultures but rather they have been able to glean out that which 
is not appropriate for them from Western culture and adapt in an assimilatory manner 
that which corresponds to their cultural identity (ibid). Previously, colonialism helped 
transmit Western culture to developing nations by way of bequeathing to them their 
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administrative systems and political institutions. In modern days Western culture is 
transmitted through management ideas by consultants and the demands imposed by 
donors (see Subsection 2.3.1 above). This is evident in the case studies in chapters IV 
and V which show that both countries are former colonies of Britain and that they 
have adopted new management ideas from consultants and technical advice from the 
World Bank at various times in their history. 
 
To understand what is or is not being applied in Botswana and South Africa it is 
necessary to review some prevailing ideas about how human resource management 
practices and strategies can be expected to be appropriate or relevant in different 
contexts. There are various definitions and theoretical models of SHRM (Budhwar 
and Debrah, 2001; Mabey, et al., 1998; Boxall, 1999). However, there are two broad 
models: the universalistic perspective known as the best practices approach and the 
contingency perspective known as best-fit. According to Armstrong and Baron (2002) 
there is a second category of models that prescribe particular approaches to the 
practice of SHRM, and these are, resource capability, high performance management, 
high commitment management and high involvement management.  
 
Having discussed HRM and its application across cultures, the next discussion 
focuses on the SHRM models. The two basic models are presented below.  
 
2.5.1. The Universalistic/Matching Model and Contingency/Best Fit 
Model 
 
The universalistic perspective is based on the assumption that adopting particular HR 
practices and approaches will result in improved organisational performance and 
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competitive advantage (Armstrong and Baron 2002; Golding, 2004). This leads to the 
idea that there is therefore one best way of carrying out HR activities that is 
universally applicable (Torrington, et al., 2002: 26). The universalistic perspective is 
associated with several other approaches such as the high-performance model 
(Armstrong and Baron, 2002), high-commitment models, and high-involvement 
practices (Golding, 2004). Delery and Doty (1996) and Guest (1997) point out that, of 
all the universalistic approaches the most widely tested and popular model is the best-
practices, which posits that there are HR practices that are strategic and those that are 
not strategic to organisational performance. However, there are various best-practices 
of HRM proposed by different writers, but Pfeffer’s (1994) model of competitive 
advantage gained in putting people first is the most widely known and cited approach 
in this area (Golding, 2004).  
 
The best practice approach has been criticised by a number of scholars for various 
deficiencies, one of them being the vast differences in what constitutes best practices 
and in their relationship to organisational performance (Golding, 2004: 57-58). 
Another criticism is that according to contingency theory the concept of universal 
best-practice is unthinkable, and also that HR practices are idiosyncratic in which case 
what works for one organisation does not necessarily work for another (Armstrong 
and Baron, 2002: 70). The model is also criticised for being prescriptive with its idea 
of a one way, or universal way, of carrying out HRM activities (Purcell, 1999). The 
contingency model has been seen as a viable alternative to the universalistic 





The strength of the contingency models lies in their attempt to ‘link HR policies to the 
particular circumstances of the organisation’ (Bach, 2001). The contingency model is 
seen as emphasising the linkages between HR strategy and the external environment.  
The critical point in best fit is that a bundle of HR practices works well for a particular 
organisation in the context of its culture, structure, history and traditions, technology 
and processes (Miles and Snow, 1984; Armstrong and Baron, 2002; Dolan, et al, 
2005). This is particularly so for public institutions as they are predisposed to 
influence from politics, social culture, economy, labour unions and public law. 
Perhaps this is so because of their nature of ‘publicness’. Dolan, et al, (2005) observe 
that there is a general perception that the absence of a fit between HR strategy and the 
external environment in which the organisation operates would lead to suboptimal 
performance. External fit seeks to establish the extent to which there is vertical 
integration between HR strategy and organisational strategy (Torrington, et al, 2002; 
Guest, 1997), while internal fit aims at ensuring a fit between individual HR practices 
and policies (Delery and Doty, 1996; Torrington, et al, 2002; Armstrong and Baron, 
2002). The key approach in vertical integration is to link organisational goals with 
individual objective setting, to the measurement and rewarding of that organisational 
goal (Golding, 2004: 42).  
 
However, the contingency model has been criticised for some inadequacies.  Purcell 
(1999) notes that the main problem with the contingency model arises from the 
difficulty of showing how the factors are interconnected and how changes in one 
affect the others. The interconnections between the contingent factors, that make for 
the unique experience of each organisation, are numerous, subtle and often hidden 
(ibid). This leads to what Purcell (1999) refers to as ‘idiosyncrantic contingency’ 
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which indicates that there is no one best path of HR system but that each organisation 
develops its own best approach. This is in congruence with evidence in chapters V 
and IV as, for instance, environmental factors in the two case studies interacted in 
unique ways and affected HRM in different ways. However, in spite of the 
weaknesses there are certain aspects of the contingency model that apply to public 
sector institutions. As indicated in Section 2.2, local government objectives (like any 
other public sector organisation) are multiple and these external factors significantly 
affect how HRs are managed. The main weakness of the contingency model is its 
overemphasis of the external factors while paying minimal attention to the internal 
factors. Internal factors are crucial in understanding how HRM is applied in the public 
sector. For instance, chapters V and IV indicate that even though the government may 
attempt to create a supportive environment for the adoption of public sector reforms, 
the degree of success is dependent on, among other factors, the capacity of public 
organisations to implement such reforms and also their organisational culture.  
 
However, the contingency model overlooks these internal characteristics of 
organisations. The resource-based view concept has been increasingly proffered as an 
alternative to both the universalistic and contingency models because of its focus on 
the significance of the internal resources as critical to the success of organisations. 
However, the resource-based view too will be shown to be inadequate on its own to 
explain why certain things happen the way they do in public sector institutions. The 




2.5.2. The Resource-Based View (RBV) 
The Resource-Based View developed as a result of dissatisfaction with the 
contingency approach of the industrial organisation strategists’ view that relied on the 
external factors of the organisation as sources of competitive advantage, the SWOT 
framework based on the analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
(Barney, 1999, 1991; Carmeli and Cohen, 2005; Kamoche, 2001; Wright and 
McMahan, 1999).  Strategic management was initially influenced by industrial 
organisation perspective that influenced the matching model of SHRM (Kamoche, 
2001). The difference with the RBV is on its focus on the internal resources of the 
organisation as the source of competitive advantage (or, in the case of the public 
sector, a source of greater efficiency and effectiveness) and the linkage of these with 
organisational strategy (Wright and McMahan, 1999).  
 
The resource-based view assumes strategy as pivotal for management to be able to 
identify, develop and deploy resources to maximise returns. Resources mean assets 
(tangible and intangible) that are tied to the organisation (Wernerfelt, 1984). Not all 
resources are believed to create a sustained competitive advantage (or sustained 
efficiency and effectiveness) for organisations. It is only those resources that are 
heterogeneous and immobile that would create the potential for sustained competitive 
advantage. Barney (1991; 1999) suggested that the organisational resources that can 
be the sources of sustained competitive advantage are those that are: 
• Valuable – important resources that enable an organisation to develop 
strategies that enhance its efficiency and effectiveness; 
• Rare – unique resources that cannot be easily attained by competitors;  
• Imperfectly imitable – resources that are the sources of competitive advantage 
are those that cannot be obtained by other organisations (i.e. inimitable). The 
unique historical conditions, importance of small events and socially complex 
resources (explained below) make imitability difficult; and 
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• Non-substitutable – there must be no alternative resources that are either not 
rare or imitable.  
 
Unique Historical Conditions 
History is important in creating sources of sustained competitive advantage for 
organisations through the organisation’s evolutionary development of skills, abilities 
and unique resources (Barney, 1999). ‘These resources and capabilities reflect the 
unique personalities, experiences, and relationships’ that exist in only one 
organisation (ibid; 132). Governments as well have unique characteristics acquired 
through their political and cultural histories that others cannot copy. HRM is applied 
within these unique conditions that influence it variously as chapters IV – VII show. 
The Importance of Small Events also highlighted by Barney (1999) who stated that 
big events do matter in creating a firm’s [and by implication public agency’s] 
competitive advantage, but adds that more often a outfit’s competitive advantage 
comes from the cumulative effect of small decisions through which resources and 
capabilities are developed and exploited.  Path dependency theory (see Subsection 
2.5.3 below) points in the same direction. However, the RBV cannot explain factors 
of a political nature and this is where path dependence plays a significant and 
complementary role. 
 
By looking at unique organisational circumstances the importance of socially complex 
resources can also be noted. An organisation would usually have a combination of 
various forms of resources such as the tangible and the intangible assets. Some of the 
tangible or physical resources such as machinery can easily be imitated or substituted. 
However, intangible resources such as reputation, trust, friendship, teamwork and 
culture are not patentable but yet difficult to imitate (Barney 1999; 1991). Tangible 
  
50 
resources can be easily copied but it will be almost impossible to imitate the socially 
complex processes through which these physical resources are converted into 
resources of sustainable and competitive advantage. Culture is subject to the 
conditions (value, rarity, inimitability and non-substitutability) that characterise other 
resources that are sources of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). The 
significance of particular resources, their availability and specificity to the success or 
otherwise of organisations is seen by several public management writers as central to 
an understanding of developments in any one country.  This is clearly the case in the 
country studies of Botswana and South Africa that are presented here. However, the 
processes involved in these are best explained through the use of path dependency 
concept, and it is discussed below.   
 
2.5.3. Path Dependency Theory  
The concept of path dependence will be used in this study to help explain aspects of 
the particular trajectory of local governance development in the two Southern African 
countries under examination. The notion was originally conceived in the field of 
economics and has, as well, been adopted in public policy and political studies. The 
father of path dependency theory, Paul A. David, based his original idea on the 
technological development of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard; a technology that 
had particular relevance in an age of copy-typing but survives in an age when finger 
speed is no longer the main criterion in word-processing. David observed that 
economic changes follow ‘[a] path dependent sequence …’ that ‘… takes on an 




The concept of path dependence emphasises that ‘initial moves in one direction elicit 
further moves in that same direction’ (Kay, 2003: 406).  The concept explains that ‘[a] 
path-dependent economic process is one in which specific contingent events – and not 
just fundamental determinative factors like technology, preferences, factor 
endowments, and institutions - have a persistent effect on the subsequent course of 
allocation’ (Puffert 2002: 282).  
 
The import of path dependency theory into political studies came along with the 
adaptation of its underpinning concept in economic history, increasing returns. 
(Thelen, 1999). Pierson (2000a: 263) identifies four key characteristics of political life 
that are a function of increasing returns or path dependent processes; 
1. Multiple equilibria. Under a set of initial conditions conducive to increasing 
returns, a number of outcomes – perhaps a wide range – are generally possible. 
2. Contingency. Relatively small events, if they occur at the right moment, can 
have large and enduring consequences. 
3. A critical role for timing and sequence. In increasing returns processes, when 
an event occurs may be crucial. Because earlier parts of a sequence matter 
much more than later parts, an event that happens “too late” may have no 
effect, although it might have been of great consequence if the timing had been 
different. 
4. Inertia. Once an increasing returns process is established, positive feedback 
may lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium will in turn be resistant to 
change. 
 
In politics increasing returns processes are characterised by self-reinforcing 
mechanisms or positive feedback processes (see Pierson, 2000a, 2000b; Kay, 2003). 
That is, initial choices made would influence later decisions or choices to be made 
along the same path. In Pierson’s words ‘over time “the road not chosen” becomes 
increasingly distant, increasingly unreachable alternative’. In economics this invokes 





Political scientists emphasise the idea that path dependence is not equivalent to 
historical determinism (Pierson, 2000b; Rose and Davies, 1994; Wilsford, 1994). In 
politics once path dependent processes have reached the lock-in stage change 
becomes difficult, but not impossible. As Rose and Davies (1994: 15) observed, ‘[t]he 
inheritance of the past is not a dead hand; it is the starting point for action by the 
current administration’. Change still happens but incrementally (Wilsford, 1994). 
Incrementalism in public policy making is similar to inheritance through political 
inertia (Rose and Davies, 1994). Political inertia is a consequence of the persistence of 
incremental additions that are made to public policy (ibid). Change will continue to 
happen but options will be constrained or proscribed by history and therefore leading 
to the stability of political processes. These ‘patterns of politics persist and indeed 
reproduce themselves over time’ (Thelen, 1999: 396). Mahoney (2003: 53) sums this 
into three stages: ‘an initial set of causal forces’ or critical junctures; the set in of 
‘increasing returns’ and continuation in the same direction; and lastly ‘stabilize 
around enduring equilibrium points’.  
 
Once a path has been set, self-reinforcing processes tend ‘to consolidation or 
institutionalization. Critical junctures generate persistent paths of political 
development’ (Pierson, 2000b). ‘Critical junctures’ is a concept developed by Collier 
and Collier (1991) to explain the trajectory of economic development in Latin 
America. The concept posits that specific events in a sequence will place particular 
political aspects on a distinct path out of several choices, which will then be 
reinforced over time. Pierson (2000b: 75) states in the footnote that ‘what makes a 
particular juncture “critical” is that it triggers a process of positive feedback’. This is 
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irrespective of whether the juncture is a big or small event. Several scholars have 
applied path dependency theory to the analysis of public policy and/or reform (see 
Gains, et al, 2005; Kay 2005; McCourt, 2005; and Wilsford, 1994). However, 
McCourt (2005) applied ‘Braudelian history’ which unlike path dependency is less 
deterministic and rejects single cause explanations. Nevertheless, path dependency 
when applied within an historical institutionalist perspective is also known to obviate 
some of the concerns raised against path dependency as the rest of this section 
demonstrates.  
 
There are three so-called ‘new institutionalisms’ – rationale choice institutionalism, 
sociological/normative institutionalism and historical institutionalism. The different 
characteristics and comparisons of institutional analysis are explored in detail by 
Thelen (1999) and Hall & Taylor (1996). The large body of literature on path 
dependence shows that it is anchored on historical institutionalism. Kay (2003) argues 
that the application of path dependency within political science has been exclusively 
within an institutionalist framework. Institutionalism is based on the idea that 
institutions are the structures and mechanisms through which the behaviour of society 
and individuals is influenced. This could be achieved through formal and/or informal 
rules, norms and other ways. That is through organisations, and culture and customs 
respectively. 
 
Historical institutionalism, a term associated with Sven Steinmo, originated out of a 
group of political science theories of politics and structural functionalism prevalent 
between the 1960s and 1970s (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Historical institutionalists view 
institutions as some of, but not the only, important variables influencing political 
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outcomes (Boychuk, 2006). However, institutions are seen as the arena within which 
battles are fought (ibid), and that they structure these battles or behaviour as well as 
being interested in the understanding of the context within which things happen 
(Steinmo, 2007; Boychuk, 2006; Thelen, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Historical 
institutionalism adopts an inductive approach in its application, meaning they go out 
to test a theory against the outcomes they have observed (Boychuk, 2006: 3). Its 
fundamental approach to path dependency is its emphasis on critical junctures and 
developmental paths, self-reproduction, policy feedbacks and evolutionary change 
(Thelen, 1999). Notably it is the characterisation of historical institutionalism by 
works on critical junctures, policy feedbacks, institutional evolution and path 
dependency that set it apart and instead of proposing stability suggests institutional 
change (ibid).  This approach has been found to be particularly useful in analysing the 
case material presented in later chapters.  
 
The rational choice approach to institutionalism on the other hand, is characterised by 
four key features: first is that actors behave in an instrumentalist and rational way to 
maximise on their fixed preferences or tastes, doing so in a calculated way; second 
politics is perceived as a collective action of dilemmas in which actors may make a 
sub-optimal choice; third, the importance given to the assumption that an actor’s 
behaviour is influenced by a strategic calculus which in turn is affected by the actor’s 
expectation of the others likely behaviour; and finally, the rational choice 
institutionalists’ explanation of how institutions originate is distinctive in its use of 
deduction to reach conclusions (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 944-45). The rational choice 
institutionalists focus on locating the ‘Laws of political behavior and action’ 
(Boychuk, 2007: 2). After that they seek to develop models that can be used to explain 
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and ‘predict political behaviour’ (op cit). In essence the rational choice 
instituionalists’ analytical approach to social science is deductive (Boychuk, 2006; 
Hall and Taylor, 1996).  While this approach may be useful in seeking to explain 
particular decisions in particular situations it would be less useful in this study in 
seeking explanations of broad trends. Lastly we discuss sociological institutionalism. 
 
Sociological institutionalism is premised on the idea that culture underpins 
organisational form and performance. Derived from organisational theory, 
sociological institutionalism was aimed at consolidating what was hitherto seen as a 
dichotomy between the ‘formal means-ends rationality’ and aspects of the ‘social 
world said to display a diverse set of practices associated with culture’ (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 946). Sociological institutionalism differs from other institutionalisms 
in the following three ways: institutions are perceived as more than just formal rules, 
norms or procedures but a means to transmit cultural practices; institutions affect the 
behaviour of actors through socialization into particular roles, in turn internalising the 
norms associated with those roles; and lastly, the adoption of institutional forms or 
practices is perceived not to be based on rational choices like ‘means-ends of the 
organisation’ but because they are widely accepted in the ‘broader cultural 
environment’ (ibid). This approach has a bearing on the present study.  
 
Although the institutionalisms are founded on distinct approaches, there are 
commonalities between them. The distinctions are reduced by the wide spread 
borrowing from across the fence by scholars from each of the schools to address 
particular empirical questions (Thelen, 1998). From the above discussion it can be 
seen that no one set of concepts will suffice to provide an analytical framework. 
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However, because of the advantages that historical institutionalism possesses, that is 
borrowing from the other two institutionalisms, this study adopted an approach that 
situates institutional actors within an historical framework - path dependent - of the 
present study. 
 
Path dependency has critics, and some (for instance Gains, et al, (2005)), criticise the 
idea of increasing returns for policy in path dependency as found in Pierson’s 
writings. The criticism is aimed at the suggestion that increasing returns keeps actors 
‘locked in’ to an initial path and that path dependency overlooks change. Instead they 
argue that policy and institutions change in a way that path dependency fails to 
capture well. Gains, et al, seek to illustrate that increasing returns can foster change in 
a way previously not perceived by path dependency scholars. They further suggest 
that increasing returns does not necessarily lead to a ‘lock in’ and eventual 
equilibrium but that change continues in some places leading to a ‘rapid adoption of 
new institutional practices and forms once a tipping point has been reached’ (2005: 
26). However, not all historical institutionalists subscribe to the idea that once a policy 
decision has been made and ‘locked in’ it will reach equilibrium. Thelen (1996: 386) 
for instance, argues that institutions continue to evolve in line with their 
environmental conditions and political circumstances but in ways that are constrained 
by previous choices. Therefore, Gains, et al, criticism falls away. 
 
Greener (2005) also adds his voice to that of the critics. He lays the blame for the 
weaknesses in path dependence on its reliance on historical institutionalism. Greener 
(2005) raises four issues in his criticism: First, he finds fault with path dependence’s 
heavy reliance on critical junctures as the source of change in political processes and 
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its assumption that the sources of change are exogenous; Second, he questions the use 
of ideas in path dependence, arguing that ideas are being used merely to sustain 
institutionalist research agenda; Third, he queries whether the feedback mechanism 
that locks in political processes and thereby prevent change are subject to increasing 
returns and positive feedback. He wonders whether negative feedback should be 
included as part of the concept; Last, citing Pierson, Greener alludes to the wide 
variety of writings around path dependence as threatening to render the concept 
obsolete. Greener proceeds to suggest, instead of institutionalism, a morphogenetic 
social theory that he argues has more analytical power. On the contrary Muukkonen 
(2005) contends that Greener’s alternative theory adds little value to the path 
dependency theory. In spite of its limitations, which all theoretical concepts have, path 
dependence has been proven to be a ‘valid and useful concept for policy studies’ 
(Kay, 2005: 553). 
 
However, to be applicable in this study the issue of equilibrium or resistance to 
change has not been adopted in this study but rather the study adopted the idea of 
incremental change. The study adopted the path dependence concept that emphasises 
multiple equilibria, contingency, timing, and evolutionary change based on policy 
feedback. 
 
Having reviewed a number of concepts in public management and approaches to 
understanding their relevance in different contexts it is now possible to develop a 





2.6. The Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework bundles together the HRM concepts of contingency and 
RBV models and path dependence concept from which an analytical framework could 
later be developed. This study adapted Kamoche’s (2001) and Jackson & Schuler’s 
(1999) frameworks that took into account the external context of the organisation as 
well as the SWOT approach. The RBV adds another dimension by emphasising the 
importance of the internal resources, which the SWOT analysis does not do 
adequately. Combined together these address both the external and internal 
environments, giving them equal significance.  The diagrams in Appendix 1 and 2 
attempt to summarise both Kamoche’s (2001) and Jackson and Schuler’s approaches. 
 
Kamoche (2001) applied the processual approach to HRM in Kenya, where he found 
out that the HRM approaches were largely found in the multinational companies, not 
the public sector. This is not surprising considering that it is easier to effect change in 
the private sector than it is in the public sector simply because of the nature of the 
public sector. Also, these multinationals have a history of particular managerial 
practices in the countries from which they originate that they transfer to the host 
country. Besides that the external environments of public agencies are often complex, 
dynamic and are always political (Nigro and Nigro, 1986: 31). Public organisations 
are by nature political institutions and are a creation of government (Farnham and 
Horton, 1996). The public sector environment differs from that of the private sector in 
three aspects, the legal, political and economic spheres (Daley, 2002). Their activities 
and objectives are strictly governed by legislation that established them, and they are 
funded from public funds. As such there is a strong element of public accountability, 
which subjects their actions to more public scrutiny. Public organisations basically 
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constitute the administrative arm of government and must be managed in such a way 
as to benefit the citizens. Because of this arrangement public sector institutions’ 
objectives are always complex, vague and in conflict (Farnham and Horton, 1996: 8).   
Also, public organisations are characteristically large, bureaucratic and more complex 
because of the need to ameliorate the multifarious demands emanating from their 
customers. 
 
The ‘processual’ model emphasised a phased approach to the understanding of the 
HRM integration in organisational strategy is interesting and relevant to the present 
study framework to help understand how environmental factors influence HRM 
policy, practices and outcomes.  The process based model that Kamoche applied took 
into account the contextual and national factors that influence HRM in Kenya. 
Kamoche’s (2001; 1997) processual model and Jackson and Schuler’s (1999) 
integrative framework/model have a lot in common, in that they both give importance 
to the role of the environmental context on HRM.  
 
Although they do not suggest literally the same elements in their models, there is 
some convergence on their broader perspectives. While Kamoche unbundles some of 
the elements of his model under ‘strategy implementation’ outside of the ‘internal 
context’, Jackson and Schuler have included the same as subsets under the ‘internal 
context’. While Kamoche (2001) appears to give both the internal and external 
context more or less equal significance on the influence they have on HRM 
approaches, Jackson and Schuler (1999) see the external environmental context as 




According to Jackson and Schuler’s model the external environment influences the 
internal context consisting of technology, size, structure, life cycle stage and strategy. 
These in turn bear on the type of decisions to be made whether formal or informal that 
influence HRM activities that eventually lead to outcomes depending on how HRM 
has been integrated in organisational strategy.   While Kamoche limits the application 
of his model to Africa, and indeed incorporates some factors commonly found in 
African organisations such as political manipulation, corporate welfarism, and 
community spirit, Jackson and Schuler’s model is presented as generic, but the two 
are not contradictory but may in fact be complementary. In the public sector political 
manipulation comes in the form of patronage and this factor is widespread in Africa.  
 
Although it is undeniably important as Kamoche (2001; 1997) observed that external 
factors impact upon HRM policies and practices, and understanding them is critical 
for comprehending the circumstances that influence HRM, it is equally important to 
understand how internal resources also play a role in HRM. This study adapted both 
Kamoche’s and Jackson and Schuler’s approaches. These models do not explain the 
mutual interaction between factors of the internal and external environments. This 
study attempted to address this in the analytical framework presented in Section 2.7 
below. In addition to that the models do not address the internal resources adequately 
nor take into consideration factors of a historical nature.  The discussion below 
presents how the RBV and path dependence were introduced as a way of enhancing 
these models for adaptation.   
 
The resource-based view model has been applied to the public sector by other 
scholars. A few examples are; Carmeli and Cohen (2001), Daley and Vasu (2005), 
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Matthews and Shulman, (2005). Carmeli and Cohen (2001) applied the RBV in their 
study of the financial crisis of the local authorities in Israel. More specifically, Daley 
and Vasu (2005) used the SHRM framework to understand the impact of personnel 
practices on the achievement of organisational goals in county social services 
departments in North Carolina. Daley and Vasu (2005) alluded to the idea that the 
resource-based view of the organisation emphasises the value of human capital on 
improving organisational effectiveness. Daley and Vasu (2005) found, when 
considering these private sector ideas in a public sector context concluded that 
perhaps the public sector is not adept at private sector practices, and that the 
challenges may be reflecting the private-public differences. These limitations in the 
applicability of private sector practices in the public sector influence the choice for a 
multi-theory approach that attempts to address the overlapping aspects of the public 
sector that may not be adequately addressed by applying pure private sector concepts. 
 
It has to be acknowledged that the application of the SHRM concepts in the public 
sector is fraught with difficulties and limitations. In particular there are limitations in 
explaining phenomenon of a non-economic nature such as political choices (e.g. 
affirmative action) (Rose and Davies, 1994).  But of equal significance are factors that 
may affect an organisation’s performance that are a product of some unique historical 
circumstances that could be best explained through path dependent models (Barney, 
1991). One particular aspect that path dependence will be able to help explain is 
decentralisation. The HRM models cannot explain the dynamics of decentralisation, 
but these may be understood better within the context of institutionalism. Public 
policies are themselves historical and hereditary, that is even though governments 
generate new policies some will be inherited from previous governments (Rose and 
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Davies, 1994). In developing countries inheritance more often than not goes beyond 
the post independence era to stretch as far back as during the colonial and sometimes 
pre-colonial periods. The relevance of path dependence comes from the idea that 
contemporary management ideas are applied in contexts where there is history and 
entrenched institutional factors. The next section considers the analytical framework 
that has been drawn from the concepts discussed above.   
 
2.7. The Analytical Framework   
This study adopted an analytical framework anchored on a multi-theory approach that 
integrates the contingency and resource-based view models for synergy between the 
two and augments them with the path dependency theory to plug the gaps they leave 
behind on matters beyond HR processes and values. This is borne out of the fact that 
the public sector by nature has multiple objectives that more often than not can not be 
explained through the application of a single theory. The main argument, for example, 
is that strategic planning and management on which SHRM is based, attempts to 
bypass or do away with decision making that is anchored on how things have always 
been done and focus on objective strategies that can lead to the achievement of 
organisational goals and objectives. Yet on the other hand in the public sector this has 
to be reconciled with the contradictory approaches of public policy-making that are 
often influenced by past experiences and institutions. 
 
Figure 2.1 below summarises the analytical framework. The framework consists of 
two phases, the strategy formulation (in which path dependency is integrated) and the 
strategy implementation. The first phase involves exploring the external and internal 
environmental contexts of the organisation, paying particular attention to the 
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dynamics of the environmental factors within an institutional framework. This part of 
the analytical framework helps explain the context within which decentralisation and 
HRM processes take place and as such addresses the principal research question that 
seeks to understand whether there is a trade-off between SHRM and decentralisation 
in developing countries. For example, questions 3 and 14 in the survey instrument that 
seek to understand if ‘Mechanisms to ensure the autonomy of local 
government/administration are efficient and effective’ and ‘To what level have the 
human resource management responsibilities been decentralised to your 
organisation?’ respectively, are some of the questions that seek help to answer the 
main research question.  This part of the framework seeks to identify the factors that 
characterise HRM and decentralisation in these countries and understand the 
dynamics within the context of these countries. This section of the framework also 
partially answers the secondary research questions. It looks more at ‘the what and 
why’ questions. The second phase of the framework involves the assessment of how 
the HRM practices were carried out in the two case studies and while addressing the 
main research question it is also directed at addressing the two secondary questions 
that look at the way things happen in these countries. For instance, the question that 
asks ‘Does the socio-political environment provide supportive environment for the 
efficient functioning of your organisation?’ is one of those aimed at addressing the 
research question that seeks to identify factors influencing HRM in local government. 
On the other hand the question that seeks to understand ‘How often is performance 
appraisal performed annually’ belongs to a group of questions that want to explain 
what countries do and how they do it, that perhaps may identify the differences in 
practices and outcomes.  The part of the survey research questions that fall under the 
sections titled HRM Policy, HRM Practices and Performance Management are those 
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that attempt to address the two minor research questions. However, there are some 
overlaps as these also address the main research question in one way or another.  The 
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2.7.1 Strategy Formulation Phase  
Strategy formulation involves what in strategic management is commonly known as 
environmental scanning. This begins with the internal and then external 
environmental scanning, assessing the conditions under which the organisation exists 
and operates. The factors considered in the model are those that have been identified 
by Kamoche (2001) and Jackson and Schuler, (1999) and elsewhere in this chapter as 
factors that are important to local government and HRM.  
 
Other factors are due to Africa’s peculiar experience, for instance, entrenched labour 
union recognition is due to the involvement of labour unions in the liberation struggle 
in some countries (though not Botswana) and also to the industrial relations role they 
played after independence (Kamoche, 1993). However, in post independence Africa, 
labour unions have existed in a hostile environment in which their role has been 
curtailed by laws aimed at preventing strikes to minimise industrial disruptions which 
politicians fear could derail the much needed economic growth (ibid). Another factor 
considered in the external environment is decentralisation. 
 
Local government exists within a peculiar environment characterised by central-local 
relations and operate within the confines of the laws establishing them. They also 
exist within particular political, economic and social contexts that impact either 
positively or negatively on their human resource management philosophy and 
policies. These environments determine to a greater extent the local authorities’ 
access to resources, both material and human. The resources at the disposal of the 
local authorities determine significantly as to whether or not they are able to compete 
effectively in the labour markets: that is get well-qualified human resources who will 
 67 
perform in an efficient and effective manner. Local government typically faces a 
number of dilemmas. These dilemmas arise from the following factors: legitimacy 
that arises from elections between the centre and local government, different views of 
policy and different policy choices, constrained choice due to legal framework made 
by Parliament and usually initiated by central government, and controls imposed by 
the centre through policy instruments and some forms of direct controls (Stewart, 
1985: 23-26). These challenges have an impact on the management of local 
authorities. Of interest to this study is the effect of these on HRM. 
 
 SHRM tends to be associated with managerial decentralisation and line management. 
Under the bureaucratic system personnel management tends towards centralisation 
and control through both organisational and group rules (Beattie and Waterhouse, 
2007). Bach (2000: 17) notes some decentralisation implications for HRM, that: due 
to existing centre-local power relations there can be staffing problems; there are issues 
of personnel capacity and capability; increased concerns for transaction costs may 
trigger increased coordination and recentralisation, and; increased workload among 
line managers may lead to reluctance to take further responsibilities. In this context, to 
what extent are local authorities free to perform HRM functions without excessive 
interference from the top? As it is shown in Chapter IV, for instance, in Botswana the 
government has been reluctant to decentralise claiming they do not want to mix 
politics with administration in order to avoid politicisation of the administration by 
local level politicians. 
 
Path dependency, within a historical institutionalist perspective, coupled with the 
resource-based view approach was applied to explain the context within which HRM 
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and decentralisation processes are situated, and the factors they are influenced by. 
Path dependency theory enables one to identify the key factors and/or key stages in 
the processes, such as: critical junctures or initial forces; contingency; timing and 
sequencing; and incrementalism within the historical or political contexts under 
examination. All elements in the two environmental contexts are intricately 
interwoven in each country’s experience and have shaped or influenced their HRM 
systems and nature of decentralisation respectively. How these concepts are melded 
together into an analytical framework is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and represented as 
the Environmental and Institutional Factors on the extreme left hand side box in 
which two other smaller boxes (external and internal contexts) are enclosed.  
 
 
The socio-cultural environment is another major factor that influences HRM. The 
socio-cultural environment may be defined as a society’s ‘… collective norms and 
values, and individual beliefs, attitudes, and action preferences’ (Kanungo and Jaeger, 
1990: 5). Jackson (2002: 2) notes that ‘… contained within any managerial decision 
making are attitudinal values that can determine the outcome of decisions.’ National 
culture and institutions have been found to form the basis for HR in any country 
(Budhwar and Debrah, 2003; and Kanungo and Jaeger, 1990). Culture, customs, 
habits, norms, values, etc., are important institutional factors that influence 
organisational culture in a significant way.   
 
In the internal environmental scan the organisation takes stock of itself, internal 
weaknesses and strengths. All this is assessed against the background of the mission 
and objectives the organisation has set for itself (Daley 2002) in relation to its 
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resources. This analysis of organisational strengths and weaknesses also involves the 
assessment of the state of the human resources, their skills and capabilities. Over time 
organisations develop particular practices and ways of going about their business. 
Once these practices have been sustained over time they are known as organisational 
values. Organisational values are grounded on ethics the organisation perceives as 
important in its drive to achieving its mission and objectives.  Government laws and 
regulations, customer standards and values, and professional associations are key 
factors in influencing organisational ethics4. Organisational values come to define 
employee behaviour in the conduct of business and also define the type of conduct 
customers should expect when doing business with the organisation (ibid).  
 
Associated with organisational values is organisational culture. ‘Organisational 
culture is a system of values and beliefs that forms the foundation of an organisation’s 
management practices and behaviours’ (Denison, 1990, cited in Cseh, et al., 2004: 
13). Organisational culture is built on ‘assumptions about human behaviour and the 
causal relationships of how things work with a set of philosophical, societal, and 
ideological values as to what should be done’ (Daley, 2002: 23). Daley highlights the 
importance of organisational culture that it defines what the organisation wants to be, 
its vision and mission and what it wants to achieve. Of all the internal environmental 
factors, organisational culture is the most important because it determines what ‘type 
of people are employed, their career aspirations, their educational backgrounds, their 
status in society’ and ‘[t]he culture of the organisation may embrace them’ or ‘[i]t 
may reject them’ (Jarvis, 2003: 2). In the public sector organisational culture is 
largely influenced by ‘regime values’ and ‘a distinctive public administration ethos’ 
                                               
4
 http://toolbox.tafe.vu.edu.au/telecommunications/ip/ip_c16.html accessed 3rd April, 2005. 
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that emphasises an optimum balance for ‘efficiency, equity and responsiveness … 
[n]otions of public interest … and real considerations for public employees’ (Daley, 
2002: 23). Because organisational culture varies from one organisation to the other it 
becomes an important internal resource considered in this study.  
 
The mutual interaction between the external and internal environmental factors has a 
direct bearing on the concept of HRM (i.e. HRM philosophy and policies). The 
appropriate philosophy and policies of SHRM should be applied in a way that enables 
an organisation to achieve its objectives through the proper application of the HRM 
practices. The implementation of HRM practices and performance management fall 
under the strategy implementation phase and are discussed in Subsection 2.7.2 below. 
 
2.7.2. Strategy Implementation Phase 
Public sector organisations in most plural societies are governed by a democratic 
ethos. There is a public service ethos that includes key principles of: ‘political 
neutrality, loyalty, probity, honesty, trustworthiness, fairness, incorruptibility, and 
serving the public’ (Farnham and Horton, 1996: 20). It is at this point that the 
integration of organisational and HRM strategies takes place. Mabey, et al., (1998) 
note that this integration takes two forms. One is the integration of the various HRM 
Practices to the extent they are mutually supportive, and the second is the coherence 
of SHRM policies and practices with the organisation’s strategy (ibid). This can only 
be achieved if the concept of HRM can be integrated with organisational business 
needs. This integration can be understood within the context of Schuler’s (1992) 5-P 
Model of defining SHRM activities. The 5-Ps are: philosophy, policies, programmes, 
practices, and processes. Schuler’s framework for the translation of an organisation’s 
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mission and vision statements into SHRM activities that facilitate the achievement of 
organisational strategy and objectives is important to this study’s analytical 
framework. This is depicted as strategy implementation phase in Figure 2.1 above. 
This phase or part of the framework assists in the analysis of the processes involved in 
the implementation of HRM practices and performance management. 
 
Strategy implementation may bring about HR issues that may need to be coordinated 
so that the implementation of the strategic changes prompted by the organisational 
strategy needs goes on smoothly (Schuler, 1992). HR Programmes result from these 
coordinated HR efforts, which Schuler states are influenced by HR policies. This 
phase unravels how HRM philosophy and policies affect the practices and 
performance management and seeks to explain how information on outcomes and 
feedback is utilised.  
  
HRM practices in both personnel management and SHRM are the same. SHRM does 
not necessarily invent new practices but utilises the good ones that already exist to 
achieve organisational goals (Daley and Vasu, 2005). This study examines how these 
are applied in the case study countries.   
 
Performance management is not useful without feedback on outcomes both at 
individual and organisational levels. This relates to the performance cycle. Employees 
need information on their performance reviews for them to be able to improve and/or 
accentuate the good traits they have. Also, organisations need to know how they are 
performing on the individual and overall HRM practices so that they can improve 
where necessary. This feedback loop is represented on Figure 2.1 by an arrow that 
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links HRM practices and performance management together. How employee 
performance impacts organisational performance and overall national economy is of 
great importance in the public sector. But HRM practices and processes in local 
government can only be understood within the context of decentralisation. Subsection 
2.7.3 below illustrates how decentralisation and HRM will be applied to categorise 
and explain the results that come out of the analytical framework above. 
 
2.7.3. The Decentralisation and HRM Framework 
This subsection seeks to illustrate the relationship between 
centralisation/decentralisation and HRM in relation to the public management model 
adopted. In order to understand the extent of decentralisation and nature of HRM and 
the relationship between these variables in the cases being studied, a 
decentralisation/HRM matrix is introduced (see Figure 2.2 below). The 
decentralisation/HRM matrix relates to the extent with which local authorities are 
responsible for the management of their human resources. This relates to the 
flexibility in HRM with which organisations are able to make decisions and 
implement them. Flexibility in HRM at local government level is constrained by the 
type of HRM system adopted in a particular country (i.e. be it separated, integrated or 
unified - see Subsection 2.2.2 in this Chapter). This can happen either in a public 
administration or NPM system.  
 
The decentralisation/HRM matrix is introduced as a guide to the starting point from 
which HRM systems in different countries occur. The matrix indicates where the 
systems are and the direction they might move to. However, this does not explain the 
factors that propel them in any of the directions indicated by the arrows.  
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Figure 2.2: The Decentralisation/Centralisation and Personnel Management/SHRM Matrix  
 
The circles suggest the possible types of HRM systems and the extent of 
decentralisation/centralisation, before or at the start of the reforms. The arrows 
indicate the intended and/or possible direction the HRM system may move towards, 
which depends on a number of contingent factors. These contingencies could be 
factors such as politics, history (path dependency), current management ideas or 
philosophy and issues arising out of current municipal capacity. Depending on the 
public management and HRM models adopted and whether the system is centralised 
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the coordination mechanism is centralised the HRM system would be in either the 
upper left hand side or upper right hand side quadrants of the matrix depending on the 
public management system; that is either centralised under a personnel management 
system or centralised under a SHRM system. What would make a HRM system to be 
perceived as the old personnel management (PM) system or SHRM would be the 
public management system adopted. 
 
In the matrix above a country with a public administration system and practising the 
personnel management type of HRM would be placed in any of the two left hand side 
quadrants. On the other hand a country’s HRM system would be considered to be 
SHRM if its HRM system operates within the framework of NPM (any of the right 
hand side quadrants). The circles in Figure 2.2 are placed on the left hand side 
quadrants (PA) due to the fact that countries reforming their management systems 
usually shift from public administration to NPM and not vice-versa. 
 
Mosley (2008) identifies the following aspects: goals and performance management; 
organisation of service delivery; integration of strategies; financing; and personnel, as 
important for consideration in order to assess the degree of decentralisation in labour 
market policy. In addition to these Mosley raises the issue of ‘trade-offs between 
decentralisation and accountability’, local flexibility in terms of budgeting, 
programmes, performance management (with flexibility depending on the types of 
targets set by the centre), and local policy coordination. Capacity and capability at 
sub-national level are also considered important in the decentralisation process 
(Mosley 2008; Robinson, 2003; Bach, 2000). Capacity building is intended to 
ascertain minimum quality standards and standardisation of services, to ensure 
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accountability, coordinating mechanisms and retain overall policy framework 
(Mosley, 2008). The manner in which the coordination mechanism is instituted as 
well as the extent/degree of standardisation would determine the extent of 
centralisation/decentralisation in the HRM system. These factors that Mosley and 
others have highlighted are considered throughout this thesis as they constitute the 
factors that make the HRM systems move between categories.   
 
On the matrix, a separated HRM system operating under a public administration 
system would be in the lower left hand side quadrant – a decentralised personnel 
management system. While on the other hand unified as well as integrated HRM 
systems often imply significant measure (though to varying extent) of central 
involvement and therefore centralised HRM systems. This would position the HRM 
system on the upper left hand quadrant as centralised personnel management systems.  
 
For the HRM system to move over from the left (PA/personnel management) to the 
right hand side of the matrix (NPM/SHRM), the country and its local government 
would need to have adopted NPM reforms. However, reforms may have unintended 
outcomes. Although a country may have adopted NPM reforms the HRM system at 
local government may still be the personnel management type as a result of the 
reforms having not been implemented at local level. Even under the NPM/SHRM 
framework an HRM system could either be centralised or decentralised. As earlier 
alluded to by Mosley (2008) and Bach (2007) the extent of central involvement and 
intervention would be dependent on the degree of standardisation and/or coordination 
applied.  The lower right hand side quadrant represents a decentralised system 
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possible, while the upper right hand side quadrant reflects a centralised SHRM 
approach.  
 
This framework proved to be useful to this study as it enabled us to classify different 
relationships between HRM/SHRM and different degrees of 
centralisation/decentralisation. The framework’s significance is also due to the fact 
that countries’ institutional resources/path dependencies dispose them to different 
degrees of centralisation. The framework allows us to investigate as to whether once a 
country has been predisposed to greater centralisation under PM cannot move to 
SHRM. The framework does allow for centralised SHRM, implying it will not be 
strange to find that in the findings. This framework enables us to understand how 
S/HRM is practiced in the case study countries.   
 
2.8. Summary 
This chapter has discussed the relationship between decentralisation and HRM, in the 
context of different public management models. The discussion has also looked at 
public management in Africa in the context of wider global trends in the direction of 
NPM-related reforms. Clearly there have been disparate degrees of success and failure 
in introducing NPM and decentralisation. Many factors may influence this, but the 
resource-based view, complemented by the path dependency theory offer a better 
prospect for the development of a conceptual framework that can facilitate a better 
understanding of this phenomenon. Given that there is a complex relationship 
between decentralisation and HRM, which may complicate any attempt to reform the 
system of HRM, we have introduced an analytical framework to identify and explain 
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different factors that influence decentralisation/HRM as well as a framework that 
identifies the decentralisation/HRM typologies. 
   
This chapter is followed by Chapter III which presents the research methods. The 
research methods map out the strategies adopted in the collection of data and its 
analysis. The chapter establishes linkages between the analytical framework and the 









METHODS OF THE STUDY 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the background, theories relevant to this study, and the 
analytical framework. The purpose of this chapter is to indicate how the research questions 
will be answered and also present the approach and methodology used in addressing them. 
The premise of this study is based on the ontological assumption that HRM is influenced by 
each nation’s economic, cultural and political idiosyncrancies thereby making each country’s 
HRM character distinct. I use the interpretive approach to studying the phenomenon of 
human resource management in local government. An interpretive approach allows the 
researcher to come-up with different meanings to the experience of a phenomenon (Neuman, 
2003: 77). As already discussed in Chapter II there are many variables, especially those found 
in both the internal and external environments of an organization, that affect each country’s 
practice of HRM. As these factors are known to be nation specific, an interpretive approach 
melds well into this study.  
 
This approach runs counter to the positivist approach that assumes a single answer to all 
human behaviour (Neuman, 2003).  And culture is known to vary across the world and 
influence management in such a way that it becomes customized to a particular country or 
region. This leads us to the epistemological position that the meaning of social action is 
subjective (Bryman, 2001) and therefore the researcher should adopt a research methodology 
suitable for the interpretation of social action. The qualitative approach is known to be the 
most suitable for interpreting social action and giving meaning to social action that is peculiar 
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to a particular environment. An interpretive approach is associated with qualitative research 
(Neuman, 2003; Grix, 2001), hence more weight was given to the qualitative than 
quantitative data. This factor is discussed further in Section 3.8 on Data Analysis and 
Interpretation. 
 
Here is how this chapter is organized. The chapter discusses the case study research method, 
mixed methods approach, validity and reliability, data collection procedures, and the data 
analysis and interpretation. 
 
3.2 The Case Study Approach 
In view of the fact that this study will involve an analysis of the human resource management 
processes, approaches, administrative structures and assess systems in place, there is a need 
to employ a research strategy that can be flexible to allow for a multifaceted approach. Some 
scholars (Verschuren 2003; Stoecker 1991) have identified the case study research strategy as 
possessing this quality.  
 
However, the definition and use of case study varies according to discipline (Maan                     
en, et al, 1993: v), but a look at literature would suggest that a commonality of definition in 
the social sciences is developing. That a case study has to be a profound and holistic analysis 
of the phenomena is being generally agreed. Stoecker (1991: 98) defines case study as 
‘research …, which attempt to explain holistically the dynamics of a certain historical period 
of a particular social unit’. Hamel, et al, (1993; 1) define a case study as ‘an in-depth study of 
the cases under consideration …’ The case study approach is best suited in that it is known to 
be best in studying process (Becker 1966 cited in Stoecker, 1991).  Stoecker (1991: 94) 
emphasizes that process is both historical and idiosyncratic, and that the case study approach 
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derives its strength over other methodologies in its ability to explain the idiosyncrancies, 
which make up the unexplained variance. The emphasis of history in case study methodology 
corresponds with the application of the path dependency concept. Together the two 
approaches enable us to explain holistically the processes, structures, systems and the history 
behind the phenomenon we are studying, and these are indiosyncratic to each country. 
Idiosyncracies may point to the exceptionality of particular cases. In public management, and 
with specific reference to this study, the idiosyncrasies could be associated with the 
peculiarities of a country’s culture, politics, economic and administrative experiences and 
environments that may shape its human resources management approach and policies. On the 
other hand the case study is known for enabling the ‘observation of patterns, structures, 
mechanisms, types, profiles, and configurations instead of variables’ (Verschuren, 2003: 
129). This includes looking at ‘processes, dynamics and developments instead of the status 
quo as is the case in most quantitative … research’ (ibid). Section 3.3 presents  
 
3.3. Selection of the Cases  
The study is premised on the assumption that public management approaches in Botswana 
and South Africa are distinctive and do not necessarily follow sub-Saharan African trends, 
and this has been argued in Chapter II above. Stoecker (1991: 94) in his defence of the case 
study research as the most relevant approach to studying exceptionalities argued that ‘the 
case study provides evidence to show how both the rule and its exceptions operate’. The 
exceptionality of these two countries can be explained from their political histories, culture, 
economic management, and administrative structures and processes, leading to distinctive 




Botswana and South Africa are among sub-Saharan Africa’s most successful economies and 
also are politically stable. These conditions create conducive environments for 
decentralisation and their contexts are suitable for addressing the research questions.   
However, within South Africa I chose the North West Province as South Africa is a much 
larger country than Botswana. Its demographics and economy account for much of the 
differences. However, the North West province bears more commonalities with Botswana 
than any of South Africa’s nine provinces. 
 
The North West Province has more or less similar demographic characteristics to those 
prevailing in Botswana. The people are ethnically of the same stock, predominantly the 
Tswana speakers. Also the Province is among the least developed in South Africa and in a 
way not very different from Botswana as Botswana is less developed than South Africa 
generally. Botswana and the North West Province share a common border and among the 
South African provinces, with the exception of Gauteng, the North West shares stronger 
economic links with Botswana than any other province. Also, the Gaborone City Council and 
the Mafikeng Local Municipality have a twinning relationship, which indicates the sharing of 
ideas and perhaps cultural ties. Below we discuss the methods that were used for data 
collection from the cases identified above. 
 
3.4 Mixed Methods Approach 
The study adopted a mixed methods approach otherwise known as triangulation, which is a 
combination of the qualitative and quantitative research methods. Data collection using the 
two approaches, otherwise known as The Concurrent Triangulation Strategy (Creswell, 
2003), took place in the same phase of the research. This approach proved to be advantageous 
over the sequential approaches in terms of shorter field work particularly for studies with a 
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limited time frame and resources as this one.  Although the traditional approach of 
quantitative methods is renowned for methodological rigour, it is perceived to be limited in 
capturing the ‘fabric of global phenomena that include complex interactions of culture, 
institutions, societal norms and government regulations, among a few concerns’ (Kiessling 
and Harvey, 2005: 22) hence it was applied in concert with the qualitative method. Culture, 
societal norms, economy, politics, etc., are idiosyncratic variables that also interact intricately 
to impact on human resource management systems across nations and can only be captured 
through mixed methods that have the flexibility and depth of capturing this ‘fabric’ (ibid). 
Applying a mixed method approach had the advantage of the complementarity of the two 
methods and ‘maintain methodological rigour as well as measures for reliability and validity’ 
(Kiessling and Harvey, 2005: 22; Creswell, 2003: 217).  
 
Having adopted a mixed methods approach and the case study method, one may opt for a 
deductive or inductive approach. This study adopted the inductive approach, in which as 
Neuman (2003: 79) argues, ‘theory and evidence are interwoven to create a unified whole; 
and the concepts and generalisations are wedded to their context’.  On the contrary 
quantitative techniques are good for theory testing or verification and hypothesis testing 
(Creswell, 2003; Montiel, 1998).  Quantitative methods assume a ‘universalist paradigm’ that 
‘uses evidence to test generalisations of an abstract and law-like character and tends towards 
acceptance of convergence’ (Kiessling and Harvey 2005: 30). This approach is known as 
positivism and is deductive. The positivist approach would be limited in the face of the 
interpretive as the interpretive is ‘sensitive to context’ (Neuman, 2003: 80). Since the 





However, quantitative data and its analysis are useful to case studies only in as far as they are 
‘not too complex’ (Gillham, 2000: 80). In this case descriptive statistics, that is averages, 
totals, ranges, etc., are more relevant as opposed to inferential statistics that deal with 
correlations (Kiessling and Harvey, 2005). Qualitative research on the other hand would add 
value by capturing ‘cultural values, people’s experiences, and gives meaning to events, 
processes and the environment of their normal setting’ (ibid: 30) that quantitative methods 
may miss out. Also, triangulation becomes advantageous over both methods than they would 
if applied individually as it offers complementarity and takes advantage of the best in both 




3.5.1 The Survey Sample Frame 
The survey research sought to establish perceptions and opinions of the human resource 
personnel in local authorities. These are people who have the practical experience of what 
really works and what does not, as well as how they have been doing things on the ground 
and why.  In Botswana the sample frame consisted of an establishment of 102 HR personnel 
posts. These consist of 30 officers in the urban councils and 72 in the district councils. 
Appendix 6 presents the categorised councils in Botswana. The total HR personnel 
establishment in the North West province municipalities was 111 staffs. Of these 63 were 
from the Mayoral Executive System, 42 from the Collective Executive System and six from 
the Plenary Executive. The categorisation of municipalities in South Africa’s North West 
province followed the categories stipulated in the Municipal Structures Act. However, all of 




Within each of the categories of municipalities there are three basic types of municipal 
systems.  These are the Mayoral Executive System, Collective Executive System and the 
Plenary Executive System. In relation to each other the Mayoral Executive System 
municipalities are the largest followed by the Collective Executive and the Plenary Executive 
is the smallest. The sample frame in the North West province was clustered according to 
these three basic types of municipalities which also reflect the different sizes of the 
municipalities, while in Botswana it was according to the urban and district councils. The 
sample frames in the two countries were smaller than expected. However, the sample had to 
satisfy the minimum requirements for a statistically acceptable sample size which is 
suggested to be at least 30 respondents (Alreck and Settle, 1995: 62). 
 
When considering the issues of service delivery and the ability of a local authority to be able 
to attract and retain desirable human resources, the type of a local authority and its distance 
from the capital city of the country and/or province are likely to have a differential impact on 
its human resources. It is on these grounds that the population is clustered by council or 
municipal type. In Botswana we knew how each of the HR job posts are distributed over the 
councils as the data was centralised. However, in the North West province municipalities it 
was difficult to know the distribution of job posts before the fieldwork commenced. This 
factor compounded with limited funding affected the sampling technique used for the 
selection of the respondents. 
 
3.5.2. The Sampling Technique 
In view of the above the study adopted a multi-stage sampling technique known as a two-
stage sampling design to select the sample. The multi-stage sampling technique has been 
applied widely before and also by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
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(UNECA) in 2001 for their Africa wide study on the ‘State of Governance in Africa’. 
UNECA applied the multi-stage sampling approach within a stratified random sampling 
technique. This thesis adopted a multi-stage sampling approach but using the cluster 
sampling technique, there by varying the methodology in accordance with the prevailing 
conditions, particularly those of a small sample size that this study dealt with. The variation 
mentioned above applied to Stage II of the method. The selection of respondents at that stage 
was not random but based on clusters, due to the smallness of the sample frame, but all 
officers in the selected local authority were interviewed as random sampling at that level was 
not feasible as initially intended. In addition to that cluster sampling is known to alleviate 
budgetary problems that many a student encounter in their research. Sampling is an art, and 
as such special sampling designs or variations are acceptable as long as they do not increase 
sampling error and bias (Alreck and Settle, 2004; 78).  The discussion below presents the 
sampling procedure. 
 
Stage I: This stage involved the selection of local authorities as primary sampling units 
(PSUs). This first step involved the grouping of the local authorities or municipalities 
according to clusters appropriate for the conditions in each country. In Botswana the local 
authorities were clustered according to urban and district councils. In the North West 
province the clusters were based on the types of municipalities. That is Mayoral Executive 
System, Collective Executive System, and Plenary Executive System. These were selected 
using the probability proportional to size (PPS) selection method. In this case size was 
determined by the number of local authorities in a given municipal cluster (i.e. 
category/type). Presented below is the description of the sample selection: 
• List all local authorities (in Botswana all sub-districts are listed so that they are not 
omitted from the sampling)  
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• List the cumulative numbers of job posts 
• Find the sampling interval where 
sampledbetoLAsofnumber
posts jobofnumberTotal
ervalsampling =int  
• Choose a random number between 1 and the sampling interval 
• This random number identified the first local authority on the list that is to be 
included in the sample. 
• Add the sampling interval to the random number chosen above. The resulting number 
identifies second local authority on the list to be included in the sample 
• The remaining local authorities are selected by successive addition of the sampling 
interval to the number used to identify the second local authority 
 
Stage II: At this stage, job posts were supposed to be selected systematically from a fresh list 
of occupied posts prepared at the beginning of the survey fieldwork for the selected local 
authorities. However, due to difficulties in acquiring the data and also due to the smallness of 
the sample sizes dealt with, stage two was modified. Instead there was no sampling for 
individual job posts at this stage and HRM staff from all the selected local authorities were 
interviewed.  
 
3.5.3. Determination of Sample Size 
In a multi-stage sample, for one to estimate the required sample size estimates of variances 
between and within the first-stage units should be made. However, because of the application 
of random sampling to the selection of clusters there is no need to make any adjustments to 
determine the sample size. The notation for the calculation of the sampling interval is given 




If X units in a population of N possess some attribute, and that x units in a sample of size n 
possess the same attribute. Then, the proportion of units in the population that possess the 
attribute is given by 




And the proportion of units in the sample that possess the attribute is given by 




It can be shown that the sample proportion p is an unbiased estimate of population 
proportion ∏ . 
 
Sample Selection for Botswana 
Stage I 




∴ round off to the nearest one, hence the sampling interval = 4. 
 
Stage II 
Due to limitations related to unavailability of data in the North West province at the time of 
sampling in Botswana (and for purposes of consistency across the countries) as well as 
resource limitations, there was no direct sampling of respondents. Rather, all the job posts in 
the selected councils were eligible for interviews. The total number of job posts selected for 
interviews was 35. This satisfies the minimum statistically acceptable sample size for 




Sample Selection for the North West Province 
Stage I 
The following is a calculation of the sampling interval for the North West Province. 
21
111
= 5.28  
∴ we round off to the nearest whole number, hence the sampling interval = 5. 
This sampling interval was used to select the municipalities from categorised list. 
Stage II 
Due to the unavailability of accessible data at the sampling stage and problems experienced 
in communication, direct sampling of the respondents could not be undertaken. Instead 
municipalities sampled in the first stage produced the respondents for stage two. The total 
number of those sampled in this way came to 42.  
 
3.6. The Qualitative Interview Sample 
The respondents for the face-to-face interviews were selected through purposive sampling. 
These were drawn from the top echelons of the local authorities and ministries and/or 
departments and other government agencies responsible for HRM at local government level 
and/or responsible for managing the general decentralisation policy. Most of these people, 
particularly in Botswana, have served in various capacities in the local authorities and rose 
through the ranks to senior positions and therefore have a deeper understanding of the 
workings of the systems and would be in a better position than anybody else to provide more 
useful data. Some of the respondents were academics and members of non-governmental 
organisations associated with local authorities and they too have been helpful in finding 
explanations for the research questions.  Even though some notable scholars such as Moser 
and Kalton (1971: 54) argue that purposive sampling lacks the rigour demanded by theory, it 
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is nevertheless the most appropriate for the selection of respondents with special qualities that 
may not be adequately captured if the selection is subjected to random sampling. Although 
there is no set size of a sample for qualitative studies, twenty respondents are generally 
regarded as reasonable or whenever there is no longer any new information being added by 
interviewing any more respondents. In this study 18 respondents were interviewed in 
Botswana, and 13 in the North West Province (see Appendices 11 and 12). 
 
3.7. Data Collection 
The data collection procedures involved a multilevel approach that consisted of a survey 
among human resource management officers and interviews with top management. This 
involved a survey, in-depth qualitative interviews with key informants, and desk/document 
research.  
 
The interviews consisted of open-ended questions. These consisted of face to face interviews 
with the top management of the local authorities and other government departments. Verbal 
or face to face interviews are known to allow for opportunities to raise issues or topics that 
the interviewer may never have thought of (Bailey, 1987: 189). Interviews have several other 
advantages that alternative methods of data collection such as mailed questionnaires may 
lack. Some of the advantages of interviews are flexibility, a high response rate, spontaneity 
and completeness (ibid: 174) and probing. The key informants consisted of the human 
resource management personnel of the councils/municipalities, heads of departments, as well 
as the top management of the local authorities. Also interviewed were the leadership of the 
staff associations, and the staff members of the central government agencies (both national 
and provincial departments in South Africa) who are involved in local government and/or HR 
matters of the local authorities of the two case study countries. These groups could be 
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involved with staff matters both at policy level and at a technical level and ideally they 
understand local government matters better than most other government employees.  
 
Data collection during the survey was conducted through the use of structured questionnaire 
instrument with pre-coded alternative answers for each question. Questionnaires were self-
administered and in order to cut down on costs were mailed to potential respondents. Mailed 
questionnaires have the advantage of eliminating interviewer errors, and also are reputed to 
be suitable in dealing with questions that demand a considered answer (Moser and Kalton, 
1971: 258). Non-contact is another problem that mailed-questionnaires address. This is 
particularly important in my case where resources were limited. 
 
The desk research was based on written reports such as HR policy documents, laws, 
regulations, official and non-official publications, and scholarly publications such as relevant 
academic journals and books. This enabled us to assess the local authorities’ approaches to 
the management of human resources as well as assessing their overall human resource 
management strategies. How the collected data was analysed is discussed below. 
 
3.8. Data Analysis and Interpretation  
During the interpretation of the data more emphasis was given to the qualitative interviews as 
these were conducted among the most experienced and mostly senior officials. These were 
senior government officers who deal mostly with policy issues and also are more 
knowledgeable and experienced than the operational officers in the municipalities. 
 
After the survey, quantitative data was cleaned and entered into data files, with data entry 
errors and inconsistencies checked and corrected where necessary. The Statistical Package for 
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the Social Sciences (SPSS, Version 13.0) was used for this purpose. The software was used to 
generate descriptive statistics such as percentages, frequency counts and tabulations. The 
statistical data was analysed separately from the qualitative data but integrated at the 
interpretation stage.    
 
The qualitative data was analysed by way of placing it into categories and manipulated in 
order to identify patterns, themes and concepts (Neuman, 2003). Thereafter the data was 
coded for easier analysis and interpretation. As an analytic strategy, I adopted the ‘Ideal 
Types’ approach, which is commonly used in qualitative research to ‘contrast contexts’ 
and/or to draw ‘analogies’ (ibid: 450). Since this study is largely interpretive it was expedient 
to employ the Contrast Contexts approach. The Contrast Contexts approach is known to be 
sensitive to peculiarities of specific contexts, especially capturing important societal aspects 
such as culture. Neuman (2003: 450) states categorically: 
Thus, one use of the ideal type is to show how specific circumstances, 
cultural meanings, and the perspectives of specific individuals are 
central for understanding a social setting or process. The ideal type 
becomes a foil against which unique contextual features can be more 
easily seen. 
 
This analytic strategy becomes more relevant for this case study of Botswana and South 
Africa. Through it the study identified unique characteristics that emerged in the HRM of the 
two countries’ local governments.  
 
To ensure the reliability and validity of the data, the survey instrument was pre-tested and 
changes made to the instrument before the questionnaires were administered. This was done 
to ensure consistency during the survey by avoiding changes to the instrument during the 
data collection exercise. Also, the triangulation approach was applied in which interviews, 
the survey and literature were applied in concert and consistency ensured through this 
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method. However, it will be noted that the survey respondents and the interview respondents 
seemed to say the same things or hold similar views (see chapters VI and VII). One of the 
reasons, in the Botswana case as already alluded to in Chapter IV was the fact that the 
government had started in 2004 to implement some of the recommendations of the 
Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure. Also, the roll-out of performance 
management systems had just started and most government officials had been drilled through 
the PMS concept in workshops and seminars. Most likely as the euphoria wears thin with 
time and the reality becomes clearer, differences of opinion between the different ranks are 
likely to appear. Similarly in South Africa the reforms were still being implemented as 
Chapter VII indicates and also everybody had great anticipation of what the new dispensation 
was about to bring. This is particularly manifest in the South African officials’ frequent 
reference to the legal documents in their interview responses (see Chapter VII). This 
contrasts with the Botswana case where respondents mostly referred to what the practice was 
as it seemed they relied more on what worked but not necessarily what the law stipulated. 
The limitations for this study are presented in Section 3.10 below. 
 
3.10. Limitations 
The fieldwork preparations started mid-September 2005 and the data collection was 
completed in early March 2006. The actual data collection was run concurrently from January 
2006 in both countries. In October and November I was actively establishing contacts and 
learning more about the South African local government system. At first it was not easy 
contacting municipalities in South Africa as it took me more than a month and a half to 
access the contact details of all the North West municipalities. It also took me weeks (after 
running between my office and the South African Embassy in Gaborone) to get to know that 
one does not need a research permit to do academic research in South Africa. By the time I 
93 
 
was familiar with the municipalities in the North West province it was almost December 
2005. Because of the coming Christmas holidays, I decided to shelve the interviews and start 
when everybody comes back early January. The data collection was conducted between 
January and March 2006.  
 
The data in this study should be treated with caution because of its smallness as it may not be 
as representative of the entire study population but reflects the views of the respondents who 









The previous chapter presented the research methods and how the research questions will be 
answered. This chapter presents and analyses background data on Botswana that helps in the 
understanding of the context of decentralisation and HRM. The overview attempts to explain 
how the environmental and institutional factors influence decentralisation, HRM policy and 
practice. To do this the study applied the contingency, the RBV and path dependency 
concepts and how they relate to decentralisation and HRM, the HRM philosophy, HRM 
practices and performance management. The chapter partially answers the research questions 
but most importantly presents the necessary background that contextualises the HRM 
situation in Botswana. The chapter maps the development of HRM in local government and 
its relationship with decentralization or local democracy in Botswana. The chapter further 
explores in detail the main factors/elements that influence the management of human 
resources in local government in Botswana as well as trying to show how the country’s 
decentralisation system and its approach to HRM differs from most of SSA countries.  The 
discussions begin by outlining the environmental and institutional factors.  
   
4.2. The Environmental and Institutional Factors 
This section discusses Botswana’s background focusing on both the external and internal 




4.2.1 External Environment 
The external environment focuses on the following factors: politics, national economy, social 
culture, laws, the labour market, unionisation, and decentralisation, indicating how these may 
have impacted on HRM. 
 
Political Background 
Botswana is situated in the Southern Africa region, between Namibia, South Africa, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe (see Appendix 3). Geographically the country measures about 582 000 km² 
and has a small sparse population of about 1.7 million (GoB, 2001) mainly concentrated in 
the south and the east where the soils are relatively fertile and rainfall is more frequent. 
Before 1966 Botswana was a British Protectorate with the capital located outside the 
territory, in Mafikeng (present day capital of the North West Province), South Africa. It is 
widely understood in Botswana that it was the three chiefs of Bakwena, Bamangwato and 
Bangwaketse who asked for British protection against the advancing Boers from the south 
and the Germans in the west. These three were originally one tribe, the Bakwena, but broke 
up due to sibling rivalry. Later the Bamangwato broke into two when the Batawana left in 
discontent. Botswana was declared a protectorate in 1887 and was known as the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate. However, that came with a conditionality that the Tswana tribes 
should cease infighting that had hitherto characterised their fragmentary polity (Morton and 
Ramsay, 1987). This could be seen as a critical juncture that ushered in political stability in 
Bechuanaland and later Botswana, which was never to change ever since. In 1966 Botswana 
gained independence from British rule and has been a stable democracy ever since. One 
significant factor to note is that at independence in 1966, Botswana existed within a region 
that was characterised by one party states and dictatorships such as Malawi, Tanzania, the 
then Zaire, and Zambia. The closest neighbours, South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia) 
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and Zimbabwe were ruled by racist regimes while Angola and Mozambique were still under 
colonial rule. The ruling parties in most of the independent countries in the region were 
socialist including the liberation movements in the then yet-to-be independent countries. 
However, Botswana’s leadership chose a democratic governance system that has since 
reached a stage of lock-in in which a reversal will be difficult.  This has also been achieved 
because the Tswana traditionally espouse consultation and consensus making as one of the 
important tenets of their traditional governance system.  Free and fair elections are held every 
five years. The judiciary is one of the most independent in Africa, and the public service has 
continued to be apolitical and meritocratic.  
 
Botswana is one of the few African countries that have achieved political and social stability 
prior to and after independence. This is due to Botswana’s colonial history and traditional 
polity. Botswana’s traditional polity is noted for its being developmental in nature 
(Maundeni, 2001), and the modern government has been credited for successfully blending 
both the traditional and modern elements of governance (Good, 1992). This has created a 
suitable environment for the entrenchment of democratic governance and the development 
and implementation of sound social and economic policies. However, the ruling Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) has been in power since independence, albeit with a gradually 
declining electoral support. The distortionary effect of the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) 
electoral system, that has apparently disadvantaged smaller parties, has enhanced the BDP’s 
strength in parliament. Coupled with this has been a weak civil society and fragmentary 
opposition parties (Forster-Seba, 2003). This has led to the entrenchment of a one-party 
dominant system.  And yet on the other hand, these factors have enabled the BDP to form 
strong successive governments, after every election, that have been able to push through 
public policies and programmes with negligible opposition. However, in the late 1990s the 
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governing party experienced some factionalism that threatened the stability of the party. But 
after the state president appointed some of the members of one of the factions that felt 
sidelined to cabinet, factionalism has since abated.  
 
As one of the leading liberal democracies in Africa and perhaps in the developing world, 
Botswana has continued to deepen its social and political reforms. This is both as an 
incremental improvement to its democracy and also resulting from attempts to address 
emergent challenges. But some of Botswana’s notable endeavours are its commitment to 
public sector reforms aimed at improving productivity through the enhancement of 
performance management.  
 
The government realised that to improve performance more comprehensive strategies were 
needed. The process to develop a strategic framework was initiated with the appointment of a 
Presidential Task Force in 1997 to consult with the public and develop a national vision to 
guide national development planning (UNECA, 2003). This vision which came to be known 
as ‘Vision 2016 A Long Term Vision for Botswana: Towards Prosperity for All’ developed a 
set of aspirations to be achieved by 2016. These are: 
• An educated and informed nation; 
• A prosperous, productive and innovative nation; 
• A compassionate, just and caring nation; 
• A safe and secure nation; 
• An open, democratic and accountable nation; 
• A moral and tolerant nation, and; 
• A united nation. 
 
Each stakeholder (including the public sector) in the economy is to identify which of the 
aspirations they could contribute to and identify strategies of how they can participate in the 
realisation of the identified national aspiration/s. Vision 2016 establishes a strategic 
framework upon which the Performance Management System is based (ibid). PMS has fully 
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been implemented in central government but has rather taken longer to be implemented in 
local government. In central government the HRM responsibilities of the Directorate of 
Public Service Management (DPSM) have been devolved to Ministries and Departments. 
HRM responsibilities have been devolved to line managers, who can hire and fire employees 
with the exception of the post of Permanent Secretaries who are appointed by the President 
with advice from the Permanent Secretary to the President. Managers in Departments and 
Ministries play a major role in the recruitment process and other HRM responsibilities. Most 
of the HRM tasks, such as recruitment and promotions, are handled by committees in which 
the DPSM sits to advice and ensure consistency and transparency. Turning to another factor, 
civil service reforms are implemented within particular social context that affect the way they 
turn out to be in practice. Below the discussion presents the social culture of Botswana. 
 
Social Culture 
The social culture in Botswana has not changed dramatically from what it was before and 
during colonialism, and immediately after independence. It has been observed that Tswana 
society is the most ‘highly stratified’ and ‘sharply hierarchical’ of any in Southern Africa 
(Good, 1992: 69). This stratification is hierarchical with the elite (the chief and his inner core 
of advisors) at the top, and then the commoners and the serfs at the lower rung. The kgotla (a 
traditional political institution for consensus making) continues to play an important role in 
Tswana society as an institution for consultation between the society and its political leaders. 
The kgotla was ‘… essentially operated to facilitate social control by the leadership’ (ibid: 
70) and ‘… were in fact highly centralised institutions’ (Maundeni, 2001: 114). Maundeni 
(2001: 109) observed that ‘The Tswana had a state culture that promoted the centrality of the 
state’. However, the Tswana state did not have bureaucratic structures or systems as modern 
governments do (ibid). Modern administrative structures and management systems (although 
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now reformed) have been inherited from the colonial administration. The Tswana polity has 
bequeathed the kgotla to the post-independence government, which continues to use it more 
or less in the same way it was utilised by the chiefs in the pre-independence era (Maundeni, 
2001).  
 
The pre-colonial Tswana politics ‘emphasised control, continuity and quiescence of the bulk 
of the population of commoners and serfs’ (Picard and Morgan, 1985 in Good, 1992: 71). 
Effectively, ‘pre-colonial Tswana politics subordinated civil institutions to the states’ 
(Maundeni, 2001: 110). This characteristic of the state culture was to be continued in the 
post-independence era wherein state power was centralised in the presidency. The top 
bureaucrats in Botswana are known to have instituted measures that subordinated civil 
society to the government. Civil society, especially trade unions and staff associations, were 
strictly controlled by legislation until recently. However, there has been a shift from the 
control of, to collaboration with, civil society organisations. This factor is well noted by 
BIDPA (2005: 194-96) and Maundeni (2005a: 189) who mentions that there have been 
limited confrontation among civic organisations as well as between them and the state. The 
war that characterise state-NGO relations in most of Africa is absent in Botswana and instead 
NGOs are seen as development partners by the Botswana government (Maundeni 2005a).   
 
The other major characteristic of Tswana society is the absence of militancy, which is 
attested to by many. Instead Tswana culture espouses dialogue. In fact there is a Tswana 
saying ‘ntwa kgolo ke ya molomo,’ which means ‘the grand battle is fought by word of 
mouth’. Reilly (1983: 144) notes the peaceful nature and docility of Batswana. Mackenzie 
(1884: 221 cited in Maundeni, 2001: 115) sums it up succinctly when he said ‘But while the 
Tswana sometimes fight with their spears, they decidedly prefer to do so with their tongues, 
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and are indeed much better qualified for the latter warfare than for the former. And so 
diplomacy played a prominent part in public business in each little court, without letters and 
without secret cipher’. The age old tradition of non-aggression has been practised for ages 
and adopted by civil society to the extent ‘Civic organisations’ in Botswana will only ‘engage 
in mass action as a last resort’ (Maundeni, 2005a: 189).  
 
Most researchers observe that when the Botswana public service was relatively new after 
independence, the public officers served with zeal and self-sacrifice. They and the political 
elites won the government international acclaim ‘as a stable democracy with sound and 
prudent development management and an efficient and accountable public bureaucracy’ 
(Hope, 1995: 42). Mueller (1983) found out that although personal reward was the source of 
motivation among local government employees in Botswana, ‘altruistic goals’ were the most 
prominent in a period when resources were scanty. However, as time went by and new 
economic challenges emerged attitudes also changed triggering some concerns within 
government. The public service performance declined and drifted away ‘from the principles 
of honesty and integrity that had set it apart from the public services in other developing 
countries and those in most of Africa in particular’ (Hope, 1995: 42). As Hope (1995) 
observed the government’s concerns were translated into a number of public sector reforms 
such as Work Improvement Teams and Performance Management Systems, to recapture the 
lost post-independence spirit. The ability of the state to control civil society organisations and 
the public sector is related to Tswana social culture in which civil society has traditionally 
been dominated by the state and there was a strong tendency towards centralisation. These 






Botswana has had the best economic performance of any developing country in the world for 
over three decades (Acemoglu, et al, 2001). Botswana started off at independence in 1966 as 
one of the poorest countries in the world. However, this was to change radically after the 
discovery of diamonds in the late 1960s. To date the World Bank ranks Botswana as an upper 
middle-income country. ‘Between 1966 and 1980, Botswana’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) grew at an annual rate of 14.5 per cent, and was for a long time one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world’, and ‘the per capita GDP quintupled over the first 20years 
of independence’ (Forster-Seba, 2003: 54). Botswana’s GDP growth rates slowed to just 
under 10 per cent per annum in the 1990s. In 2001/02 the growth slumped to 2.3 per cent 
from 8.4 per cent achieved in 2000/01 (ibid) before rebounding to 7.8 per cent in 2002/03 
(GoB, 2005; 4). In 2003/04 real growth rate slipped lower to 5.7 per cent, and was expected 
to further slow down to between 4 and 5 per cent in 2004/05 and 2005/06 owing to a slack 
performance in the mining and non-mining sectors (ibid; 4). In spite of this slackening 
performance Botswana has performed better on most key development indicators than the 
average of Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 4.1 below). Botswana’s growth has always been 
mineral led. Diamonds have been the single largest contributor to the government’s output at 
40 per cent (Acemoglu, et al, 2001: 1), and mineral revenues accounted for around 45 per 
cent of total revenues for 2004/05 (GoB, 2005; 21). 
 
Minerals alone fall short of explaining Botswana’s economic success (Foster-Seba, 2003; 
Acemoglu, et al, 2001; World Bank 2000; Nordås, et al, 1998; Good, 1992). A mixture of 
variables especially fiscal discipline (Nordås, et al, 1998), good policy choice (Harvey and 
Lewis, 1990) and political stability have been advanced as some of the factors that 
contributed to Botswana’s success. Also, Botswana has had a remarkable approach of dealing 
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with donors. The Government has always resisted aid that could not be integrated into the 
national budgeting system (Nordås, et al, 1998). Fiscal discipline, that borders on 
conservatism, and cautious policy choice were paths that were chosen at independence, and 
institutions (rules/norms) developed around them, as a result of the continuity of one political 
party in government, have been maintained uninterruptedly since independence.   
 
One other factor that augurs well for Botswana’s prudent economic management is the low 
levels of corruption. Unlike many other African countries, there is negligible nepotism and 
corruption is not institutionalised or part of the administrative routine in Botswana (Hope, 
1995). In fact Botswana has for many years been ranked by Transparency International (TI) 
as the least corrupt country in Sub-Saharan Africa with a Corruption Perception Index 
ranging between 6.0 in 2004 to 5.8 in 2008 but with some fluctuations in between (see 
Appendix 135). Neither is the country heavily indebted nor ever served any SAPS. All these 
can be credited to the choices that the leaders made at independence. 
 
Oluwu and Wunsch (2004: 92) note that Botswana’s highest growth rate among developing 
countries ‘offered an environment that was to prove supportive for local and democratic 
governance’. Furthermore, while local governments in Botswana have more resources than 
their counterparts in most of Africa, their local revenue sources remained very limited (ibid).  
Local priorities and policy choice have been undermined due to the over-dependence on 
central government funding resulting in a pattern that is common across Africa (Oluwu and 
Wunsch, 2004; Brown, 1999; Sharma, 1997; Picard, 1987). Decision making related to 
district level development planning remains top-down in spite of the spelt out intentions of it 
being bottom-up (Sharma, 1997: 65). 
                                               
5
 Appendix 13 presents the CPI score of four of the least corrupt countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. These 




Whereas there may be questions as to whether the ‘… achievement of greater local autonomy 
ha[s] led to greater efficiency in delivering services and/or greater democracy’ (Brown, 1999: 
4), it is also important to consider whether the centralisation of resources has led to economic 
efficiency and also improved the management of human resources. The centralised control of 
economic resources and state power in Botswana is entrenched in Tswana state culture and 
predates colonial rule and modern governance as stated above. Although the reversal of some 
decentralisation initiatives in the 1970s were largely due to concerns over the lack of capacity 
by councils (Picard, 1987), the political elites and top bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning also found it expedient to continue with it for the better 
management of scarce resources. Even when resources increased it has not been easy to let go 
simply because the path not chosen has become distant. Economic management in Botswana 
is entrenched in history and shows to have reached a stage of inertia in which change has 
been difficult to bring about. However, opportunities for change seem plausible as 
consideration for broadening local government sources of revenue such as the introduction of 
property tax, reintroduction of local government tax, for example, has been going on for 
almost a decade (see Hope, 2000). This points to an evolutionary change. Perhaps the many 
years it is taking to implement these reforms shows how entrenched institutions affect local 
government and also how difficult (but not impossible) it is to effect change there. 
 
Labour Market 
At independence Botswana barely had any tertiary education institutions and very few 
educated citizens. The use of expatriate labour in Botswana to compensate for what was not 
available locally has been a long term strategy adopted immediately after independence 
(Picard, 1987). The Botswana government resisted the temptation to localise for the sake of 
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localisation immediately after independence, putting merit and ability first (ibid). This 
marked a critical juncture in the creation of merit-based recruitment in the public service. 
Expatriate labour has played a very significant role in Botswana than in any other country in 
Africa (Picard, 1987: 203; Hope, 1995: 43). This was due to the underdeveloped colonial 
educational and training capacity, which differed from other African country experiences 
(Picard, 1987). It was also adopted as a deliberate strategy ‘to aid in its post-independence 
development management effort’ as well as being ‘borne out by the post-independence 
development results’ of using expatriate labour (Hope, 1995: 43). The continued reliance on 
expatriate labour in Botswana has been a result of the labour market that remains 
underdeveloped due to limited supply of technical skills, lack of adequate training 
institutions, and the cost of training abroad. The poor conditions of service in local 
government worked to its disadvantage as more educated and capable people joined the 
central government where the conditions of service and pay were better and the local 
authorities could hardly attract any highly educated staff (Picard, 1987). 
 
The major challenge for LAs is attracting and retaining skilled manpower. Incentives in the 
local authorities have long been noted to be inadequate (Sharma, 1997; Picard, 1987; Reilly, 
1983). But lately jobs are hard to come by as the central government has frozen the creation 
of new posts and some of the big private sector companies such as Volvo, Hyundai and 
Owens Corning have relocated to South Africa, and economic diversification proved elusive 
(Mmegi, 2005; Good and Hughes, 2002). But this could be a temporary phenomenon as the 
economy has recently rebounded led by the mining sector and this requires lasting strategies 




Many researchers have noted this weakness in the local authorities’ human resource 
management structures. Some perceive these weaknesses to have been a deliberate strategy to 
keep local governments weak (Reilly, 1983; Picard, 1987). Picard (1987: 227) observed that 
‘[a]t least until 1982, central government policy makers were not willing to increase the 
capacity of the local level institutions’. He further argued that the HRM policies are linked to 
the ‘political and socio-economic context of rural development policy’, that seeks to maintain 
the predominance of central authority over local-level political activity. And also to pursue a 
policy ‘… that is conducive to existing political interests’ which are limited to the ‘… 
expansion of existing areas of economic activity …’ (ibid: 227-228).  
 
Employee Relations 
The labour movement in the local authorities of Botswana consisted of two main players 
only. There is the Botswana Unified Local Government Service Association (BULGSA) that 
represents professional employees and the National Amalgamated Local and Central 
Government and Parastatal Manual Workers Union (NALCGPMWU) representing the 
industrial/manual workers. Industrial employees have always been allowed by law to 
unionise whereas white collar employees have all along not been allowed to. The government 
of Botswana has established parallel consultative machineries through which both the 
NALCGPMWU and BULGSA participate. These are the Local Works Committees which 
addresses matters pertaining to industrial class employees and the Local Authorities Joint 
Staff Consultative Council in which BULGSA sits. Both BULGSA and the NALCGPMWU 
have participated in public service wage and salary negotiations through the high profile 
National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council (NEMIC). NEMIC is a tripartite 
consultative body in which government, employers and labour are represented and usually 
advices government, among others, on recommended annual salary increases. Labour 
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movements have always felt dissatisfied with the decisions of NEMIC arguing that they are 
always underrepresented and outvoted in the forum. In 1992 NALCGPMWU staged a 
nationwide strike in protest against what they perceived to be inadequate wage increase. The 
government responded strongly to the strike, dismissing its employees who were involved 
and insisting the wage increase was justified.  The tough response shows the control 
government placed over labour movements in its attempt to instil stability.   
 
BULGSA was in the process of unionising at the time the study was conducted. They still 
operated as a staff association and according to the labour laws of Botswana they are not 
allowed to strike while still operating under that framework, so they usually resort to sit-ins. 
However, the government has ratified International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 
151 which allows the public service to unionise (GoB: 2003a: 386). Other Acts such as the 
Employment and Trade and Disputes Acts and the Public Service Act are being reviewed to 
harmonise them with these changes (ibid).  
 
Decentralisation 
During the colonial era local government in Botswana was part of tribal administration under 
the local chiefs. After independence the traditional chiefs were stripped of most of their 
powers when these were transferred to elected (and a few appointed) councillors. However, 
the chiefs were made the ex-officio non-voting members of the councils. The chiefs still 
commanded some influence, even though the governing party was determined to realign state 
power at all levels away from the chiefs to democratically elected bodies. Olowu and Wunsch 
(2004) and Hope (2000) make a factual error that chiefs are members of local councils in 
Botswana, overlooking the fact that the chiefs’ residual powers and influence in the councils 
were dealt a heavy blow in 1981 after the Local Government Structure Commission of 1979 
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recommended their removal from the councils. A study carried out in Botswana in the late 
1980s showed that councillors were the most preferred point of contact than chiefs on 
community matters relating to local affairs and even on matters of a personal nature 
(Lekorwe, 1989).   
 
The local authorities in Botswana are a creation of parliamentary legislation. The Townships 
Act (as amended) 1955 and the Local Government (District Councils) Act (as amended) 1965 
established the urban and district councils respectively and define their powers, 
responsibilities and jurisdictions. Besides the general duties of promoting and maintaining 
good governance as stated in the above laws, the First, Second and Third Schedules of the 
same specify the responsibilities of the councils as: 
• Education – provision of primary school facilities and other primary education 
services (e.g. books, stationery, feeding, etc.); 
• Health and sanitation – provision of primary health care services, sanitation and 
public lavatories; 
• Water – provision of public water supplies where there is no water authority assigned 
the task; 
• Communications – construction and maintenance of public roads excluding those 
under the authority of central government; 
• General administration – establishment and control of markets, recreational parks and 
other public places, cemeteries and burial grounds, stadia, assist in disaster 
management, assist sport associations and those dealing with children’s and other 
vulnerable people’s welfare; 
• Regulation and licensing – the regulation and licensing of donkey carts, bicycles, 
herbalists and brick-makers. (But these have been extended to include licensing of 
businesses); 
• Abattoirs – to establish and operate abattoirs, charge user fees, inspect carcasses; 
• Beer depots and beer halls – establish, maintain and operate beer halls where 
traditional beer is sold and consumed off premises and on premises respectively; 
• Implementation of bye-laws – implement bye-laws made by the council; 
• Commercial – enter into contracts for the sale of land or premises; 
• Council staff – to ensure proper working of the council and welfare of its staff; 
• Land – acquire land for development and sell such land in serviced lots; 




However, some of the statutory responsibilities of the councils have been centralised or 
allocated to other authorities. The supply of water in the urban areas and electricity in the 
whole country has been delegated to parastatal organisations, the Water Utilities Corporation 
and the Botswana Power Corporation respectively which deal directly with consumers. In the 
major villages water is supplied by the Department of Water Affairs under the Ministry of 
Minerals, Energy and Water Resources. The construction, operation and maintenance of 
stadiums is the responsibility of the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture. Fire fighting and 
housing have not been listed on any of the schedules but are provided by all urban 
municipalities. However, housing which involves the provision of loans for low income 
groups through the Self Help Housing Agency (SHHA) programme is being extended to 
district councils as well. 
 
The government of Botswana has adopted the position that ‘decentralisation is not a means in 
itself’ but that it can only be valued ‘in terms of other desired objectives to which it 
contributes’ (GoB, 2003a: 400). The government has determined that its decentralisation 
policy objectives are to: 
1. Facilitate and enhance control and coordination of planning and implementation 
capacity in the execution of development policies, programmes and projects; 
2. Enhance local popular participation in decision making; 
3. Ensure and facilitate sustainable service delivery to communities; 
4. Develop systems for local governance and development; 
5. Promote democracy and governance; and  
6. Promote social and economic development (ibid). 
 
The transfer of responsibilities and power and authority to the local authorities has been more 
consistent in Botswana than in any other African country (Reilly, 1983: 171) where 
immediately after independence there was recentralisation. Although Botswana has offered a 
supportive environment for decentralisation (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004), limitations due to 
the nature of Botswana’s democracy and resource limitations have been noted (Reilly, 1983; 
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Picard; 1987; Sharma, 1997; BIDPA, 2004). The government of Botswana was cautious not 
to create a strong local government system that could eventually pose a threat to the state 
(Picard, 1987). It was this overcautious approach that eventually left a legacy of a ‘dominant 
centre with limited autonomy for local government’ (Sharma, 1997: 75). It is apparent that 
there was some rationale behind the underdevelopment of local government in Botswana. 
Perhaps having developed its local government in a region and time characterised by political 
instability and overt pro-socialist/communist liberation movements, Botswana as the only 
pro-West government besides the racist regimes in the region may have been overcautious 
not to allow local government politicians too much freedom lest they become powerful and 
foment dissent in their areas. But having benefited politically from these controls it proves 
difficult for the governing party to let go. These are the feedback loops that reinforce 
movement in one direction or say path dependent choices that are also based on self-
preservation by the ruling elite. 
 
 However, within these widely acknowledged limitations, decentralisation in Botswana has 
been more substantive and has evolved over a longer period of time than in most of Africa 
(Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Brown 1999; Sharma, 1997; Tordoff, 1988; Picard, 1987; Reilly, 
1983).  Furthermore, local government in Botswana has a track record of good performance, 
effective provision of service delivery and political viability better than any in Africa and 
perhaps most of the developing world (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 92, 102). 
 
However, the government has acknowledged that there are serious limitations with its 
decentralisation strategy and has resorted to continual improvement. In recognition of the 
need to further strengthen local level institutions and fine tune the service delivery systems 
the government has committed to a number of reforms involving the ‘functional and 
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organisational structure for the formulation, management and coordination of decentralised 
activities at the local level’ (GoB, 2003a: 400). Radical changes have been deliberately 
avoided instead choosing a gradualist or incremental approach. The most significant changes 
have been derived from the two Local Government Structure Commissions (the Presidential 
Commission on Local Government Structure in Botswana 1979, and the Second Presidential 
Commission on Local Government Structure in Botswana 2001) as well as from the PMS 
Programme and the Organisation and Methods reviews (O & M). The said Presidential 
Commissions have had profound effect on the structure of local government. The 1979 
Commission recommended the separation of the Land Boards and the removal of chiefs from 
the councils. The Second Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure in 
Botswana, which was chaired by the former Permanent Secretary (PS) of the then Ministry of 
Local Government, Lands and Housing and now a Minister in the Ministry of 
Communications, Science and Technology, Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi, hereinafter referred to 
as the Venson Commission Report after its Chairperson has been widely seen by many 
observers as more radical and innovative. It is worthy at this juncture to comment on Venson-
Moitoi’s role in the development of local government in Botswana as her influence will be 
evident in the background and analytical chapters on Botswana.  
 
In 1992 during Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi’s tenure as PS in the then Ministry of Local 
Government, Lands and Housing there was a major corruption scandal relating to the 
Botswana Housing Corporation in which top politicians were implicated. A commission of 
inquiry was established by the President to investigate the saga. The Commissioners held the 
then Vice President and Minister of Local Government, Lands and Housing politically 
responsible while Venson-Moitoi was held administratively responsible, and both lost their 
jobs. Venson-Moitoi then moved to Western Cape in South Africa, in 1993, where she 
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became a consultant on local government until 1998 when she returned to Botswana and got 
a job as the Acting Executive Secretary of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party. In 1999 she 
joined active politics, first losing the primary elections but bouncing back as a Specially 
Elected Member of Parliament the same year. Since 2001 she has held a number of 
ministerial posts in government.    
 
As Chairperson of the Commission, Venson-Moitoi, seemed to have significant influence on 
the outcome of the Commissioners’ report as it had some of the recommendations that veered 
towards a more or less similar local government model to that in South Africa. For instance, 
the recommendations to introduce a mayoral system in which politicians have executive 
functions and decentralising more decision-making powers to local authorities. Because of 
the novelty associated with the Report and its recommendations, also bearing in mind that at 
the time of collecting data many of the recommendations were still being implemented and 
much talked about in government circles, the respondents in this study (as it will be shown in 
Chapter VI) tended to share similar opinions. Venson-Moitoi’s four year consultancy work in 
South Africa indicates the sharing of ideas between the two countries. Besides borrowing 
from the South African experience during her role as Chairperson of the Commission, and 
her work in Cape Town, she influenced both budding scholars and practitioners as a Part-time 
Lecturer on MPhil programme on Development Processes at the University of the Western 
Cape, a role she held from 1994 -1996. 
 
Among some of the significant recommendations the Venson Commission Report 
recommended the establishment of additional Sub-Districts, Administrative Authorities and 
Service Centres (GoB, 2001, 126) and the government accepted the recommendations (see 
GoB, 2004: 53). These structures are meant to improve service delivery at local level. All of 
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the large district councils and some small ones have established subordinate district councils, 
known as sub-district councils, to which they have decentralised some of their own 
responsibilities. The Central District Council (CDC), the largest district council in the 
country, developed its own policy on decentralisation in 1999 and has decentralised some of 
the functions that have all along been performed at the District Headquarters to its five Sub-
Districts of Mahalapye, Serowe/Palapye, Bobirwa, Tutume and Boteti. The Central District is 
the only district in Botswana to decentralise more substantive powers to its sub-districts. This 
is so because it is the largest district both geographically and in population size, covering an 
area of 147, 740 km² or a third of Botswana’s land mass and an estimated population of 501, 
378 – almost one third of the national population.  
 
The CDC’s decentralisation policy is modelled along the South Somerset District Council in 
the UK (Meyer-Emerick, et al, 2004). The South Somerset decentralisation was described as 
having devolved decision-making powers and budgeting, and having a culture of flexible and 
performance oriented organisational structure (ibid; 227). The intended objective of the 
CDC’s decentralisation policy is to ‘set a stage for an effective take-off to a decentralisation 
process’ (CDC, 1999: 2). This decentralisation process is additional to the process that started 
way back when Sub-Districts were ‘established in the early 1980s’ (Meyer, et al, 2004: 228). 
And the reasons for decentralisation remain the same, the main objective being ‘to enhance 
and foster the delivery of service to the rural populace’ and also because of the large number 
of councillors ‘it has become increasingly difficult to meet as a council and deliberate 
fruitfully on development issues without compromising service delivery’ (CDC, 1999: 2). 
The strategy enjoyed support from the Office of the President and the Permanent Secretary in 
the Ministry of Local Government. A Presidential Directive CAB 10/99 of 28 April 1999 and 
a Savingram from the Permanent Secretary directed the establishment of two additional 
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committees for each of the larger sub-districts (Mahalapye, Serowe/Palapye and Tutume) and 
one for each of the smaller sub-districts (Bobirwa and Boteti). The two committees in larger 
sub-districts were known as Finance, Planning, and Development Committee, and another 
known as the Health, Education and Social Services Committee. These were in addition to a 
committee that was already in existence in all the sub-districts, known as Trade and 
Licensing Committee. These were responsible for the statutory function for council finance, 
stores, council projects, furniture and the purchasing and maintenance of council mechanical 
installations and vehicles. The second committee was responsible for statutory functions of 
health, education, and social welfare programmes. For the smaller sub-districts only one 
committee was established to deal with all these matters.  
 
Most of the functions of the council would now be conducted at the sub-districts. The 
statutory functions of the district council were now performed at the sub-districts, closer to 
the people, and this had HR implications and the organisational structure of the Sub-districts 
had to change to accommodate the increased responsibilities. The Headquarters remained 
with two statutory committees Finance and Education, which coordinated the activities of the 
sub-districts and also handled policy matters. The councils’ committees consist of councillors 
from all political parties that have representation in the local assembly.  These also help 
involve local level politicians in the decision-making process.    
 
A significant improvement has been noted in service delivery as most decisions are made at 
the sub-districts closer to the clients (Meyer, et al, 2004). The Full Council Meetings at the 
Headquarters also take a shorter time resulting in more savings for the council and to divert 
such funds into development projects which could otherwise have gone into paying 
councillors for the trips to the Headquarters to attend meetings (ibid). Meyer, et al, also noted 
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that councillors now have more time to consult with their wards. However, Meyer, et al, 
questioned the sustainability of this reform arguing that Sub-Districts are not legally 
recognised so the bureaucrats and politicians at the Headquarters may withdraw 
responsibilities as they wish because the decentralised responsibilities have been 
deconcentrated but not devolved. However, latest developments would alley any fears as the 
Venson Commission Report has already recommended that Sub-Districts be established by 
statute and the government has already accepted that recommendation. Also, there is both the 
political will and administrative commitment from the Office of the President and the 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, respectively as they support the 
strategy. In addition, structures have already been created such as Committees and some 
powers already given to these Committees which may make the reversal of the decision 
difficult.  
 
The Venson Commission Report made some significant observations concerning 
decentralisation in Botswana. The commissioners were critical of the government’s slow 
decentralisation process stating that ‘the responsibility of government to set up strong local 
government was delayed and in some cases sidestepped’ (GoB, 2001: 4). This attitude 
towards decentralisation was found to have affected the manner in which resources are 
allocated to the LAs. The allocation of human resources was found to be ‘characterised by 
inconsistency, no transparency, and unclear and disjointed procedures’ as well as poor ‘career 
prospects and incentives’ that led to the loss of some of the best personnel to the central 
government (ibid: 6). The government did accept some of the recommendations from the 
Venson Commission Report including one on the contractual employment of council Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) with performance targets attached (GoB: 2004: 29). However, a 
recommendation on making the salaries of council CEOs and top management comparable to 
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that of their counterparts in central government was refused on the grounds that, according to 
the Paterson Model, employees at councils are not at policy level but operational level. Also 
accepted was the recommendation that appointments into the council CEO posts should be 
advertised instead of moving people between posts. Figure 4.1 illustrates the trajectory of 
HRM in the Botswana local authorities. 
Figure 4.1: The Trajectory of HRM in Botswana’s Local Government 
 
Source: Author’s Own Construct (2008)  
 
In fact HRM in local authorities has been recentralised through the Unified Local 
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HRM system that was introduced at independence and introduced the unified model in which 
the centre had a more decisive role. 
 
At independence Botswana adopted a separated HRM system for its local authorities, 
meaning each could hire and fire its own staff. But shortly after independence it was evident 
that lack of skilled labour was a major concern for most of the local authorities (as stated 
earlier by Picard, 1987) and that compromised the standard of services and service delivery. 
By the early 1970s the government had decided to change to a HRM system that could best 
serve the national interest. That decision led to the enactment of the ULGS Act of 1973 and 
the decision moved the HRM system from the decentralised personnel management system to 
the centralised personnel management system. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1 above. 
 
As it will be demonstrated in Section 4.4 below, through incremental changes to the HRM 
system responsibility for the management of certain posts up-to middle management level in 
the local authorities have been decentralised. This factor makes the HRM system to have a 
combination of both centralised and partially decentralised HRM responsibilities. In Figure 
4.1 this movement is represented by the downward pointing arrow, and the position at which 
the municipalities are perceived to be is represented by the circle with a cross. In the same 
Figure 4.1 above it shows that the HRM practices are being performed in the personnel 
management style under a PA system. 
    
4.2.2. The Internal Environment 
This section discusses the internal environmental factors raised in the analytical model in 
Chapter II. These include local political leadership, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 




Local Political Leadership 
Politicians at local level in Botswana do not have executive powers. However, they do 
constitute council committees that do make binding resolutions on various council functions. 
However, the CEOs (i.e. Council Secretaries, City Clerks and Town Clerks) wield more 
power, control resources, and command more prestige than the political leaders (i.e. Council 
Chairpersons and Mayors). This has in a way constrained the accountability of the local 
political leadership to their electorate. The Venson Commission Report recommended that 
the position of Executive Mayor be established and also each council should have an 
Executive Committee to be chaired by the Mayor. The government rejected the 
recommendation on the grounds that it would compromise the principle of the separation of 
powers and neutrality of public officers (GoB, 2004: 16).  The decision to maintain the status 
quo was based on past experience or history as local politicians in Botswana have never had 
executive powers since independence. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
Olowu and Wunsch (2004: 93) noted impressive personnel in terms of diversity, 
professionalism, competency, and paper qualifications. While this may be true, many 
(especially doctors and engineers) were recruited from other African countries (e.g. Kenya, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and abroad (e.g. India). The ability to 
recruit from other countries perhaps lies in Botswana’s economic strength (comparatively 
higher salaries) relative to other African countries. Although coming with some strings 
attached, as well as limiting policy choices at local level, local government in Botswana 
enjoys fairly stable and predictable source of revenue and equitable distribution of HRs. 
There is also political commitment to the latest reforms, in particular the implementation of 
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PMS in local government, and periodic review and reform of local government through 
Presidential Commissions.  
 
However, the main threat to local government is the legal framework in which the laws grant 
the Minister of Local Government the power to dissolve any local council he/she may have to 
discipline. This clause has never been invoked even when one of the opposition controlled, 
Jwaneng Town Council, failed to submit their budget proposals in time to be incorporated in 
the national budget. One important factor considered is organisational culture.    
 
Organisational Culture and Structure 
Unlike its neighbours and most developing countries, at independence the colonial 
government left behind a very limited administrative infrastructure in Botswana. At the time 
when many African countries were localising their public services Botswana decided to 
continue the importation of expatriate labour especially former colonial administrators from 
other former British colonies in East and West Africa (Picard, 1987: 205, 206). The new 
government of Botswana had rejected a localisation recommendation made by the 1966 Luke 
Commission calling for the unbridled Africanisation of the public service and ‘some lowering 
of standards’ as an ‘acceptable price to pay for the creation of a national civil service’ (ibid: 
205, 206). In 1967 Botswana’s first President, Seretse Khama, emphatically rejected the 
recommendation arguing that, “We would never sacrifice efficiency on the altar of 
localisation” (President Khama cited in Picard, 1987: 205). This marked a critical juncture in 
HR policy at all levels of government through which a merit based recruitment system was to 




Jones, et al, (1996) conducted a study on the perceptions of leadership and management 
among managers in Botswana’s then Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing. The 
study was based on Kotter’s (1990) differentiation of a manager and a leader. Kotter’s 
argument is premised on the perception that a manager’s and leader’s roles are fundamentally 
different and that the individuals performing these tasks are psychologically different as well 
(Jones, et al, 1996: 459). In Botswana they found that the interviewees perceived no 
difference between manager and leader. Furthermore they found the respondents (who 
themselves were managers) to be concerned about the quality of their relationship with their 
superiors and that there is significant amount of deference to the superior, also a leader is 
perceived as supportive and kindly (Jones, et al, 1996: 463). They also found that 
performance is judged by the reaction of the superior but not any measurable performance 
criteria (ibid: 464). This suggests that the particularistic tendencies observed by McCourt 
(2006) in Mauritius and Namibia, and Blunt and Poopola (1985) in several other African 
countries (see Chapter II, Subsection 2.2.2) are present in the Botswana HRM system. Jones, 
et al concluded that this contrasts with the ideal western organisational leadership and the 
African organisational leadership mentioned in several other studies.   
 
Batswana have developed a dependency attitude on the state in spite of one of the national 
mottos being self-reliance. ‘… Botswana’s development strategy has relied largely on 
government, not only for the provision of services, but also for investment in development 
activities as well as for the creation of jobs’6 (UNDP, 2001: 4). Public sector jobs provided 
the most widely available opportunities of employment and a source of livelihood for many. 
This dependency attitude has translated into organisational culture in which employees have 
developed a culture of entitlement. This is manifest in the expectation of progression and 
                                               
6
 Emphasis added. 
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promotion based on seniority but not performance and reliance on government training 
without the employee investing in their own personal development. 
 
The neglect of the HRM function in the local authorities is reflected in the organisational 
structure of the local authorities in which human resources has always remained as a unit but 
not a full-fledged department. Picard (1987) and the Venson Commission Report indicate that 
commitment to proper staffing of local authorities has always been lacking. The 
Decentralisation in Botswana Policy Paper and Action Plan (1993; 24) recommended the 
‘strengthening of personnel function in local authorities particularly councils, through the 
creation of well staffed Personnel Departments/Units’. For a long time HRM functions were 
performed by a Personnel Unit under the Secretariat Department. As a Unit the pay for the 
head of personnel is not on par with the other heads of council departments and therefore 
commands less authority. Obviously, the councils would not be able to attract highly skilled 
and experienced employees to effectively manage the personnel units. 
 
Besides the anomaly of relegating the personnel division to a unit, other structures were 
found to be problematic. The Task Force noted that there was uncontrolled growth of LAs as 
more functions were decentralised and the needs exerted by a growing population increased 
the demand for services (GoB, 2005a: 16). Together with this was the uncontrolled creation 
of departments within the councils which are established without any rationalisation or 
review (ibid: 19). The Task force also found that O & M review was infrequently done to 
address the problem.  
 
In some of the attempts to address the problem, in 2005 the Department of Local Government 
Service Management (DLGSM) appointed a Task Force to undertake a comprehensive O & 
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M review of the local authorities. This was to address organisational structure problems 
prevailing within the local authorities. Prior to this two O & M studies had been carried out 
before. The first ever for local authorities was in 1993 carried out by a Swedish company 
known as SIPU. That study was found to be inadequate as ‘it was not closely aligned to the 
strategy adopted in the Review of Government Ministries’ (GoB, 2005a: 1). A review of the 
SIPU report was undertaken in 1996 to see how best to implement its recommendations but 
the Report of the Review Committee was never implemented on the grounds that the SIPU 
study was inherently inadequate (ibid). Instead a comprehensive study was preferred and 
commissioned in 1999/2001, which was also rejected as it was found to be ‘misdirected and 
completely irrelevant to be implemented’ (ibid). Other notable endeavours in addressing local 
authorities’ organisational structure are the 1979 and 2001 Presidential Commissions on 
Local Government Structure. All these recognised the need to upgrade the personnel unit into 
a full-fledged department but this recommendation, albeit coming from various sources, was 
never heeded. However, the 2005 Report of the Task Force on the O & M Study of the Local 
Authorities has been accepted by Cabinet and a strategy for implementation of the approved 
structure of local authorities has been developed and its implementation was planned to be 
carried out from the 18th September 2006 to the 30th April 2007. Notable in this approved 
structure is the elevation of the personnel unit to a department in the local authorities. This 
development would place the head of HR on par with other departmental heads. Whether this 
would lead to the head of HR playing a more significant role in management, or not, is yet to 
be seen. The next section outlines the concept of HRM in Botswana’s local government. 
 
4.3. Concept of Human Resource Management 
The local authorities in Botswana do not have a HR policy separate from that of the central 
government but operate within the HRM policy framework of central government that is set 
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and managed by the DPSM. There are three main legislations that inform the HRM policy in 
Botswana, these are: the Public Service Management Act 1998, Unified Local Government 
Service (ULGS) Act 1973 and Teaching Service Management (TSM) Act. The ULGS Act 
was enacted after the government realised the shortage of skilled labour in the country and 
also to control nepotism. However, in practice the Directorate of Local Government Service 
Management (DLGSM) and Teaching Service Management (TSM) only serve a subservient 
role to the DPSM. The DPSM is responsible for the supervision of the implementation of 
HRM policies and for general guidance on other management practices to be used in the daily 
operations of the respective ministries (GoB, 2003a). Both the DLGSM and TSM are 
departments within the ministries of Local Government and Education respectively. So they 
are under the direction of the Permanent Secretaries of the respective Ministries, who in turn 
derive their HRM policy guidance from DPSM.  
 
The basis for the HRM policies in Botswana’s public sector, as stated in NDP 9, is the 
facilitation of the realisation of the Vision 2016 goals and the efficient and effective delivery 
of services which includes the application of appropriate management strategies (ibid: 381). 
It is on the ethos of ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services to the 
customer that HRM policies at all levels of government are based. This indicates a shift from 
a public administration ethos to a customer focus that is embodied in the NPM philosophy.  
The vision statement of DLGSM commits itself to the ideals of Vision 2016, and its mission 
statement reiterates the public service’s focus on customer service. The Vision reads as 
follows: 
‘We, the Department of Local Government Service Management as part of 
the Ministry of Local Government will be a competitive customer focused 
centre of excellence in service delivery, development coordination and 
capacity building. We will maintain a transparent culture in keeping with 




The Mission statement reads: 
 
‘We, the Department of Local Government Service Management as the 
lead organisation in the provision of human resource management services 
and capacity building in Local Authorities, commit ourselves to providing 
meaningful customer-focused service to facilitate efficient and effective 
service provision by the Local Authorities’ (GoB; 2005a: 9). 
 
The Vision statement for the DLGSM reads exactly the same as that of the Ministry of Local 
Government except for their self identification in the statement. However, the LAs are at 
different stages of developing their own vision and mission statements. It is anticipated that 
their vision and mission statements will be consistent with that of the Ministry of Local 
Government. This customer focus indicates some direction towards NPM-style reform of the 
HRM. 
 
In its pursuit of public sector reforms, the government of Botswana decentralised some 
responsibilities of the DPSM to other government ministries to shore up efficiency and 
accountability in all issues related to HRM. This covered the human resource functions of all 
posts up-to D1 (which is a super scale position). The HRM responsibilities of all the agencies 
that fall under the Ministry of Local Government remain with the Permanent Secretary of that 
Ministry. However, the HRM operational functions for LAs are performed by the DLGSM as 
already mentioned and some responsibilities have further been decentralised to the Local 
Authorities, while some are shared (see Appendix 10).  
 
The DPSM has retained supervisory responsibility over local authorities to ensure that the 
HRM strategy is successful. This central control is manifest in the public sector human 
resources management structure, which comprises of the Public Service, parastatal 
organisations, the Teaching Service and Local Authorities with the DPSM at the helm. This 
structure is, however, perceived to impose some limitations on certain aspects of human 
124 
 
resource management especially with regard to recruitment in local government. What is 
surprising is that the acute shortage of skilled labour in the professional and technical fields 
has been noted repeatedly in every national development plan but little seems to have 
changed. The government unequivocally notes that the shortage of manpower limits the 
capacity of local authorities to perform their mandate and that the ‘shortage is more 
pronounced in the professional and technical fields’ (GoB, 2003a: 393).  
 
The DPSM is not only responsible for the broad policy guidelines but also for the 
standardisation and coordination of the day-to-day HRM activities of the other government 
ministries and departments. The advantage of this institutional set-up is that it ensures a 
consistent application of policies across the civil service and local government. On the other 
hand it has led to centralisation that has availed little freedom/flexibility in the decision-
making process within the broad policy framework for other players such as the DLGSM and 
the councils. The centralisation resulting from the coordination of HRM activities is within 
the government’s tradition of central control that predates the colonial era and has been 
perpetuated under the new reforms. The framework for the performance of HRM activities in 
local government is discussed below.  
 
4.4. HRM Practices 
The management of human resources in local government is centralised as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1 above. At independence the HRM system used was the separated model but due to 
problems related to nepotism, capacity and resource constraints faced by the majority of the 
councils the government introduced a unified service in 1973. Immediately after this, all 
HRM responsibilities were performed by the DLGSM at the centre. However, as the capacity 
of local authorities increased some HRM responsibilities have been decentralised. While 
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DLGSM remained with HRM responsibilities for middle management positions upwards, the 
rest, including posts ranging from the salary scales/grades A1 to C3 (i.e. for unskilled 
workers to middle management entry level), have been decentralised. That means they can 
hire and dismiss such without reference to the centre. This as well, accounts for the 
positioning of the HRM system to be neither fully centralised nor fully decentralised as 
reflected in Figure 4.1 above. The HRM system is somewhere in the middle, showing mixed 
tendencies towards centralisation/decentralisation under a personnel management system. 
However, for the promotions of officers on C3 posts the concerned council has to make a 
recommendation to DLGSM who in turn would look elsewhere in the country to see if there 
is a vacant senior post into which the officer could be promoted.  
 
Councils in practice find some decisions that are made at the centre (DLGSM), to be 
inconvenient. Two examples are presented for illustrative purposes. These are transfers of 
staff between councils and, training and development. Transfers, for example, have been 
noted to be disruptive of council activities and also limit the control of councils over their 
employees (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 94; Sharma, 1997; Picard 1987). Indiscriminate 
transfers have been noted to leave some employees disgruntled (Sharma, 1997). Transfers of 
this kind also may leave even the most productive employees demotivated.  
 
As for training Sharma (1997) observed more than a decade ago that there was no 
comprehensive manpower development plan that has been drawn, even though a training 
needs assessment for local authorities was done in 2005.  Current training for local authorities 
consists of ‘institutional training, in-house training, mobile training, and ad hoc workshops 
and seminars’ (ibid: 67).  Ironically, training is not designed to address the needs of the 
broader unified local government service but that it is local authority specific (ibid).  Some 
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employees that a particular council recommended for further studies to build their capacity to 
perform at a higher level may be transferred to another council after the completion of their 
studies (Phirinyane and Kaboyakgosi, 2001). Sometimes there are no vacancies in a particular 
council into which they could promote an employee and as a result they end up losing the 
trained person to another council (ibid). There are both advantages and disadvantages in the 
setup. The advantage is in the always present opportunity to promote an employee from a 
municipality with no senior posts into one with a vacant post. HRs can be deployed where 
they are most needed. On the contrary local authorities have no control over an employee 
whose capacity was developed through training in anticipation of them taking up more 
challenging responsibilities (filling a vacant post). This background shows that after the 
centralisation of HRM in the early 1970s, there has been an evolutionary change towards 
decentralised HRM that is still in progress. Lastly, this chapter looks at performance 
management. 
 
4.5 Performance Management 
The government of Botswana has embarked on a series of public service reforms such as: 
Performance Management (PMS); Computerised Personnel Management System (CPMS); 
Organisation and Methods (O&M); Privatisation; Performance Based Reward System 
(PBRS); Performance Contract; Parallel Progression; Scarce Skills; Job Evaluation; 
Localization; and Decentralisation (GoB, 2003a: 366). It is useful to consider how these have 
been implemented since they have a bearing on the underlying research question about the 
degree, effectiveness and overall direction of decentralisation.  Some of these were to be 
implemented with the assistance of the Botswana National Productivity Centre (BNPC), 




Of all the public sector reforms the most important in Botswana are PMS, PBRS, 
Computerisation of Personnel Management Systems and Decentralisation.  These were 
completely new initiatives and had a dramatic impact on the management of HRs in the 
public service. Through CPMS all HR managers had access to computerised data base linked 
to the computer at the DPSM. Decentralisation has shifted HRM responsibilities for the 
designated cadres entirely to the Permanent Secretaries, thereby doing away with the delays 
that ministries used to complain about. PBRS is intended to align individual performance 
with rewards in order to retain good performers and discourage poor performance. The 
implementation of PBRS is intended to facilitate the implementation of Performance Contract 
for senior public officers. New performance appraisal instruments for central government 
have been designed and implemented. However, at the time data was collected the local 
authorities were yet to develop theirs. PMS is the most comprehensive of all the reforms and 
through it all other reforms have been consolidated which had hitherto been intermittent and 
limited in scope. PMS involved the restructuring of public institutions to realign them to their 
strategies.  
 
These reforms have been extended to local governments as well, but after they have first been 
implemented in central government. Computerised HRM systems are in place in all the 
councils. Certain HRM responsibilities have been decentralised from the DLGSM to the 
councils. But before the discussion focuses on the implementation of PMS at local level, we 
discuss the establishment of the BNPC and its role in public personnel management in 
Botswana.   
 
The BNPC was established through an Act of Parliament, the Botswana National 
Productivity Centre Act, 1993. The objectives of the BNPC are to promote increased 
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productivity, standards of management and labour-management relations, and to create 
productivity consciousness in Botswana. BNPC seeks to achieve its objectives through a 
tripartite strategy involving the government, commerce and industry and trade unions in 
Botswana. Its Board of Directors is constituted to reflect this ‘tripartism’ composition, and a 
few other stakeholders; an interestingly complex form of decentralisation that is in 
consonance with the ideals of NPM. 
 
BNPC was contracted to introduce the Performance Management Systems in the government 
between 1999 and 2004. PMS was rolled out to the local authorities in 2004, after its roll out 
to central government was completed. Prior to that, in 2000/1 BNPC introduced PMS as a 
general concept of change management for purposes of creating awareness among LAs’ 
CEOs. In 2002 a situation analysis was carried out to assess the management reality and how 
PMS could be rolled out to the local authorities. However, due to technical problems the 
implementation of the project was delayed, the project eventually being implemented in two 
phases, first phase started in 2004/6 and the second phase having started in 2006 and ending 
in 2007.  
 
A structure has been developed to manage the implementation of PMS at local level, and to 
ensure its success. The project is housed at the Office of the President and the Botswana 
National Productivity Centre has been contracted as the consultant for the implementation of 
the project. Funding for the project was provided by the Office of the President. Because the 
project started after budget allocations had already been passed by parliament the Ministry of 
Local Government had to explore other sources of funding including Supplementary Budget 




The Ministry of Local Government is responsible for managing the project. The overall 
project is managed through a Technical Committee consisting of representatives from: 
District Administration as the Client, DLGSM, Reforms Unit in the Office of the President, 
Performance Improvement Coordinator (LAs) - Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of 
Lands and Housing, and BNPC. There are monthly progress reviews for which the BNPC as 
the Consultant has to furnish reports. The Consultant is also expected to visit the project sites 
regularly to monitor progress. The Reforms Unit has been moved from the DPSM to the 
Office of the President to give it the necessary prestige and keep it close to the Permanent 
Secretary to the President and State President for close monitoring. This shows the political 
commitment the leadership has on the public sector reform initiatives.   
 
4.6. Information on Outcomes 
Local authorities in Botswana do not have objective quantifiable measurement of 
organisational and individual performance in place (Phirinyane and Kaboyakgosi, 2001: 49). 
The local authorities used annual plans, quarterly and monthly reports as instruments for the 
measurement of performance (ibid). There were no key performance indicators and key result 
areas that could guide the Local Authorities as to whether they were moving in the right 
direction to achieve their objectives. Most of the councils at the time of this study were still 
implementing PMS, implying they had not yet started using the measurement mechanisms 
that PMS affords them. Although audit reports are prepared annually for local authorities, 
there is no performance audit carried out for local government. The combined absence of a 
performance measurement system and a lack of performance audit imply there is limited 




4.7 Summary  
This chapter presented the background on decentralisation and HRM in Botswana. The 
discussion shows that many policy choices and decisions that the government made had 
enduring influence on the socio-political and economic policy choices. Many of the 
decisions/choices were influenced by experience and as time passed by became path 
dependent. Some of these influences predate independence and in some cases even the 
colonial era. For instance, this study has shown that political stability occurred prior to 
independence as part of the condition for British protection. The domination of civil society 
by the ruling elite was inherited from the Tswana polity predating colonialism and 
perpetuated during the colonial and the post-independence period. The pre-independence 
social culture has been largely preserved and successfully blended with modern governance 
practices.  The domination of civil society went along with the centralisation of power in 
Tswana society. This aspect of social culture extends to organisational culture where it is 
expressed in the power relations between senior officers and their subordinates.   
 
On economic management the prevailing scenario has been that of a conservative approach 
where the government avoided excessive debt and donor funding that seemed not consistent 
with national interests. Here was a very poor country at independence that could have easily 
fallen for donor funding and loan finance but opted for restraint. The persistence of one party 
in power and the policy feedbacks on the good policy choices, led to the formation of 
institutions around a particular approach to economic management that continued to bear 
good results and remained largely unchanged since independence. Rules and norms have 
been developed and entrenched around prudent economic management that underpin the way 
the economy is run. These institutions were persistent to the extent that when the 
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centralisation of fiscal resources had evidently become a liability for local authorities, moves 
to decentralisation have remained very slow. 
 
With regard to the management of HRs, the timing of the decision made by the first President 
of Botswana rejecting localisation for the mere Africanisation of the public service was 
critical. That marked a critical juncture in the establishment of a merit based system. Also, 
the enactment of the ULGS Act in 1973 to standardise and coordinate the recruitment of 
employees for local government (which effectively reversed a more decentralised system), 
was a timely sequencing that assisted in the fight against nepotism, corruption and lack of 
capacity across municipalities.  Flexibility in HRM has been subordinated to the pursuit of 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services. This has led to a decentralisation 
characterised by a dominant centre and limited autonomy for local government in the 
management of its HRs. The introduction of the PMS in the public service marked yet 
another critical juncture in HRM as it led to a major shift in the HRM ethos to one based on 
customer service. Also, the introduction of PMS was accompanied by the establishment of a 
strategic framework in the public service. These changes denoted transition to NPM-style 
reforms that are linked to SHRM. Nevertheless HRM practice at local level remained the 
personnel management type as the reforms were still ongoing. 
 
The introduction of democratic local governance at independence at the expense of traditional 
leadership represented a critical juncture in decentralisation, and its timing took place at the 
formative stages of local governance in the post independence era. In spite of the two 
Presidential Commissions on Local Government Structure change has largely been 
evolutionary (as opposed to radical). On the other hand decentralisation has been contingent 
upon the regime’s perception of the threats to its own survival. In some cases decisions that 
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could strengthen local government were deliberately avoided. This is in spite of the officially 
stated position on decentralisation. This led to a situation where the centre gave more 
responsibilities to local government as and when they felt it was either politically and 
administratively convenient or expedient to do so. The next chapter discusses the case of the 
North West province. It presents background information that will help us to better 










This chapter presents the background of South Africa and the North West province. The 
background information of any province in South Africa can only be appreciated within the 
broader context of South Africa.  The chapter applies the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter II to present the background that partially answers the research questions. In this 
chapter the question of whether there is a trade-off between SHRM and decentralization or 
local democracy in South Africa is considered. The chapter begins by looking at the main 
factors/elements that influence the management of human resources in local government in 
South Africa. Also highlighted are some of the peculiarities that distinguish South Africa 
from other African countries.   
 
The discussion in this chapter focuses first on the environmental and institutional factors and 
how they impact on the HRM and decentralisation.  
 
5.2 The Environmental and Institutional Factors 






5.2.1. The External Environment 
Political Background 
South Africa is situated at the southern tip of Africa and shares borders with six other 
countries; Mozambique, Swaziland (which it almost encircles), Zimbabwe and Botswana to 
the north, Namibia to the north west, and Lesotho which is totally encircled towards the 
southern interior of the country (see Appendix 4). South African society has experienced 
conquest, racial segregation and violence for over several centuries. Prior to conquest by 
European settlers, Africans in south-eastern South Africa had a turbulent period. In the 1820s 
a predatory Zulu kingdom under Shaka’s leadership traumatised other neighbouring 
chiefdoms.  Thompson (1996: 85) gives a graphic illustration of the aftermath of Shaka’s 
military campaigns against neighbouring ethnic groups, he stated that: 
 
Settlements were abandoned, livestock were destroyed, fields ceased to be 
cultivated, and in several places the landscape was littered with human 
bones. Demoralized survivors wandered round singly or in small groups, 
contriving to live on game or veld plants. Some even resorted to cannibalism 
– the ultimate sign that civil society had collapsed.   
 
 
Many communities were destroyed or displaced. Thompson further notes that thousands of 
the displaced groups, Basotho, Batswana, Mfengu and Xhosa left the highveld and went to 
the Cape in search of livelihoods, which they could only secure by working for white settlers. 
When the white settlers expanded eastward, the highveld appeared to be uninhabited as it was 
now sparsely populated. In the highveld the settlers defeated Mzilikazi’s Ndebele who fled 
across the Limpopo River into present day Zimbabwe (ibid). Elsewhere the Zulus too were 
eventually defeated after repeated battles. The Sotho and Tswana chiefdoms that the Ndebele 
had displaced returned to their former homes. ‘The entire highveld region became a scene of 
divided loyalties and endemic conflict’ (Thompson, 1996: 94). Africans were eventually 
conquered by the white invaders from the south, and were subjected to discriminatory 
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policies. The conquest of Africans by the Boers/Afrikaaners (South African whites of Dutch 
descent) marked a critical juncture in South African politics. 
 
The Afrikaaners established independent republics and resisted British sovereignty. It was 
after their loss to the British in the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 that the Treaty of 
Vereeniging established British sovereignty over the republics7. According to the Treaty of 
Vereeniging blacks were not allowed to vote, except in the Cape Colony where the British 
dominated.  Institutionalised racial segregation in South Africa became more blatant and 
emboldened after the establishment of the Union of South Africa in February 1909 when it 
was entrenched in the constitution (Thompson, 1996: 150). From 1910 (when South Africa 
became independent) to 1948, as colonial influence over South Africa waned, racial 
segregation and the disenfranchisement of blacks was extended to all four of the South 
African provinces, formerly the Orange River Colony, the Transvaal, Natal and Cape Colony 
(ibid). Events that occurred in the years 1910 and 1948 were incremental to the initial forces 
that introduced apartheid.  
 
The basis of this discrimination was separate development for the different races in South 
Africa. This was captured in D.F. Malan’s speech in 1944 when as leader of the opposition he 
stated that he does not use the word ‘segregation’ but ‘apartheid’, ‘which will give the 
various races the opportunity of uplifting themselves on the basis of what is their own’ (cited 
in Giliomee, 2003: 374). It was in the 1940s that the racially motivated discrimination came 
to be officially known as ‘apartheid’ (Giliomee, 2003; Thompson, 1996). The first recorded 
reference to apartheid was in 1929 by Rev. J.C. Du Plessis of the Dutch Reformed Church 
(DRC) (Giliomee, 2003: 381). The DRC policy, although recognising racial equality between 





white and black, advocated for blacks to develop ‘on their own terrain, separate and apart’ 
(ibid: 382). This ‘apartness’ was to be the gist of apartheid. As Thompson (1996: 190) states, 
there were basically four principles behind apartheid and these were, that: 
• The South African population consists of four races – the Whites, Coloured, Indian 
and Blacks, each with a distinct culture of its own, 
• Whites as the civilised race were entitled to have absolute control over the state, 
• White interests should prevail over Black interests, and that the state was not obliged 
to provide equal facilities for the subordinate races, 
• The White race was one nation constituted of two components, Afrikaans and 
English speakers, but Africans belonged to several distinct nations.  
 
Based on these principles the apartheid government proceeded to segregate the African 
populations into ‘homelands’, or what was also known pejoratively as Bantustans, according 
to their ethnic identities. There were about 10 homelands created: Bophuthatswana, Ndebele, 
Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Swazi, Kwazulu, Qwaqwa, Transkei and Ciskei. Four of these 
were declared independent (Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda) by apartheid 
South Africa, but no other sovereign state ever recognised these as independent. All these 
except Ciskei were located on fragmented territories between white farms. At the end of 
apartheid in 1994 South Africa was reorganised into nine provinces; Gauteng, Eastern Cape, 
Western Cape, Northern Cape, Mpumalanga, Free State, Limpopo, North West and Kwazulu 
(see Appendix 4). 
 
The North West province, which is the focus of this study, was made from parts of the former 
Bophuthatswana, parts of the former Cape Province and the Transvaal. The main language in 
the North West province is Setswana, the same language spoken in Botswana. Throughout its 
so-called independence Bophuthatswana remained economically and politically dependent on 
the apartheid regime. Lucas Mangope became the President of Bophuthatswana when it 
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gained ‘independence’ in 1977 and under his regime political opposition was not allowed and 
major anti-apartheid organisations such as the ANC were banned (Francis, 2002). Civil 
society was almost non-existent and participatory political institutions were not easy to 
develop even after 1994 (ibid: 3). Laws governing the public service as all others regulating 
all spheres of life were based on racism. However, international pressure coupled with 
economic sanctions and guerrilla attacks eventually led to the demise of apartheid, and all its 
creations (homelands) crumbled with it.  
 
The African National Congress (ANC) having been formed in 1912, and banned since 1960, 
came to power in the 1994 democratic elections. The ANC won an overwhelming majority of 
85 percent of the vote in the North West provincial elections (Jones, 1999). The ascension to 
power by the ANC marked another critical juncture in the politics of South Africa. However, 
the new South African government inherited established institutions and their ‘powers and 
habits were carried forward’ (Hawker, 2000: 632). This points to the strong element of 
inheritance in politics and public policy referred to in Chapter II.  Hawker (2000: 632), 
writing only six years after the beginning of a new era, cited other scholars approvingly that 
‘the new state may face a recalcitrant bureaucracy, military and judiciary’. Although nothing 
of this sort happened on a massive scale, the main challenge for the new government of South 
Africa has been integrating employees from the former regime with the new less experienced 
but sometimes more qualified ones.  
 
The new leadership was fully aware of the potential pitfalls during the transition period and 
perhaps because of the uncertainties in the early years delayed the transition to democracy at 
local level (Wallis, 1996: 179). However, between 1997 and 2004 an array of legislations and 
138 
 
white papers were issued resulting in a complex local government legal framework (see 
Appendix 6 for a list of some of the laws governing the South African local government).  
 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996) 
establishes principles of ‘cooperative government and intergovernmental relations’. What this 
notion means and how it works out in practice constitutes the present day reality of South 
African decentralisation and local government.  Section 43 vests the legislative 
responsibilities of the national, provincial and local spheres of government in the Parliament, 
provincial legislatures and municipal councils respectively. The South African Parliament 
consists of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. The latter 
represents provincial interests in the legislative process. The political head of a provincial 
department is known as a Member of the Executive Council (MEC). All metropolitan and 
district municipalities and some local municipalities have an executive mayoral system.  The 
mayors are indirectly elected by the municipal councils (see sub-section on Decentralisation 
for more details on the local sphere of government). The South African constitution stipulates 
that elections should be based on the proportional representation electoral system. The 
President is elected indirectly by parliament. Provincial legislatures elect their own Premiers. 
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 (Act No. 13 of 2005) was enacted in 
accordance with Section 41(2) of the Constitution to provide for structures and institutions to 
facilitate supportive intergovernmental relations.  
 
The ANC dominated the first rounds of elections in most parts of the country. However, the 
ANC has lately been experiencing factional problems within its structures. At national level 
presidential hopefuls jostled for control of the party. Divisions emerged between supporters 
of the then incumbent President Thabo Mbeki, who was recalled by the ANC’s Executive 
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Committee in 2008 before the end of his term in 2009, and his erstwhile deputy Jacob Zuma. 
Factions in the provinces were said to follow these fault lines. However, three different 
factional groups were reportedly active in the North West; known colloquially as the 
‘Talibans’, ‘Mapogo’ and the ‘Vryburg Mafia’ (City Press, 2005c). One of these, the 
Talibans, was accused of wanting to take over the province (ibid). The situation had 
deteriorated to the extent the death of one former councillor was blamed on factionalism. The 
then ANC Provincial Chairperson and Premier of the North West, Edna Molewa, is alleged to 
have apologised on behalf of the ANC to the family of the multiple murder-suicide 
perpetrator Jaycee Nxamakele (The Mail, 2006). Nxamakele is alleged to have murdered his 
wife and two children and then killed himself due to frustrations he was experiencing as a 
result of the ANC factionalism. An MEC for Roads and Transport at the time, Jerry Thibedi, 
was quoted calling for unity and denouncing factionalism as evil at the funeral (ibid).  It will 
be explained later in Chapter VII how these factions influenced HRM.    
 
The underlying social culture of the Northern part of South Africa goes some way to explain 
what could be the factors influencing current factional behaviours in the society. 
  
Social Culture 
It is evident that South Africans have never had peace since the ancient days of Shaka, 
conquest by settlers and the subsequent racial discrimination and the resistance to it. Political 
violence and protests started as a challenge to the apartheid regime that apparently lacked 
legitimacy. Although political movements were formed as early as the 19th Century when 
apartheid was introduced, the initiatives by the black communities to resist increased in their 




Political violence especially among black communities heightened during 1984 to 1989 when 
5, 500 people lost their lives, and more than 13, 500 more lost their lives between 1990 and 
1993 (Charney, 1999: 184). The increase in violence was largely in black communities, and 
was suspected to have been instigated by some white elements seeking to destabilise the 
transition process (Thompson, 1996: 242; Charney, 1999: 182). Economic sanctions, 
disinvestment from multinational companies that sold their interests in South Africa and 
internal political violence and civil resistance made it hard for the Afrikaaners to continue to 
govern. National party leaders realised this and attempted ‘to create institutions Africans 
could respect …’ (Thompson 1996: 237).   
 
However, as Thompson (1996: 237-8) noted, the white electorate instead swung to the right. 
The swing to the right among  white voters was most obvious in the Transvaal where in the 
white municipal elections of October 1988, the Conservative Party won most of the small 
towns and almost won a majority in Pretoria (ibid: 238). The institutionalisation of apartheid 
significantly benefited the white community by creating exclusive white areas that were 
affluent and by far had good social services. These benefits, and other political factors 
beyond the scope of this thesis, constituted the feedback loops that spurred the white South 
Africans not to effect change of government through elections. The positive feedbacks from 
the racist policies led to resistance to change as demonstrated by the continued popularity of 
the National Party among white South Africans. On the other hand the black communities, 
largely rejecting the apartheid institutions that were imposed upon them, developed 
institutions (rules or norms) that governed civil resistance, with adherence enforced through 
punitive reprisals (e.g. killing and/or destruction of property of suspected collaborators). As it 
will be illustrated in the next paragraphs, some of these norms persisted even after majority 




Although the apartheid regime had competent security forces that it effectively utilised in 
brutalising the antiapartheid activists, it deliberately provided inefficient policing services in 
the black townships. Baker (2002: 33) states that communities resorted to ‘their own forms of 
policing in a context where the state offered very little and what was offered was seen as at 
best, inadequate and at worst, hostile, racist and illegitimate’. The neglect, or the inadequacy, 
of policing services in the townships led to the creation of vigilante groups, known for 
reprisal killings of those suspected of collaborating with the white regime.  
 
Bophuthatswana did not escape suppression of civil society development. The Mangope 
regime ‘was extremely vigilant and hostile to any potential political threat from what is 
considered foreign, in other words South African, trade unions and political groups’ (Jones, 
1999: 513). Moreover, Mangope’s rule was characterised by ‘patronage and corruption’ 
which were used ‘to maintain political support’ (Francis, 2002: 3; Jones, 1999). Civic 
organisations started to form after the collapse of Mangope’s regime.  
 
Widespread strikes, boycotts of rents and service charges, and violent clashes had 
nevertheless presented an insurmountable challenge to the apartheid regime (Major, 2005: 
493; Fjeldstad, 2004; Charney, 1999). Mangope’s fall in Botphuthatswana was also 
associated with the strike by civil servants over pay increase, which turned into political 
demonstrations as hospital staff, students and residents joined in (Jones, 1999). Widespread 
unrest formed the political culture that influences present day politics in the North West and 
South Africa as a whole. Both the apartheid regime and the former Bophuthatswana regime 
left an enduring legacy of social discord that may last for a considerable time. For instance, 
payment boycotts have continued into the new era and are creating challenges to the local 
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authorities’ ability to raise revenue (Fjeldstad, 2004: 540). This is one of the indicators that 




The South African economy is by far the biggest single economy in sub-Saharan Africa (see 
Appendix 7). South Africa has one of the most advanced communications and transport 
infrastructure in Africa, a well developed legal system and an advanced economy. South 
Africa also boasts a well developed energy sector, exporting electricity to its neighbours, a 
good industrial base and a well developed financial sector with one of the largest stock 
markets in the world. South Africa’s neighbours depend on her well developed 
communication and transportation infrastructure for the transportation of their goods. Migrant 
labour in the region has always flowed to the south, with 280, 000 migrant labour employed 
in South Africa in 1984 (Thompson, 1999: 230).  
 
The North West province is regarded as somewhat of an exception. It is a medium-sized but 
relatively poor province, with a 2004 population estimated at 3,562,280 and constituting 8.3 
percent of the South African population. The population composition is predominantly 
African, with the Setswana speakers making 67.2 percent, IsiXhosa 5.4 per cent and only 7.5 
percent Afrikaans speakers. As one of the poorest, it contributes only 5.3 percent of the total 







Table 5.1: Statistical Overview of the North West Province 
CAPITAL MAFIKENG 
Principal Languages Setswana                                    67,3% 
Afrikaans                                     7,5% 
IsiXhosa                                      5,4% 
Population 3,562,280 
% of total 8.3% 
Area (km) 116 320 km 
% of total 9.5% 
GGP at current prices R22,974 million 
% of total GDP 5.3% 
Per capita GGP R6,905 
Economically active population 1.35 million 
% of population 37.7% 
Source: RSA (2004)8,  
 
The province is also composed of areas that are predominantly rural with a mainly poor 
population, high levels of illiteracy, inadequate infrastructure and huge backlogs in basic 
service delivery and maintenance (RSA, 2006). The distribution of available resources is 
skewed and limits the potential for the improvement of service delivery and growth (ibid).   
 
Apartheid South Africa created wealthy white suburbs with central business districts (CBDs) 
and municipal services comparable to those of the developed countries and on the other hand 
extremely deprived black townships without any economic base (Reddy, 1996: 53). The 
apartheid regime did not allow the location of commercial or industrial undertakings in the 
homelands. After the new dispensation most people still remain in their localities, and with 
40 percent of South Africans living below the poverty datum line (RSA, 1997), 
municipalities are faced with a grim prospect of financial viability. 
 
To create an economically supportive environment for the municipalities the new government 
established a fiscal legislative framework for intergovernmental cooperation. Section 214 (1) 
and (2) of the Constitution guarantees equitable shares and allocations of funds to provinces 
                                               
8
 www.nwpg.org.za - Note should be taken that figures may change due to alteration of provincial boundaries. 
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and municipalities. Other laws, such as the Public Finance Management Act 1999, Annual 
Division of Revenue Act, the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 1997, and the Local 
Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 2003, also regulate the intergovernmental 
financial and fiscal relations. Section 36 (1) and (2) of the Constitution establishes the 
‘predictability and certainty of sources and levels of funding for municipalities including 
transfers for the next three financial years’. Section 3 (2) of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act provides for its own supremacy in the event contradictions arise between 
this Act and any other legislation, excluding the Constitution. 
 
Provincial and local government transfers are managed by the Department of Provincial and 
Local Government (DPLG). In the 2004/05 financial year provincial and local government 
transfers from the DPLG amounted to R13, 137,381. Appropriations increased by 26 percent 
in the second fiscal year, 39 percent in the third, 44 percent and 39 percent in the fourth and 
fifth years respectively. The year on year allocations to municipalities indicate a rapid 
increase in the amount of funding. In spite of the seemingly huge financial support from the 
national government, municipalities have to raise a substantial proportion of their revenue, 
about 90 percent, from own sources. Chapter 13 of the Constitution stipulates the funding 
sources for local government, such as entitlement to equitable share of revenue raised 
nationally, property rates, surcharges on user fees and, national legislation allowing, other 
taxes and levies. However, the main challenges for local authorities to raise adequate revenue 
and efficiently manage their financial resources are lack of capacity, poverty and non-
payment as well as boycott of user fees, corruption and failure to collect debt (Schoeman, 




Although corruption was a problem in apartheid South Africa and continues to present 
challenges in the new South Africa, the country has been one of the least corrupt in Sub-
Saharan Africa alternating between the second and third least corrupt (see Appendix 13). 
Between 2004 and 2008 South Africa’s CPI Score ranged between a minimum of 4.5 and 5.1. 
Only on two occasions in 2006 and 2008 did South Africa drop to third position as least 
corrupt country in SSA after Botswana and Mauritius respectively. Even then, South Africa 
was in a comparable position to some East European countries such as Latvia, Slovakia, 
Greece and some newly industrialised economies (NIE) such as South Korea and Malaysia.  
 
The Auditor General’s Report 2004/05 indicates that of the 284 municipalities only 95 (33%) 
had completed their financial statements for auditing by 30 April 2005 which was 10 months 
after the deadline.  Forty (14%) of the municipalities had not submitted their financial 
statements by that date were.  Slightly over half, 145 (51%) submitted their financial 
statements after the deadline on 30 September 2004. Compliance to the Municipal Finance 
Management Act which was effected in 2004 is yet to bear some impact. Municipalities are 
required to link the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) with the multi-year budgets, but 
this was proving difficult for many municipalities due to lack of capacity. According to the 
Municipal Demarcation Board findings, many of the services provided by the municipalities 
for the 2002/03 financial year were either not budgeted for, no human resources allocated for 
them or provision not linked to a budget (RSA, 2003). However, the government 
acknowledged the complexities involved and the capacity limitations of local government 
and has recruited consultants from overseas as change agents in the financial management 
reform (Rainford, 2004). Skilled labour in South Africa, especially the North West province 
is in short supply as shall be highlighted in the following sub-section. 




During the apartheid era training institutions for blacks were under resourced and did not 
cater adequately for technical courses which white schools provided for their students. Also, 
the government extended its control over the already less resourced black education which 
was under the mission schools (Thompson, 1996). The objective of the government was 
clearly to keep black education sub-standard. This was achieved through the Bantu Education 
Act 1953. Later Coloured and Asian education too was also controlled. Verwoed made his 
intentions about black education clear when he stated that: 
Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in 
accord with the policy of the state. … If the native in South Africa today in 
any kind of school in existence is being taught that he will live his adult life 
under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake. … There is no 
place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of 
labour (Omond, cited in Thompson, 1996: 196).      
 
Through the ironically misnamed Extension of University Education Act (1959) blacks were 
barred from acquiring university education unless given permission by a cabinet minister. 
Even those blacks that had access to university education were taught in segregated classes 
(Thompson, 1996: 197). Education for white South Africans was by far superior to that of 
blacks in every respect. Whites were also recruited in large numbers into the public sector, 
including homeland governments. Thompson (1996: 199) states that, in 1977, 90 percent of 
the top bureaucrats were Afrikaaners, and that ‘the vast majority of white bureaucrats were 
ardent supporters of apartheid’. Although there were blacks in government employment they 
occupied subordinate positions that did not require high skill levels. The new government has 
sought to correct the past anomalies by declaring education a basic human right, beginning 
with primary education, adult basic education and further education. Section 29(2) of the 
Constitution provides for equity and the redress of past injustices in access to education. 




Other legislations have been introduced that facilitate the implementation of the 
Constitutional provisions on education, especially targeted at employers. The Skills 
Development Act 1998 and the Skills Development Levies Act 1999 have been enacted to 
ensure that every employer develops a five year Skills Development Plan and to report 
annually to the national government their performance on these. Section 3 of the Skills 
Development Levies Act imposes a levy of not less than one per cent of the employer’s 
annual payroll to redress historical imbalances. 
 
According to Section 4 of the Skills Development Levy Act 1999 public service employers in 
national and provincial spheres of government are exempt, but local government is excluded 
from the exemption. Every employer eligible to pay the skills development levy is legally 
required to register with a relevant Sector for Education and Training Authority (SETA) for 
purposes of payment of their dues and for their employees to benefit from the scheme. 
Municipalities belong to the Local Government SETA.  
 
The municipalities in South Africa have 230 000 employees in their establishment (RSA, 
2005). The North West province municipalities had about 10, 150 public servants in 2002/03 
(RSA, 2004). Historically, Bophuthatswana exported labour to white South Africa with 70 
percent of its economically active population constituting migratory labourers or commuters 
across its borders (Jones, 1999: 513). Furthermore, the North West province had about 22.7 
percent of the adult population reported as having never received any formal education (RSA, 
2003). Significant damage had also been done to the skills pool in the country. The number of 
people completing artisan training had dropped to 5,588 in 1992, which was less than half the 
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1988 figure (Jackson, 2002). Also, there are lower levels of tertiary education in technical 
and scientific subjects than in other developing countries (ibid, 204). 
 
A number of factors may combine to influence the performance of municipalities such as lack 
of skilled labour, inability to attract the right employees, demographics, poverty, etc. Apart 
from human resources development, how labour relations are managed remains one of the 
important workplace issues that must be addressed.      
 
Labour Relations/Trade Unions 
Labour unions played a significant role in the resistance movement in South Africa. Charney 
(1999: 184) observes that black resistance ‘spawned new social movements similar to labor, 
civic, youth, student, and women’s groups …’ These were aligned to the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) and/or the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which were 
both allies of the ANC (ibid). COSATU, originally known as South African Congress of 
Trade Unions (SACTU) was formed in 1955 when the South African Trades and Labour 
Council (SATLC) dissolved to form the South African Trades Union Council (SATUC) and 
dropped African unions from its membership (Major, 2005). There was also the Federation of 
Free African Trade Unions of South Africa (FOFATUSA) which was allied to the Pan 
African Congress (PAC) (ibid). Under the apartheid regime Africans were not allowed to 
register trade unions but they could join any registered unions that were mainly white. 
Supposedly this arrangement was intended to deprive Africans of any ability to use labour 
unions to foment any effective resistance to apartheid. 
 
Labour relations in South Africa are protected in the Constitution. Section 23 of the 
Constitution guarantees the right of workers to unionise, strike, take part in union activities 
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and for every trade union to engage with employers in collective bargaining.  The Labour 
Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995) gives effect to Section 23 of the Constitution. The Act 
promotes labour relations in all respects, establishes the Labour Court and Labour Appeal 
Court as well as obligating South Africa to international labour protocols. The Act also 
provides guidance on how labour organisations are to be formed and registered. It encourages 
employers to form employers’ associations and establish bargaining chambers. In the North 
West Province for instance municipalities have a forum where they collectively discuss HR 
issues and develop common policies and common salary scales. The Local Labour Forum 
was formed to represent employees. The perception is that a worker environment in which 
there is organised labour encourages a consultative atmosphere. One of the key entities 
established by the Labour Relations Act 1995 is the South African Local Government 
Bargaining Council (SALGBC). SALGBC is constituted by organisations within local 
government to manage disputes within organisations, negotiate and conclude bargaining 
agreements, and to standardise collective agreements such as working conditions. 
 
In local government the legally recognised entities are the South African Municipal Workers 
Union (SAMWU), South African Local Government Association (SALGA) and the 
Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU). The role of labour unions has 
changed from resistance to that of partnership with the government, a strong example being 




In apartheid South Africa there were 800 racially segregated municipalities. After the year 
2000 these were amalgamated into 284 municipalities. The apartheid legacy has left a major 
impact on the nature of the South African public service. Personnel management at all levels 
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of government was centralised to ensure compliance with the discriminatory laws and 
practices of the regime. It is apparent that the apartheid legacy is the single most important 
factor acknowledged by several authors such as Olowu and Wunsch (2004), Jackson (2002), 
Reddy et al (2000) and Harrison-Rockey (1999), as influential on the performance of 
municipalities and/or the public service in general. However, initiatives undertaken in the 
South African public service have introduced a paradigm shift from public administration to 
NPM-like reforms. The reforms were characterised by: 
• The desire to provide high quality services valued by citizens; 
• Increased autonomy from centralized control; 
• A shift to performance measurement of both individuals and institutions with 
corresponding reward structures; 
• The provision of human and technological resources needed to meet performance 
targets; 
• An open mindedness to exploring challenges in traditional public service functions 
and responsibilities (Ncholo, 2000; 87). 
 
This paradigm shift and the administrative reforms that go with it are expected to have a 
significant transformation on the entire public service’s efficiency and effectiveness in 
service delivery. The South African public service, including local government, faces the 
challenge of consolidating a previously racially fragmented public service (Harrison-Rockey, 
1999; Ncholo, 2000; Pycroft, 1999, and Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). 
 
As previously stated decentralisation in South Africa is based on the principle of cooperative 
government founded in the constitution. Chapters 3, 7 and 13 of the Constitution set the 
framework for local government. The Municipal Systems Act, 2003 (Act No 44 of 2003), the 
Municipal Structures Amendment Act, 2003 (Act No. 1 of 2003) and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act are the key primary legislations that govern local government. There are 
many other decentralisation laws (see Appendix 7) that cannot be discussed here because of 




Sections 2 and 3 of the Municipal Structures Act establish the different categories of 
municipalities. These are categories A, B and C municipalities. Category A municipalities are 
those that may be referred to as metropolitan cities. These are large metropolitan cities which 
include Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Durban and the East Rand. The 
North West province does not have a category A municipality, all of its municipalities fall 
within category B and C (see Appendix 8 for the categorisation of municipalities in the North 
West province). Category C are district municipalities and category B are local 
municipalities. District municipalities cover an area constituted of several (about 4-6) local 
municipalities.  
 
The responsibilities of municipalities are stated in Schedule 4 Part B and Schedule 5 Part B of 
the Constitution as matters relating to: air pollution; building regulations; child care facilities; 
electricity and gas; fire fighting services; local tourism; municipal airports; municipal health 
services; municipal public transport; municipal public works; pontoons; ferries; harbours, 
etc.; storm water management systems; and water and sanitation services and domestic 
waste-water and sewage disposal. Schedule 5 lists the following responsibilities: beaches and 
amusement facilities; billboards and the display of advertising in public places; cemeteries, 
funeral parlour and crematoria; cleansing; control of public nuisance; control of selling of 
liquor to the public; facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals; fencing and 
fences; licensing of dogs; licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public; 
local amenities; local sports facilities; markets; municipal abattoirs; municipal parks and 
recreation; municipal roads; noise pollution; pounds; public places; refuse removal, refuse 




In the North West province, many of the municipalities have not been able to effectively 
perform their executive functions. In the 2002/03 financial year the Municipal Demarcation 
Board found that eight of the North West province municipalities could not carry out 50 
percent of the MEC’s executive functions (RSA, 2003).  Bophirima District Municipality was 
found to be the least capable. There was found ‘… significant unevenness in service 
provision across all services in the Bophirima District Municipality and, it is assumed, 
between the urban and rural areas’ (ibid; 36).  
 
Because of the limitations on capacity the national government has developed an intervention 
programme already mentioned earlier, Project Consolidate, which is targeted at supporting 
local government, especially ailing municipalities. This intervention is presented as support 
for weaker municipalities, but it might also be seen as a disguised form of centralisation.  The 
government indicates that there are two key elements of the project: 
• A targeted hands-on support and engagement programme on the building of capacity 
of municipalities to perform their mandate 
• A complimentary process of systematic refinement of policy, fiscal and institutional 
matters that will enable the consolidation of the local government system in the long-
term (RSA, 2004: 16).  
 
Capacity constraints are a major challenge in the North West province municipalities. Of the 
25 municipalities in the North West province, 17 (68 per cent) were on Project Consolidate, 
with seven performing less than 50 per cent of their powers and functions and some 
performing less than 30 per cent (North West Provincial Government, 2005). The North West 
province municipalities that were under Project Consolidate were Mafikeng, Ditsobotla, 
Tswaing, Ramotshere Moiloa, Ratlou, Klerksdorp, Maquassi Hills, Ventersdorp, Lekwa 
Teemane, Molopo, Kagisano, Mamusa and Greater Taung, Rustenburg, Moses Kotane, 
Moretele and Madibeng Local Municipalities (ibid). Given that there were eight 
municipalities in 2003 that could not perform 50 percent of the executive functions, and by 
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2005 only one had improved or dropped out of the list shows the slow progress that many 
face.  
 
The South African government wants to integrate the public service in the national, 
provincial and local spheres into a single public service, in the belief that building an 
effective developmental state that could intervene decisively and coherently in the economy 
and society to address past injustices, requires the harmonisation of systems, norms and 
conditions of service in the three spheres of government (RSA, 2006).  A Task Team on the 
Single Public Service was established in 2003, and gave its report in 2006. The task team 
consisted of the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), Department of 
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), National Treasury, National Departments of 
Health, Water Affairs and Education, and the South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA).  According to the proposed time frame, in the report approved by Cabinet on 31 
May 2006, a bill was to be tabled in Parliament in October 2007. The key objective of the 
Single Public Service strategy is to create an integrated seamless service delivery which is 
based on the ANC’s 2004 Election Manisfesto known as The People’s Contract (RSA, 2006: 
3). The objectives of the framework legislation for a Single Public Service are to: 
• Create a common culture of service delivery based on the precepts of Batho Pele (‘people 
first’) ; 
• Stabilise and integrate intergovernmental relations; 
• Achieve more coherent, integrated planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring 
and evaluation; 
• Create a single senior management service cadre, where appointment would be to the 
service rather than the post; 
• Provide a uniform framework of remuneration and conditions of service; 
• Establish uniform norms and standards for employment in the public service including 
employment practices and employee relations frameworks and mandating arrangements; 
• Provide a mechanism for the transfer of functions and staff between institutions and 
spheres of government; 
• Provide for human resource development strategy for the Single Public Service and the 
development of an integrated skills database to support human resource planning; and 




• Ensure that e-government governance, information and communication technology 
regulations, norms and standards are adhered to within the single Public service (RSA, 
2006: 4).  
 
These objectives are indicative of a shift towards centralisation in which employees could be 
transferred between the spheres of government as well as having a single senior management 
cadre that can only be coordinated from the centre. How this will impact on HRM in other 
spheres of government will be a matter of interest for further research. On the other hand this 
development shows that there are other factors beyond local government priorities that the 
development of HRM policy is contingent upon.  How decentralisation and HRM are related 
and also how they are influenced by the public management model in South Africa is 
illustrated in Figure 5.1 below.   
 
The preceding discussion indicates that HRM in apartheid South Africa was of the personnel 
management type and highly centralised under a public administration system. It is the norm 
for repressive regimes to have their administrative systems centralised as they want to have 
maximum and effective control over all the state apparatus. This places the then South 
African HRM system in the upper left hand side quadrant of the matrix. After 1994 the South 
African HRM system shifted with the adoption of NPM-like reforms to SHRM, at least in 
theory and in local government these reforms are still unfolding as it is explained in detail in 












Figure 5.1: Decentralisation/HRM Matrix showing the development of HRM in South Africa 
 
Source: Author’s Own Construct (2008) 
 
over the management of its HRs. In view of the reforms the South African government has 
introduced, it would be expected that the trajectory of HRM would follow the pattern 
presented in Figure 5.1 above. The literature suggests that the HRM system in the North West 
province is moving from a centralised personnel management system to a decentralised 
SHRM system among the large local municipalities. The HRM responsibilities have been 
devolved, through the law, to the municipalities (this is discussed further in Section 5.4). In 










Large local Municipalities  
Small/resource poor local municipalities 







          
              SHRM 
   Decentralised 
        SHRM 
       Centralised 
156 
 
lower right hand side one. However, the smaller/resource poor local municipalities that are 
dependent on the district municipalities for their HRM functions are reflected as moving 
away from a centralised personnel management system to a centralised SHRM. Centralisation 
in this case refers to the centralisation of some aspects of HRM in the sense that they are 
managerially performed by another entity.  In practice whether there has been such a move or 
not is addressed in Chapter VII. 
 
The following Section considers the internal environment of local authorities in South Africa. 
 
5.2.2 The Internal Environment 
Local Political Leadership 
 
Municipalities in South Africa are obliged by statute to adopt a particular strategic 
framework. Chapter 5 Part 2 of the Municipal Systems Act lays the strategic framework for 
development planning through the Integrated Development Plans. Section 26 of the 
Municipal Systems Act spells out the elements of the strategic framework that must be in 
place. These include: the development of a municipal council’s vision for a long term 
development; the development of municipal objectives; scanning its environment devising 
development strategies; a spatial development framework; operational strategies; three year 
budgets; and establishing key performance indicators and performance targets.  
 
Section 27 of the Municipal Systems Act lays the responsibility of developing a district 
strategic framework on the district municipalities. Among other things the district 
municipalities must adopt a framework for IDP in its area and ensure that matters included in 
the IDPs of local municipalities and district municipality are aligned to the national and 
provincial legislative requirements. The development of a strategic framework by 
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municipalities should be consultative from the very beginning, taking cognisance of the local 
community, traditional leaders, organs of the state and other stakeholders and allowing them 
a role to play in the drafting of the plans. Section 30 of the Act allocates responsibility for the 
management of the drafting process on the political leadership of the municipality, which is 
the municipal mayor, executive committee or a committee of councillors appointed by the 
municipal council as the case may be. The provincial government plays a supportive and 
monitoring role to ensure the successful implementation of the plan. According to section 
35(1), once adopted, the IDP becomes the key strategic planning instrument on which all 
planning and development and, the exercise of executive authority are based. 
 
Section 83(3) of the Municipal Structures Act gives district municipalities the responsibility 
for ensuring the integrated development planning for the entire district, promotion of bulk 
infrastructural development and service delivery, capacity building for local municipalities in 
its area and ensuring the equitable distribution of resources to the local municipalities to 
ensure appropriate levels of services in its area. The North West province has four district 
municipalities, 21 local municipalities and two cross-border municipalities (Merafong City 
Municipality and Moshaweng Local Municipality) that it shares with Gauteng and Northern 
Cape respectively. Within each of the categories of municipalities there are three basic types 
of municipal systems.  These are the Mayoral Executive System, Collective Executive 
System and the Plenary Executive System. The Mayoral Executive System municipalities are 
the most numerous followed by the Collective Executive and the Plenary Executive. The 
political leadership of the municipalities bears the responsibility for the execution of the 
municipal obligations pronounced in various Acts stated above. The Municipal Systems Act 
sets the basic principles and values governing local public administration. These are to be in 
conformity to those in section 195 (1) of the constitution. Section 51 (i) of the Municipal 
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Systems Act allocates the responsibility for overall performance of the municipality to the 
municipal manager. While the municipal managers have the administrative responsibility for 
the performance of their organisations, the mayors bear the political responsibility. The Act 
also advocates for the involvement of staff, in as far as possible, in the decision making 
process of the municipality.  
 
 The proceeding text below highlights the advantages, challenges and resources that help or 
impede the success of municipalities in the performance of their mandates. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
The legislative framework in South Africa gives local government considerable protection 
from interference by other spheres of government. The new local government also enjoys 
wider recognition and legitimacy compared to that of the apartheid era. Although the large 
South African economy that forms part of the local government environment confers some 
significant advantages there are considerable internal weaknesses as well, such as lack of 
capacity and limited sources of own revenue. Local authorities have in principle considerable 
freedom to hire and manage their own staff. However, transition from segregated local 
government and consolidation of the democratic dispensation may present their own 
challenges as both managers and politicians have to learn and acquaint themselves with the 
optimum level of operation in their organisations. 
 
Core Competencies and Capabilities 
A significant proportion of municipalities in South Africa have been enrolled on Project 
Consolidate, and more than 50 percent of those in the North West province have been under 
the programme. Capacity problems have led to the underdevelopment of competencies. Some 
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municipal executive functions have in practice been performed by the Provincial government. 
For instance, the delivery of housing that the Provincial government delegated to 
municipalities had to be withdrawn from some municipalities such as the Mafikeng Local 
Municipality. Furthermore, in 2006 the maintenance works on the stadium in Mafikeng was 
carried out by the Provincial government while according to the constitution it is the 
responsibility of the local municipality. 
 
Organisational Values, Culture and Structure 
Desirable local government organisational values are defined by various pieces of legislation; 
the key values being democracy, development, equity, community participation, 
accountability, participatory management, efficiency, effectiveness, economy, 
representativeness and affirmative action. Legislation also promotes the development of a 
culture of performance management among the political leadership. The nurture and 
successful implementation of these values into the new local government management is 
anticipated to radically transform the South African local government. 
 
The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele White Paper) 
promotes the culture of Ubuntu that underlies the African renaissance. Ubuntu is closely 
associated with courtesy, but in its African sense means much more than that. This could be 
viewed as an infusion of African culture into modern management systems of the government 
as explained in Chapter II. Batho Pele is a Sesotho adage meaning ‘people first’. The Batho 
Pele White Paper seeks to: 
Introduce a fresh approach to service delivery: an approach which puts 
pressure on systems, procedures, attitudes and behaviour within the Public 
Service and reorients them in the customer’s favour, an approach which puts 
people first (RSA, 1997: 12). 
 
Batho Pele is governed by a set of eight service delivery principles outlined below: 
160 
 
• Consultation: citizens should be consulted about the level and quality of the public 
services they receive and, whenever possible, should be given a choice about the 
services that are offered. 
• Setting service: citizens should be told what level and quality of public services they 
will receive so that they are aware of what to expect. 
• Access: all citizens should have access to the services to which they are entitled. 
• Courtesy: citizens should be treated with courtesy and consideration. 
• Information: citizens should be given full, accurate information about the public 
services they are entitled to receive.  
• Openness and transparency: citizens should be told how national and provincial 
departments are run, how much they cost, and who is in charge. 
• Redress: if the promised standard of service is not delivered, citizens should be 
offered an apology, a full explanation and a speedy and effective remedy; and when 
complaints are made, citizens should receive a sympathetic, positive response. 
• Value for money: public services should be provided economically and efficiently in 
order to give citizens the best possible value for money (RSA, 1997: 15). 
 
These principles were designed for the national and provincial governments but extended to 
other organs of the state, including local government (ibid). Most of the local government 
laws were enacted after the Batho Pele White Paper and are structured around the principles 
that it sets out.   The Batho Pele principle puts customer service at the fore, indicating its 
compatibility with the NPM-style reforms. How the factors enunciated from the previous 
sections have affected, or will affect, HRM is dealt with in the next sections beginning with 
the concept of HRM below. 
 
5.3. The Concept of Human Resource Management  
Human resource management in South Africa is governed by the provisions of Chapter 10 of 
the Constitution and Chapter 7 of the Municipal Systems Act. Section 195(1) of the 
Constitution asserts that public administration in South Africa is governed by the democratic 
values and principles. It envisages adherence to a professional ethic; the promotion of 
efficiency; effectiveness and economy in the use of resources; responsiveness to the needs of 
the people; accountability; must be representative of South African people; and based on a 
participatory policy-making process. The constitution further stipulates that the human 
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resource management practices must be in such a way as to maximise human potential. And 
that employment and personnel management practices should be based on ability, objectivity, 
fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past and to achieve broad 
representation. These are to be carried out within the framework of the Batho Pele White 
Paper that expresses a public service ethos that emphasises the perception of citizens as 
customers. Besides the customer centred approach the South African approach incorporates 
affirmative action to strike optimal representation to redress historical apartheid distortions.  
 
5.4. HRM Practices 
The human resource practices in municipalities are governed by Chapter 7 Part 4 of the 
Municipal Systems Act, Employment Equity Act 1998, the Skills Development Act, the 
Skills Development Levies Act and the Transfer of Staff of Municipalities Act, 1998. The 
Municipal Systems Act establishes two categories of municipal employees. Sections 55 (1) of 
the Municipal Systems Act establishes municipal managers as head of the administration of a 
municipality. Municipal managers are charged with the responsibility for implementing and 
monitoring the IDP, responsibility for the efficient, effective, economic and accountable 
management of the municipality, be responsive to the needs of the community, and operate in 
accordance with the performance management system. Section 57 of the Municipal Systems 
Act requires that the employment of municipal managers and managers directly accountable 
to them must be contractual, that is they must enter into a performance contract. The 
municipal managers themselves enter into performance contracts with the municipality as 
represented by the executive mayor. The employment contracts are on a renewable two-year 




Section 66 of the Municipal Systems Act provides for the municipal manager to approve a 
staff establishment together with a mechanism to regularly evaluate it, provide job 
descriptions, determine remuneration for posts and, set the conditions of service. Section 67 
(1) requires the development of management systems that engender fairness, transparency, 
efficiency and effectiveness in human resource management. These principles must be 
applied to the management of HRs in terms of:  
• recruitment, selection and appointment 
• conditions of service 
• supervision and management of staff 
• the monitoring, measuring and evaluating of performance of staff 
• promotion and demotion 
• transfer of staff 
• grievance procedures 
• disciplinary procedures 
• investigation of alleged misconduct of and complaints against staff 
• dismissal and retrenchment of staff  
  
Capacity building is addressed in Section 68 of the Municipal Systems Act. Perhaps this 
shows the significance attached to it in view of the crippling lack of capacity in many of the 
municipalities. The section gives municipalities the responsibility to develop their own staff 
according to each municipality’s capacity needs but within the scope of both the Skills 
Development Act and the Skills Development Levies Act. Besides relying on funds from the 
Sector Education Training Authority, municipalities are allowed to make budgetary 
provisions to train their own staff. There is a statutory provision for those municipalities that 
cannot afford to provide funds for training their own staff to make a request for funding from 
the local government SETA.  Insofar as municipalities have been capable of implementing 
these provisions this equates with a highly decentralised, if centrally prescribed system.  
However, as we have seen, many municipalities have not been able to keep up with what is 
required of them. In response the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) 
has been persuaded to play a mediating role. The legislative provisions give the 
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municipalities the responsibility over their human resources. The smaller municipalities that 
have capacity problems have their HRM responsibilities performed on their behalf by the 
district municipalities. 
 
SALGA in fact plays a pivotal role in the performance of HRM practices by individual 
municipalities. At its first Human Resources Development Policy Conference at Gallagher 
Estate in Midrand, Gauteng, attended by 650 municipal councillors, municipal managers and 
human resource practitioners SALGA committed itself to overseeing an integrated capacity 
building strategy (SALGA, 2003). The resulting strategy saw a Local Government 
Workplace Learning College (LGWLC), overseeing the participation of municipalities in the 
Local Government Water Sector Education and Training Authority (LGWSETA), and a 
commitment by municipalities to increase their budgetary allocations to more than the 
statutory required 1% and more human resources towards education, training and 
development (ibid: 6, 7). At the same conference SALGA decided on a remuneration policy 
that allows for differentiated, but overlapping, salary scales for municipal managers. Table 
5.2 presents the salary scales for municipal managers as published by SALGA in 2003.  
Table 5.2 Salary Scales for Municipal Managers 
CATEGORY LOWER QUARTILE MEDIAN QUARTILE UPPER QUARTILE 
1 329,000 366,000 406,000 
2 366,000 406,000 451,000 
3 406,000 451,000 502,000 
4 451,000 502,000 558,000 
5 502,000 558,000 620,000 
6 558,000 620,000 750,000 




The so-called bargaining unit employees’ salaries are determined by SALGA through the use 
of the Task Job Evaluation through the collective bargaining process.  Through this nationally 
supported intervention SALGA has led the municipalities into coordinated response to central 
performance and systems demands that could be seen to have some strong centralisation 
characteristics. 
 
5.5. Performance Management 
Performance management in the South African local government is a statutory requirement. 
Chapter 6 of the Municipal Systems Act provides for the establishment, development, 
measuring, monitoring and review of performance management systems. According to 
Section 38 of the Municipal Systems Act municipalities should customise PMS according to 
their own resources and circumstances in line with their IDPs. It is also a statutory 
requirement for the promotion of a culture of performance management among the political 
and administrative leadership of the municipality. Section 39 of the Act bestows the 
responsibility for the development of PMS on the political leadership (executive mayors, 
executive committees) of municipalities.  
 
Section 41 (1) of the Municipal Systems Act provides for the measurement of the 
performance outcomes and impact with regard to the municipal development priorities and 
objectives set out in the IDP. Subsection (1)(c) states that the key performance targets must 
be measurable as well as performance being monitored and reviewed at least once a year. The 
law requires the setting up of a regular reporting system to the council, political structures, 
other political office bearers and municipal staff, the public as well as other organs of state. 
The monitoring and review process should be designed as an early warning indicator for 




Section 42 of the Municipal Systems Act requires the involvement of the local community in 
the development, implementation and monitoring of a performance management system and, 
in particular, the setting of key performance indicators and performance targets for 
municipalities. However, the national Minister of Provincial and Local Government, in 
consultation with MECs (Members of the Executive Committees - provincial ministers) for 
local government and organised local government, has the prerogative to determine general 
key performance indicators for local government and also may review and adjust those key 
performance indicators. Once a municipality has set the key performance indicators and 
performance targets it is a legal requirement for them to publicise them internally and to the 
public. Section 45 requires that the results of the performance reviews must be audited as part 
of the municipality’s internal audit process, and annually by the Auditor General.   These 
contradictory provisions in which KPIs are determined by the MEC and yet supposedly 
participatory are intended to reflect the spirit of cooperative governance, although in practice 
central assessment takes precedence over local participation.   
 
SALGA plays a major role in the implementation process of the performance management 
system for municipalities. SALGA’s support of the municipal programme includes training 
support consisting of four performance management modules: 
• Toolkit: Implementing a basic Performance Management System 
• Balanced Scorecard for local government 
• How to integrate the SA Excellence model in managing PMS in local government 
and 
• How to conduct a benchmark study 
 
SALGA’s strategy is to help municipalities to implement a basic PMS and then move from 
there to implement the more sophisticated subsequent modules (SALGA, 2005). The SALGA 
intervention comes five years after the law establishing PMS in local government was 
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established.  Besides the delayed SALGA intervention, local government also receives direct 
support on the implementation of PMS from the DPLG. The department states that a major 
achievement in this role was the production of the Municipal Annual Performance Report for 
2003/04 and the holding of the Municipal Performance Excellence (Vuna) Awards in 
December 2004 (RSA, 2005: 50).  
 
For an understanding of centralisation/decentralisation in the South African context the 
accountability system should be examined.  The following section presents the local 
government performance management reporting framework. 
 
5.6. Information on Outcomes 
Sections 46, 47 and 48 of the Municipal Systems Act provide for the reporting processes on 
the performance reviews and audits. Section 46 requires municipalities to produce annual 
reports consisting of a performance report reflecting a municipality’s performance during the 
year, comparing that to the previous year’s performance. Also, in the report should be the 
financial statements and an audit report of the financial statements. The municipality must 
table the annual report within one month of receiving the audit report. The municipal 
manager is charged with the responsibility of putting a notice in the media publicising to the 
local community the planned council meetings at which the report will be tabled. The Auditor 
General and the MEC for local government are also notified and do attend the meetings at 
which their representatives have the right to speak. The municipal manager is required to 
attend the meeting for purposes of responding to questions.  
 
The municipality has to adopt its annual report within 14 days and make copies accessible to 
the public, other organisations and the media for a fee or free of charge. Other copies are 
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submitted to the MEC for local government in the province and to the Auditor General and 
other relevant organisations.  
 
Section 47 requires the MEC to make and submit a consolidated annual performance report 
of municipalities to the provincial legislature and to the national Minister. The report must 
highlight municipalities that underperformed during the year and propose corrective 
measures. A copy of the report should be submitted to the National Council of Provinces. The 
Minister must compile an annual report to parliament, and to the MECs for local government 
a consolidated report of local government performance in terms of key performance 
indicators.  However, the Auditor-General’s report showed that little has been done with 
regard to performance auditing, including all spheres of government. Table 5.3 illustrates the 
number of performance audits issued to management and tabled.  
 
Table 5.3 Number of performance audits tabled in South Africa 
DEPARTMENT/ENTITY  NUMBER ISSUED NUMBER TABLED 
National departments 9 6 
Provincial departments 10 7 
Public and other entities 1 1 
Local government 3 1 
 Source: Auditor-General Annual Report 2004-2005  
 
The numbers of performance audits carried out by the local government entities were 
inadequate and those carried out by municipalities were too few, with only one having been 
tabled. Compliance to the requirements governing the performance management reporting 
system was very low, probably because of lack of capacity and the fact that organisations 
were still familiarising themselves with the task they are faced with. According to the Auditor 
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General’s report all performance audit reports were issued to the management of the 
concerned entities.  The lack of compliance to the reporting system presented a gap in the 




This chapter has explained that South Africa has moved from a transitional stage from 
apartheid to the consolidation of democratic governance. However, apartheid has left an 
enduring legacy that will continue to influence government policy for many years to come. 
History has had a big influence on the future, creating constraints and opportunities for the 
new administration. The new political forces that came into power in 1994 (which was a 
critical juncture) are yet to fully change the course of events. Some things would be difficult 
to change such as who lives where, even though people can move and settle where they 
choose to. What went on before has had new government policies and legislations focused on 
addressing past injustices, equity, representation, racial equality and other issues of a related 
nature. Also, institutions (norms and rules) had developed that guided the struggle against 
apartheid. The culture of resistance inherited from the liberation struggle, although largely 
reduced, still remains disruptive to municipal services.  
 
Local government is entrenched in the constitution, and there is a substantial volley of 
legislations governing local government. Intergovernmental relations are regulated by law, 
significantly guaranteeing local government autonomy.  Municipal capacity to perform their 
statutory functions is one of the major problems confronting local government as new ones 
were rebuilt from the ashes of the old. More than half of the municipalities in the North West 




Since democratic rule, the South African government has been concentrating significant 
effort on correcting the anomalies of the past. These historical events have inspired the 
development of the idea of a Single Public Service. Although a law has not yet been enacted 
critical stages towards that have been reached, such as the approval of the recommendations 
by Cabinet. This and other historical developments indicate that HRM strategy is contingent 
upon national strategic objectives. These national objectives are political in nature and are 
realised through political processes. Within the ANC there has been an internal split that also 
affected the business of some municipalities, indicating that external contingencies are a 
significant factor in the management of local affairs.  
 
Yet on the other hand there are indications that internal resources within local government are 
recognised as some of the imperatives in effective service delivery. The positioning of 
municipal managers at the helm of the performance management systems is an attempt at 
ensuring the optimal exploitation of internal resources of the organisation in the performance 
of its mandate. With the stated objective of creating a common culture of efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy through the Single Public Service might enable the government to 
exploit internal resources (in this case organisational culture) in a more effective way.  The 
Local Government SETA, LGWSETA, Skills Development Act and the Skills Development 
Levies Act are some of the strategies aimed at building internal capacity of the municipalities 
in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. At another level the PMS 
approach is related to the NPM concept, which itself is a shared idea globally. The infusion of 
cultural aspects underpinned by the idea of Ubuntu in the adoption of modern systems of 




The HRM philosophy as spelt out in the Constitution, the Batho Pele White Paper and the 
Municipal Systems Act is based on an NPM ethos. The idea of the Single Public Service, 
driven by historical events, emerged as an overarching policy as well as a platform for moves 
towards the centralisation of top public service posts. The introduction of an overarching 
framework in which functions and staff can be transferred across government spheres, might 
create challenges for managers in the event the human resources that they matched to other 
resources and functions in the development of organisational strategy are transferred.  
 








FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: BOTSWANA 
 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter applies the analytical framework developed in Chapter II to the findings from 
the Botswana case study. The analysis is based on empirical data from interviews with key 
informants and from official documents and media reports. The interviews were separated 
into two categories: the quantitative interviews (for HR staff in the councils) and qualitative 
interviews for senior public officers. The objective is to understand how human resources are 
managed in Botswana and why they are managed the way they are.  Understanding the 
factors that shape or influence local governance will enable us to appreciate the nature of 
HRM in Botswana, and also to understand the factors that influence HRM and, how and why 
the HRM in local government in Botswana differs from that in South Africa.    
 
The data examined here is based upon questionnaires and interviews.  There is a brief 
presentation of the biographical data of the respondents from both data collection methods, 
that is, the survey respondents and the qualitative interview respondents. The data from the 
survey respondents is presented in tables while that from the qualitative interview 
respondents is presented in text. But these are discussed in an integrated manner under 




6.2. Biographical Data of Respondents  
6.2.1. Survey Respondents 
The representation of the respondents per type of council shows that 60 per cent came from 
the district councils, whereas 40 per cent were from the urban councils. Table 6.1 shows that 
almost 47 percent of the respondents were senior HR managers, about 43 per cent were from 
middle management and 10 percent from lower levels of the human resources departments of 
the councils.  
Table 6.1: Position held by respondent 
POSITION FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Senior management 14 47 
Middle management 13 43 
Clerical  3 10 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Of the 30 respondents 10 (33 per cent) were male and 20 (67 per cent) were females (see 
Table 6.2). This gender bias is due to the fact that in Botswana for quite a long time certain 
professions such human resource management were seen as suitable for women. Other 
professions in Botswana that are traditionally dominated by women include nursing and 
primary school teaching.  
Table 6.2: Gender of Respondent 
GENDER FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Male 10 33 
Female 20 67 
Total  30 100 




The respondents were generally well educated, with almost all of them (70 per cent) 
possessing either a diploma or degree in human resource management or personnel 
management qualifications (see Table 6.3 below). Only 23 per cent had qualifications in 
other social science subjects such as Bachelor of Arts Social Sciences or Public 
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Administration, and only about seven per cent had training in other areas such as education. 
Most of the diploma holders were apparently holding senior positions indicating that these 
may have served longer with junior qualifications and rose through the ranks, and were also 
trained by the Department of Local Government Service Management. As more people 
graduated from the local university and universities abroad with specialist qualifications in 
human resource management the DLGSM may have targeted them to build human resource 
management capability at local level.  
Table 6.3: Field of training of respondent 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
HRM/Personnel Management 21 70 
Social sciences 7 23 
Other 2 7 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
 
However, the majority of the respondents (57 per cent) had been in the post for only one year. 
About 20 per cent each had spent two and three years in their posts respectively. Only one 
respondent had been five years in post (Table 6.4 below).  
Table 6.4: Number of years in the post 
YEARS FREQUENCY PERCENT 
1 17 57 
2 6 20 
3 6 20 
5 1 3 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
 
Those who have spent about a year in their posts could possibly be the new recruits or those 
who have been recently promoted into new job posts or were transferred from other local 
authorities. The other 43 per cent who have stayed longer in positions could be the more 
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experienced and senior officers who have approached the top end of salary bands in the HR 
departments.  
 
6.2.2. Qualitative Interview Respondents 
The qualitative interview respondents consisted mainly of senior central government officials 
(DLGSM and Ministry of Local Government), senior officers from local councils, the 
Botswana Unified Local Government Staff Association, Botswana National Productivity 
Centre and University of Botswana lecturers and other experts. These were selected based on 
their knowledge, experience and role in policy matters in local government. Section 6.3 
below presents the data analysis beginning with the environmental factors. 
 
6.3. The Environment  
The environment consists of the factors that impact on local authorities and influence their 
nature, structure and management. Effectively it is these factors that give the local authorities 
their character. These factors are categorised into two separate spheres: the external 
environment and the internal environment. The analysis first presents the external 
environment as it sets the context within which local authorities operate. 
 
6.3.1. External environment 
Politics 
During the interviews the qualitative respondents criticised the current local government 
organisational arrangement on three key points. First, they indicated that although the 
councils have been established since independence without being harassed, their existence is 
not guaranteed because they are not entrenched in the constitution. The perception was that 
the Minister of Local Government has the power to dissolve a council that does not conform 
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to the decisions of the government of the day even if such a council does not pose a threat to 
national cohesion and/or security. The respondents felt this denies local councils the freedom 
to make decisions that address the needs of the community. In spite of these fears no council, 
even opposition controlled ones, has ever been threatened with dissolution in their entire 
history. 
 
Secondly, the respondents observed that councillors have no decision-making powers, but 
that the authority to make decisions rest with the bureaucrats, the Council Secretaries and 
Town/City Clerks. The council secretaries and town clerks are administratively supervised by 
the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government but not the Minister. 
Therefore, the respondents claimed, the people’s elected representatives have no meaningful 
role.  
 
Thirdly, the local government elections are held simultaneously with the General Elections 
which denies the local authorities the attention they need. The political parties’ national 
priorities and other issues of a national nature overshadow their local government policies. 
Some respondents felt that the local government elections should be conducted separately 
from the parliamentary elections so that local issues could get the pre-eminence they deserve. 
Although other respondents viewed such an approach as costly, it may be worth the cost in 
terms of local democracy. 
 
With regard to HRM issues, the qualitative interview respondents felt that politicians or 
councillors do not have any powers over staff. For instance, they cannot discipline 
underperforming Chief Executive Officers nor do they have a say in the selection of a CEO 
and other HR matters. In one case that shows the remote involvement, if any, of councillors 
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in HR matters, the mayor of Gaborone was surprised one day to find a group of disgruntled 
city council employees gathered in front of his office to demand an explanation from him 
about the late payment of their wages for five consecutive months (Mmegi, 2006a). The 
mayor expressed shock at the incident, stating that the council managers have never bothered 
to explain the situation to him (ibid). With the lack of control over the councils’ key resource, 
the human resources, the councillors are constrained to be accountable to the electorate on 
service delivery.   
                     
The respondents pointed out that the government has always wanted to keep the 
administrative and political spheres at local level separate. Nevertheless, they pointed out that 
councillors should make decisions on staff matters and that the possible strategy to realise 
this could be through the direct election of a mayor. The Second Presidential Commission on 
Local Government Structure in Botswana noted that the council chairpersons and mayors are 
expected to be politically accountable for the service delivery failure of the councils but they 
do not have authority to control council staff. Both the qualitative interview respondents and 
the Venson Commission perceived the political leadership of the councils to be weak.  
 
Another concern was raised by some respondents that councillors often want to corruptly 
influence management decisions, and that involving them in HRM would only worsen the 
situation. A respondent gave an illustration of ill-conceived intervention from councillors, 
arguing that: 
 
Politicians are corrupt and councillors in particular. Construction 
companies target council staff who they know sit on tender 
committees. If the officer refuses to cooperate they are then targeted 





The interference from the councillors was perceived to be of limited effect as transfers are 
managed at the centre and CEO’s loyalty is to the centre but not the council. One respondent 
remarked that: 
 
There is a lot of political interference on HRM. Councillors are not 
conversant with their mandate. Council CEOs also, not doing what 
they are supposed to be doing but what councillors expect or want. 
There is a compromise on quality of service and also on the calibre of 
people recruited because of corrupt practices in the recruitment 
process, especially for CEOs as national politicians interfere. Quite 
often the Minister ignores recommendations from DLGSM. There is a 
lot of political interference on HRM. 
 
 
The above comment shows that in one way the bureaucracy is accountable to itself and to the 
political elite at the centre but not the councillors. But the key issue is; will autonomy help in 
managing and controlling corruption, and most importantly improving efficiency? One 
respondent cautioned that ‘due care and caution should be taken in promoting 
decentralisation so that it does not promote corruption’. The resistance by government to 
decentralise HRM responsibilities to local level political leaders, and the concerns raised by 
some top bureaucrats during the interviews shows a united front between the two to safe 
guard their common interests. In another way this shows the institutional effects that make 
change difficult simply because of what has gone on before. The norms seem to pervade 
decision making in government and also permeate social culture. The discussion below 
further explores social culture and how it influences the management of local authorities. 
 
Social culture 
The qualitative interview respondents observed that civil society in Botswana lacks a fighting 
spirit. Coupled with this, stated the respondents, was the subordination of civil society for 
many years by the state, and that has led to a lack of demand for better public services. This 
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defining characteristic of Botswana’s culture goes back in history to the pre-independence era 
Tswana polity as indicated in Chapter IV.  However, this seemingly negative aspect of civil 
society has on the other hand created an atmosphere in which the public service can perform 
its functions without the threat of disruption from public boycott or riots against poor service 
delivery. When asked whether the socio-political environment provides a supportive 
environment for their organisations to function efficiently, the majority of the quantitative 
interview respondents answered in the affirmative (see Table 6.5 below). Only about 17 per 
cent were not positive and 83 per cent either viewed it as ‘a fairly supportive environment’ or 
‘a supportive environment.’ 
Table 6.5: The socio-political environment 
SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONEMT FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Not supportive at all 1 3.3 
Not so supportive  4 13.3 
Fairly supportive 10 33.3 
Supportive  15 50.0 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
 
Although the councils have often been criticised for poor service delivery by both national 
politicians and the public, the challenges they experience on service levy payments has not 
been associated with any form of boycott or protest against poor service delivery.  
 
 
On another but related matter, the qualitative interview respondents mentioned two 
significant factors embedded in the social culture that impact negatively on the performance 
of the public service – funerals and moonlighting. Employees lose a lot of time attending 
funerals of distant relatives, friends and colleagues. One respondent specifically mentioned 
that:  
 
Employees travel long distances every weekend to attend funerals in 
their home villages. Also, during the preparation for funerals 
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employees sneak out to work on the preliminary matters of the burial. 
Friday is spent on things like picking up the corpse for burial, and then 
travelling to the home village for the funeral. Organisations also spend 
too much on funerals. Vehicles are made available and colleagues 
released to attend funerals, which of course is both positive and 
negative. It shows compassion and fellow feeling, which are prevalent 
in Botswana.   
 
On the negative side a lot of time and organisational resources are diverted from advancing 
organisational objectives. Organisations incur expenses which are usually not budgeted for, 
such as fuel costs and drivers’ overtime payment for driving a government vehicle to the 
funeral outside normal working hours. The respondent further stated that colleagues of the 
bereaved also lose time that could be committed to performance of duties by holding 
meetings during working hours concerning preparations for their impending funeral trip. 
Allowing employees to use official time and other public resources to address funeral matters 
confirms Kamoche’s (2001) assertion about the prevalence of corporate welfarism in Africa 
(see Chapter II). 
 
The qualitative interview respondents indicated that Batswana have strong ties with their 
birth place or home town to the extent some employees have resisted transfers to places they 
regard as far from their home town/village and/or the urban centres or far from the railway 
line where there is better communication and transportation infrastructure. This supports 
Hofstede’s (1993) idea of collectivism in which choices or decisions in developing countries 
are made in the interest of the group.  
 
On the issue of moonlighting, the respondent said it is strongly tied to the economic life style 
of some public officers. However, moonlighting in Botswana unlike in other African 
countries is prompted by economic opportunities as compared to economic hardships 
elsewhere on the continent. The respondent said that there are two principal factors that are 
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tied to, and promote, moonlighting in Botswana: cattle rearing and other commercial 
undertakings. Public officers in Botswana are not allowed to be directly involved in any kind 
of business except cattle rearing. On Fridays most of the public officers who are involved in 
pastoral farming sneak out of office to buy stock feed and vaccines at the privately owned 
veterinary shops and the Livestock Advisory Centres (LACs) owned by the government 
respectively. Respondents stated that it is also not uncommon to find many employees 
running businesses during office time. Wares ranging from jewellery, apparel, bedding, 
Tupperware, food, etc., are brought to the workplace to be sold during office time. Some 
employees, a respondent stated, may even be involved in big businesses and often find an 
excuse to leave office in the morning and come in the afternoon having produced nothing the 
whole day, and still get paid.  
 
It is apparent that the work ethic in Botswana has become a serious concern. In spite of the 
public sector reforms geared towards improving productivity, employee attitudes do not seem 
to change for the better. A lot of man-hours are spent on productivity matters such as WITS 
and PMS but productivity continues to decline. How effective these reforms are is another 
question. Perhaps this could be summed up in the words of one respondent that the ‘Reasons 
are, these are taken merely as rituals. There is no hurry or urgency in Botswana. People are 
simply not applying themselves. But most importantly motivation and commitment are 
lacking.’  
 
Perhaps we need to ask a question, of which there could be many answers. ‘Why is it 
employees are not committed?’ Respondents opined that perhaps one of the principal causes 
contributing to the lack of commitment to work is the permanent and pensionable work 
arrangement. They also stated that most poor performers in the local authorities have been 
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transferred from one council to the other. The worst that could be done to them was to be 
transferred to the remotest settlement.  
 
Economy 
Empirical data from the field shows that a significant proportion, 50 per cent, of the survey 
respondents when asked as to whether they think the national economy provides a supportive 
environment for the efficient operation of their organisation responded in the affirmative. 
However, 40 per cent felt that the national economy only provided ‘a fairly supportive 
environment.’ Only a minor proportion of about 10 per cent felt that the economy provided a 
‘not supportive environment at all’ and/or ‘a not so supportive environment’ (see Table 6.6 
below). 
Table 6.6: How supportive has been the economic environment  
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Very supportive 6 20 
Supportive 9 30 
Fairly supportive 12 40 
Not so supportive 1 3 
Not supportive at all 2 7 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
The qualitative interview respondents generally felt the economy provided a supportive 
environment for the efficient operation of local authorities. However, they noted that 
economic factors such as development planning and budgeting are centralised. One 
respondent summed this up when he said local municipalities have ‘no latitude to identify 
local needs such that even where economic opportunities are available they may even pass or 
diminish. … Viable economic sectors are centralised and revenue accrues to central 
government and redistribution is based only on central government priorities’. Yet another 




Local authorities are largely dependent on central government especially for 
project funding. They are not able to generate their own funding. It is time local 
authorities stand on their own now. There are possible funding sources for 
councils. For instance Central District Council could get funding from proceeds 
from the mines; North West District Council could get something out of 
tourism; Gaborone City Council can raise funding from the business sector. 
Other councils can also be innovative to establish sources of funding. Councils 
nowadays have the capacity to manage their own resources. They are also able 
to identify their own felt needs. 
 
 
However, the survey respondents when asked about their opinion about the government 
procedures for the allocation of resources, the majority (63 per cent) felt that the distribution 
of resources is ‘fairly equitable.’ About 20 per cent felt that it was either ‘a moderate 
equitable distribution’ or ‘a fully equitable distribution’ at 13 per cent and 7 per cent 
respectively.  Only about 17 per cent felt it was either ‘not equitable distribution’ or ‘not 
equitable at all’ (see Table 6.7).  Qualitative respondents stated that the main objective of 
government for not allowing councils to raise their own revenues has been premised on the 
principle of equitable distribution of resources aimed at establishing a common standard of 
service delivery without discriminating against any council.  
Table 6.7: Government procedures for allocation of resources 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Not equitable distribution 3 10.0 
A rarely distribution 2 7 
A fairly distribution 19 63 
A moderately distribution 4 13 
A fully equitable distribution 2 7 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Although this principle may be based on good intentions it has eroded the ability of some 
councils to identify viable sources of own revenues and only served to deepen their 
dependence on central government appropriations. The central government provides 100 per 
cent of the development fund for LAs as well as 95 per cent of district councils’ recurrent 
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budget and 70 per cent of urban councils’ recurrent requirements (GoB, 2003: 392). This is 
one aspect of standardisation in the councils by central government, which is in fact 
centralisation.  
 
On the availability of resources to local authorities, the quantitative interview respondents 
were pessimistic. About 57 per cent felt there is ‘inadequate material resources’ at their 
organisation’s disposal, while only 33 per cent felt there is ‘fairly adequate material 
resources.’ And 10 per cent thought the material resources are ‘not adequate at all’ (see Table 
6.8). These perceptions are consistent with those that question the sustainability of the current 
funding strategy.  
Table 6.8: Does your organisation have adequate resources to operate efficiently 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Inadequate material resources 17 57 
Fairly adequate material resources 10 33 
Not adequate at all 3 10 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
One respondent stated that ‘the main revenue sources for Gaborone City Council are rates, 
which are estimated at about P100m per year and could be enough for the recurrent budget.’ 
However, these funds are put into the central government consolidated fund and appropriated 
with other revenues across the entire public sector. Councils have no say in how these are to 
be spent. It is widely noted that this situation has put LAs decision-making in a precarious 
position as all decisions lie with central government that is the tax rate, approval of cost 
recovery process for council services, etc. In response to a recommendation of the 
Decentralisation Policy Paper and Action Plan of 1993 the government has committed itself 
to a formula based revenue support grants to the local authorities. The formula factors in size 
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of the population served by a district/town council, remoteness and geographical size (GoB: 
2003: 392).  
 
Instances of increasing opportunities for corruption in the councils and mismanagement have 
left many to be perturbed. Councils have appeared in the media having paid for incomplete or 
even non-implemented projects. In the Central District Council a number of projects were 
fully paid for before completion and another was not even started. According to the Daily 
News (2006) presentations were made in the Full Council meeting that an abattoir had been 
completed, only for the councillors to hear later that some staff members of the council have 
been engaged to complete the project. Another project (the construction of water system 
toilets at a rural primary school), at the same meeting was presented as completed and fully 
paid for only to be discovered that in actual fact the construction never took place. 
 
Yet another major scandal rocked the Gaborone City Council. In a matter that was presented 
before the courts and duly adjudicated, a private waste management company, Daisy Loo, is 
alleged to have been corruptly awarded a contract by some council staff for bush clearing and 
grass cutting on the Segoditshane River valley, which runs across the city. The Managing 
Director of Daisy Loo and three council employees have since appeared before a court on 
charges of conspiracy to defraud the council an amount of P24 million (BOPA, 2006b; 
Mmegi, 2005). Not only was Daisy Loo alleged to have attempted to defraud the council of 
huge sums of money,  the contract was found, in its award, to have breached ‘mandatory 
statutory requirements’ by having the then Deputy City Clerk signing the contract instead of 
the Mayor (Mmegi, 2006b). Claims for payment by the company were also said to be inflated 
and falsified, and the company illegally used council vehicles and employees to perform 
some of the job resulting in those employees claiming overtime pay from the council (ibid). 
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In October 2006 the Court of Appeal threw out Daisy Loo’s case, and its manager and the 
three council officials faced criminal charges at a magistrates’ court.  Although this alleged 
corruption might seem to be the worst case, there are a lot of other corruption scandals, albeit 
involving smaller amounts of money, concerning the improper award of tenders in the 
councils. Incidents like these have led the central government to want to keep tight controls 
over financial resources of the councils. In other words centralisation is used to control 
corruption in the local authorities, while on the contrary conventional wisdom in 
decentralisation literature is that decentralisation is used to control corruption (see Chapter I).  
 
The qualitative interview respondents felt that the government’s attempt to insulate council 
matters from politics will not work and has backfired. They argued that the Mayor was not 
aware of the contract until when it blew out due to the huge claim from Daisy Loo which the 
council disputed. Perhaps if the claim had not been so huge it may have gone undetected or 
not attracted the attention it did. 
 
However, in spite of the emerging scandals the central government has been keen on 
increasing fiscal autonomy. A ‘cost recovery’ system has been proposed for the councils but 
modalities of how this should function are yet to be finalised. The qualitative interview 
respondents noted that the cost recovery system could be one approach that could assist 
councils to be financially independent. The envisaged changes show an incrementalist 
approach, which may allow the changes made to grow proportionately with capacity. At this 







There is a general shortage of skilled labour in the Botswana labour market. For many years 
the labour market has not been able to satisfy the needs of any sector including local 
government.  The qualitative interview respondents stated that most graduates from the 
University of Botswana that applied for jobs in local government had studied social sciences 
or general science. Councils, they stated, need technical skills and professionals, for instance 
auditors, nurses, engineers, etc.  The fact that many university graduates in Botswana can stay 
for years without jobs has also contributed to the significant increase in the number of 
graduates joining the local governments, which would normally not be their first choice. One 
respondent stated that: 
 
The local labour market does not satisfy labour demands especially 
science based/oriented disciplines. External recruitment has been a 
resort, (especially from Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania), but 
now the government is focusing on other countries, especially the 
Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, etc). Posts that require 
social science qualifications are easily filled but not so with posts that 
require technical skills. 
 
 
Respondents noted that besides problems of shortage of technical and professional labour in 
the local labour market, local governments are faced with stiff competition for the scarce 
labour with the private sector and central government. Respondents identified the private 
sector as the greatest competitor for labour with them and that some employees leave to 
establish their own businesses. There is competition also with developed countries for 
medical professions, especially nursing. The few nurses available are competed for by local 
authorities and central government. Local authorities have found it challenging for them to 
retain the employees they have been able to recruit. Poor work conditions and other problems 
have been cited, by some respondents, as major weaknesses of the local authorities. The local 
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authorities’ employees have a staff association to handle their collective bargaining and 
negotiation issues. The matter is discussed in the following subsection. 
 
Labour Movement/Trade Unions 
The quantitative interview respondents were asked ‘what role do staff associations/trade 
unions have in the HRM policy process?’ Forty per cent said ‘a significant role,’ 20 per cent 
‘a major role,’ 17 per cent thought it was ‘a minor role,’ while 13 per cent said ‘a not so 
significant role,’ and only 10 per cent felt it played ‘no role at all’ (see Table 6.9).  
Table 6.9: Role of Trade Unions in HRM policy process 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
No role at all 3 10 
A minor role 6 20 
A not so significant role 3 10 
A significant role 12 40 
A major role 6 20 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
These results indicate that a significant proportion of the respondents perceived BULGSA to 
be playing a meaningful role in the HRM policy process. This view differs slightly from the 
negative feedback from the qualitative interview respondents. Some qualitative interview 
respondents, however, stated that BULGSA leadership has often been overly confrontational 
in their dealings with government and that BULGSA seems not to be clear about their role, 
except negotiating salaries. They were also said to interfere in recruitment and transfer issues 
without seeking clarification first so that they could make informed contributions. Another 
respondent curtly stated that ‘[t]hey don’t understand the role of a trade union.’ However, 
qualitative interview respondents noted that the relation between the association and those 
that it deals with such as the Permanent Secretary and Establishment Secretary depends on 
the personalities of the incumbent officers. Also mentioned was that at local level there are 
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cordial relations between the association and the local authorities but these are also dependent 
on the local authority CEO and the local leadership of BULGSA. Respondents stated that the 
Unified Local Government Service Act is under review for amendment as well to 
accommodate the unionisation of the staff association. This development is a move away 
from the traditional state-labour relationships where there was the dominant partner and 
subordinate partner respectively. The section below focuses on a different but equally 
important matter, decentralisation. 
 
Decentralisation  
The predominance of the centre in terms of resource control (see subsection on the Economy 
above) over local government has created capacity gaps at local level. Responding to a 
question ‘Does the local government have adequate capacity to manage the decentralised 
responsibilities effectively?’ the majority (66.7 per cent) of the quantitative interview 
respondents were sceptical. Those who ‘strongly disagree’ made 20 percent and those who 
chose ‘disagree’ made about 46.7 per cent. Only six per cent said they ‘strongly agree’ and 
26.7 per cent ‘agree’ (Table 6.10). The capacity of the local authorities has been strongly 
associated with both the availability of financial resources and the quality of personnel they 
are able to acquire.      
Table 6.10: Does local government have the capacity to manage decentralised responsibilities 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Strongly agree 2 6.7 
Agree 8 26.7 
Disagree 14 46.7 
Strongly disagree 6 20 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
When asked about their opinions, whether the mechanisms in place to ensure the autonomy 
of local government are efficient and effective the majority (60 percent) of the quantitative 
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interview respondents indicated to be less optimistic about the mechanisms meant to ensure 
the autonomy of local government (see Table 6.11). Only 10 percent thought the mechanisms 
in place were suitable.   
Table 6.11: The mechanisms to ensure autonomy of local government/administration 
 are efficient and effective 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Don’t know 2 7 
Strongly disagree 3 10 
Disagree 15 50 
Agree  10 33 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
These perceptions correspond with the rejection of some of the Venson Commission 
recommendations that sought to further deepen decentralisation. For instance, the 
commissioners recommended the entrenchment of councils in the Constitution but 
government rejected it on the grounds that ‘[c]ouncils are entrenched in subsidiary legislation 
to the Constitution, which has just as much legal standing. This has served us well’ (emphasis 
added) (GoB, 2003: 34). On the call to reform the nomination of councillors to make it more 
transparent, the government argued that ‘[t]he current system of nominating councillors is 
adequate’ (ibid: 37). While these government responses echoed path dependent sentiments, 
the latter also indicates the entrenchment of systems of patronage and the resistance to alter 
these.  Criticism was extended to the councils by the qualitative interview respondents who 
criticised them for not decentralising more powers and authority to the sub-districts as most 
decisions are still taken at the district headquarters.  
 
Another aspect of local management where central government still has a strong hand is 
HRM. Public complaints about poor service delivery by government Ministries and 
Departments, as well as local authorities have prompted central government to undertake 
some productivity improvement reforms (GoB, 2002: 3). Key among these reforms was the 
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performance improvement strategy and the decentralisation programme. The government also 
benefitted from advice from the World Bank on these (ibid).  In what indicates some political 
and administrative commitment to reform the government established institutional and policy 
frameworks to successfully implement these reforms.  
 
However, respondents stated that there is a lack of political control at local level over the 
choice of personnel to be hired, rewards and punishments essential for the control of the 
performance of the councils’ staff. The decentralisation of these HRM activities is not to the 
Local Authority per se (in which politicians could have a say) but to the administrators only, 
and some extra-Departmental Committees9. This relationship is expressed in Figure 6.1 
below. Section 5 of the Unified Local Government Service Act places all HRM 
responsibilities under the Establishment Secretary. However, Section 6 allows the 
Establishment Secretary to delegate some of his/her powers in respect of senior officers to 
local authorities, but these may be varied or set aside at the Establishment Secretary’s 
discretion. In essence HR responsibilities have not been devolved to local authorities but 
deconcentrated to them.  This particular approach can be categorised as horizontal 








                                               
9
 This refers to the Promotions Board and the Training and Selections Committee to which some HRM functions 
have been decentralised. These are discussed in Section 6.5 as well as the role of the Ministry of Health. 
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Figure 6.1: Dispersal of HRM responsibilities between the Centre and Local Authorities 
 
 
The qualitative interview respondents observed that since the Directorate of Local 
Government Service Management is mandated to manage and provide human resources to 
the LAs it is therefore responsible for the performance improvement strategy of the LAs. 
However, PMS (an aspect of SHRM and/or NPM as stated in Chapter II) was introduced in 
the LAs from the Ministry of Local Government, with the active involvement of the Office of 
the President, but not through the DLGSM. Also, the PMS Programme Coordinator (LAs) 
was based at the Ministry of Local Government but not at the DLGSM. 
 
The implementation of the PMS project follows a uniform pattern for all LAs (another form 
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  Source: Author’s Own Construct (2008) 
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as a consultant to manage the implementation of the reform project. One of the interviewees 
stated that the project implementation strictly adhered to project schedule and attached 
penalties for unjustifiable failure to stick to the programme schedule. The respondent further 
remarked that ‘even central government did not have a comprehensive project programme 
like this one’ (referring to when central government implemented its own PMS).  
 
Asked whether the councils have the capacity to manage the decentralised HRM 
responsibilities the quantitative interview respondents were sceptical, as illustrated in Table 
6.18. 
Table 6.18: Local Authorities’ capacity to manage decentralised HRM responsibilities 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Poor capacity 7 23 
Limited capacity 14 47 
Some capacity 6 20 
Adequate capacity 3 10 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
A significant proportion of about 47 per cent felt that there is ‘limited capacity’ and 23 per 
cent felt that there is ‘poor capacity’ to manage the decentralised HRM responsibilities. 
Another 20 per cent felt there is ‘some capacity’ while only 10 per cent felt there is ‘adequate 
capacity.’ Altogether about 70 per cent were not confident of the councils’ capacity to 
efficiently handle their HRM responsibilities. This lack of confidence among the respondents 
may well reflect the poor staffing and positioning of HR units in the councils. Overall, on a 
centralisation/decentralisation and SHRM/Personnel Management matrix the HRM system in 
Botswana’s local authorities could be depicted as in Figure 6.2 below on the basis of the data 





Figure 6.2: The HRM Matrix Showing the HRM System in Botswana  
 
Source: Author’s Own Construct (2008) 
 
The preceding discussions show to what extent the HRM functions are decentralised as well 
as being shared by the local authorities and the DLGSM. Appendix 10 shows which HRM 
responsibilities are decentralised to the local authorities and which ones are performed by the 
DLGSM and/or are shared between the local authorities and the DLGSM. One issue that 
shows the significant role played by the centre in HRM at local level is ability of the centre to 
pick and choose any of the employees posted to municipalities that they want to transfer to 
another municipality. For instance, some qualitative interview respondents perceived the 
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matter is related to issues raised by respondents under the section dealing with training, in 
which returning trainees may be posted to other local authorities on promotion. This would 
compel the LA that has lost an employee through such transfers to fill the vacancy with 
another employee who does not have the training that the one they lost had.  
 
The data shows that on the centralisation/decentralisation axis HRM in the local authorities is 
somewhat in between centralisation and decentralisation because of the shared 
responsibilities referred to above. It is also indicative that the public management system is 
the traditional public administration therefore placing Botswana’s local authorities on the PA 
(left hand side) of the matrix.  The implementation of PMS (which entails elements of 
performance and its measurement, contracts, strategic integration and, ideally, flexibility – 
see Section 2.5) indicates that there will be further moves away from a personnel 
management system to the one based on integrating HRM with organisational strategy. This 
likely move is represented by the arrow that indicates the possible direction in Figure 6.2 
above. As indicated in Chapter II the implementation of PMS ideally paves the way for the 
adoption of SHRM.   
 
Reform is not static as at the time of this study some HRM related reforms were still being 
implemented that could have an impact on where the HRM is ultimately placed. These 
reforms were NPM inspired and centred around a performance management system that is 
premised on a strategic framework. However, the strong coordination from the centre, that 
already exists and the government’s affinity to stick to the status quo, points to a centralised 




6.3.2. Internal environment 
Organisational Strengths and weaknesses 
Local government in Botswana boasts a number of advantages or strengths that enable it to 
perform its statutory functions efficiently. The qualitative interview respondents noted that 
the availability of resources, human and material (funds, office equipment, vehicles and 
offices/buildings) resources, and the stable operational structures within the councils are 
almost always guaranteed.  
 
Perhaps because of the availability of these resources and a conducive environment, councils 
have been able to build some capacity in certain areas that even surpass that of some central 
government agencies. Respondents stated that the construction of district housing for central 
government has been delegated to the councils due to their comparative ability to deliver 
housing compared to the District Administration which is charged with that mandate but has 
underperformed. The centralisation/decentralisation and HRM matrix is further expanded in 
the rest of this Chapter. 
 
Respondents also noted the strong support from DLGSM as an advantage in that it ensures 
the equitable distribution of human resources across all councils irrespective of their income 
generating potential. Although the transfer of employees between councils has been noted 
elsewhere as a limitation (see Chapter IV), the respondents saw it as advantageous. This 
arrangement, they stated, ensures that capable managers are circulated around all councils 
and in the process building capacity and even turning around some of the poorly performing 
councils. Also, respondents noted that the DLGSM ensures consistency in the application of 
policies or directives across the councils. However, the DLGSM’s role makes the local 
196 
 
authorities’ HRM system to lose flexibility in dealing with employees as they have to 
conform to standardised rules and procedures.     
 
Although a number of strengths have been identified, the respondents identified specific 
weaknesses that constrain councils to perform more efficiently. These weaknesses revolve 
around the level of staff, centralisation and the inability of councils to retain trained and 
experienced staff. Notable among the weaknesses identified by some respondents was the 
perception that the councils’ current stock of CEOs is not adequately trained in management 
and financial management. The respondents said some CEOs cannot detect financial 
irregularities at an early stage. They further said there is also a lack of visionary leadership, 
leading to a reactive management style whereby they thrive on, to quote one respondent, 
‘putting-out fires’ instead of anticipating problems and developing strategies to resolve them. 
However, the respondents noted that there is ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ as the deputy 
managers have degrees and post graduate degrees. A report of the Local Authorities Public 
Accounts Committee mentioned that the councils’ Treasurers are also not well equipped to 
perform their functions. The heavy reliance on expatriate staff was also mentioned as a 
liability. Localisation in the technical fields has been extremely slow. Expressing how dire 
the situation is, one respondent stated that ‘in all the councils’ clinics there are no national 
doctors, all are expatriate staff.’ One of the weaknesses that the respondents raised was the 
issue of organisational structure for the municipalities. This is best discussed under the next 
section on organisational culture and structure. 
 
Organisational culture and structure 
Another respondent stated that centralisation created some unexpected challenges with the 
imposition of a uniform organisational structure over all the councils. He stated that all the 
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councils irrespective of size have a similar organisational structure, which is a one-size-fits-
all type of approach. The respondent gave the example of Sowa Township, which he said has 
a population of about 4000 residents, and has the post of Deputy Town Clerk just as the 
Central District Council, with a single post of Deputy Council Secretary, but with a 
population of over 250,000 people in an area covering about the third of the country (see 
Appendix 12).  As for matters relating to the management of the non-decentralised posts, the 
respondents stated that performing most of the HRM practices is a challenge as the process is 
lengthy, due to exchanges of correspondence between the concerned council and the 
DLGSM. In addition to that, the DPSM restricted the growth of the civil service by 
implementing a zero growth policy, which was applied uniformly over the civil service 
including local government as well (see National Development Plan 9).  
 
Some respondents stated that the centralised management of personnel does not take into 
consideration the peculiarities of the various councils, resulting in them failing to tailor-make 
remuneration packages to retain staff. The observation of the respondents is based on the fact 
that the local government service in Botswana has a standardised salary structure across all 
local authorities, with equal pay for similar posts irrespective of the size of the various 
councils. For example, all local authorities’ CEOs were on the same salary grade and they 
had the same number of deputies irrespective of the size of their organisations. To illustrate 
the matter, Appendix 14 present the salary grades of Gaborone City Council and two of the 
smallest councils. This standardisation is in spite of the fact that more often than not the 
bigger the organisation the more responsibilities the manager/s would have. The Venson 
Commission made some recommendations that if accepted would have altered both the 
structure and systems of the local authorities but on a number of occasions in the Government 
White Paper the reason for the rejection of some of the recommendations were that ‘it has 
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served us well in the past’. This points to path dependent decision-making in the reform of 
local government. 
 
The respondents observed that a culture of entitlement has developed among government 
employees. Superiors are reluctant to discipline underperforming and wayward subordinates 
thinking they will be jeopardising their livelihoods. One respondent captured it in his 
remarks, that: 
‘Performance Improvement Committees are not efficient. It is common for 
officers to defer work to the following year. Unpopular decisions like firing 
somebody is not liked by many managers. Government work started as a 
source of income for many but not as a form of serving the nation. Unethical 
behaviour, such as rudeness is allowed to take root and the perpetrators 
progress well in the job hierarchy. Courtesy is not well entrenched among 
public officers but it is desirable. These kind of employees are often the 
beneficiaries of scholarships for training as their superiors feel some sense 
of relief during their absence. And upon their return these employees would 
have acquired new skills and are promoted at the expense of the loyal and 
well performing ones who did not get the opportunity to go for further 
training to improve their skills.’ 
 
Respondents felt it is this laisser-faire attitude or culture among superiors that has led to the 
declining service delivery standards in the councils. Respondents further stated that in some 
quarters the situation at one point was so bad that in the councils there used to be a certain 
practice whereby subordinates would not follow the established channels of decision making 
and would commit organisational resources without proper consultation. When such officers 
are challenged about their decisions they feel victimised. A Council Secretary, Kutlwano 
Matenge, lamented the lack of commitment among public officers, stating that it has 
contributed to poor service delivery (Daily News, 2003c). The problem of rudeness among 
employees, which was mentioned by a respondent, goes against the spirit of national vision 
and ordinary Tswana and/or African culture of courtesy. One of the tenets of Vision 2016 is 
the infusion of the concept of Botho (a Tswana concept that refers to a person who is well 
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mannered, courteous, has a well rounded character and is disciplined) in the entire nation and 
the public and private sectors in particular. BNPC is responsible for promoting this concept 
as part of its productivity improvement mandate.  This concept is similar to South Africa’s 
Ubuntu discussed in Chapter VII, and its introduction in Botswana’s productivity movement 
may have been borrowed from the former.  This also indicates the borrowing of ideas 
between the two countries. The next section presents the concept of HRM.   
 
6.4. Concept of Human Resources Management 
The qualitative interview respondents stated that the institutional structure set up to oversee 
the implementation of the HRM policies causes some ambiguities, especially when there are 
controversial issues at hand to be addressed. The respondents stated that the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Local Government wants to take the final decisions about HRM 
matters when conditions are favourable. They stated that the Permanent Secretary argues that 
he/she is guided by the DPSM and the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. But 
when those decisions are challenged by employees or unions in court the Permanent 
Secretary no longer wants to be associated with the issue, arguing that the Directorate of 
Local Government Service Management was established by an Act of Parliament and can be 
sued in its own right. Indeed as it will be shown later in this chapter, Permanent Secretaries 
can direct the Establishment Secretary on what decision to take but when that decision is 
challenged in court it is the Establishment Secretary who is held accountable. The 
respondents mentioned that indeed the courts have always maintained that DLGSM is an 
independent entity established by law and should be answerable for its decisions. 
Respondents mentioned that the Act was revised, and that the revisions made the HRM 
decision-making process in the Act more inclusive of local authorities and DLGSM but the 
PS rejected the proposed changes, preferring instead to stick to past practices in which the 
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Ministry has the last say. This refusal ensured that the PS still has veto powers in the 
decision-making process concerning HRM matters at local government level. Therefore, 
HRM remains largely centralised as illustrated in Figure 6.1 above. The extent of 
decentralisation/centralisation on HRM is presented in Section 6.5 below. 
 
6.5. HRM Practices 
This section relates the context within which LAs operate and the guiding HRM policies and 
how they impact on or influence the HRM practices. The HRM practices that will be 
discussed in this section are: Manpower Planning, Recruitment and Staffing, Appraising, 
Rewarding and, Training and Development. The discussion begins with manpower planning.   
 
Manpower Planning 
Manpower planning for the LAs is a shared responsibility performed by both the Manpower 
Planning and Budgeting Division of the DLGSM and the LAs (see Appendix 10 on the 
distribution of HRM responsibilities between LAs and DLGSM). Although planning and 
budgeting for manpower is a critical stage for the management of HRs, the Division is 
manned by one officer. Apparently the incumbent officer was an expatriate, which attests to 
the slowness of the localisation strategy. The conditions of service seemed to have been a 
major contributory factor to the problems related to staffing the Division. Respondents at the 
DLGSM indicated that officers have been recruited in the past to increase the staffing for the 
Division and also to eventually localise but all national officers have left as the Division is 
small and progression prospects seemed limited compared to other Divisions of the DLGSM. 
The lack of qualified citizens to perform the manpower planning functions at DLGSM may 




The qualitative interview respondents have argued that central government HRM policies 
developed by DPSM are more often than not applied without due regard for the prevailing 
conditions at local level. The factor mentioned quite frequently by respondents as having 
affected councils in a more negative way was the freezing of new posts across the public 
service. Respondents noted that irrespective of the growth in scope of activities the councils 
have to maintain the same levels of employment, even when the DLGSM sees problems there 
is nothing that can be done. However, respondents noted that a way around this has been 
found and it involves having to forfeit less critical posts to create the essential ones. 
 
On the question whether they think there is congruence between staffing plans and the 
organisation’s strategic plan, 46 per cent of the quantitative interview respondents said ‘no’, 
while 37 per cent said they ‘don’t know’, only 10 per cent felt the staffing plans ‘reflect 
congruence with the local authorities’ strategic plan’. Seven per cent were non-responses. 
The perceived lack of integration between staffing plans and organisational strategy indicates 
that the councils practice a personnel management type of HRM. Furthermore, this indicates 
the influence of public administration in the local authorities of Botswana. This is illustrated 
by the placement of Botswana on the left hand side of the matrix (Figure 6.2) under personnel 
administration and closer to PA on the PA/NPM axis.   Related to planning is the recruitment 
and staffing processes which are discussed below. 
 
Recruitment and Selection 
Qualitative interviewees noted that the decentralisation of some HRM functions to LAs has 
been successful except for the recruitment of nurses at C3 level, which has had to be 




Recruitment for the health sector posts has been recentralised. It was very 
difficult for villages that are far away to recruit nurses. Gaborone City 
Council enjoys a privileged position because of its location and they 
attracted nurses from all over the country. Some nurses would not apply 
for advertised posts in the far away districts just waiting for an opportunity 
to open up in Gaborone and apply for that one. Some who were employed 
elsewhere would resign their post to apply for the one in Gaborone. The 
DLGSM does not have the power to prevent them from doing so. It is a 
question of personal choice and balancing that against service delivery. 
The recentralisation of health sector recruitment satisfies the needs of the 
service and it has benefited LAs in rural areas. BULGSA also understands 
the situation and they supported the recentralisation. 
 
Another challenge the respondents mentioned was that there is some difficulty in filling posts 
due to lack of qualified and experienced citizens in the labour market. Because of this the 
recruitment efforts have been targeted at other developing countries, especially in Africa. 
However, the qualitative interview respondents stated that some expatriate employees 
especially from African countries falsify their qualifications and some of them are alleged to 
have stolen medical equipment and medications, particularly the Anti-Retroviral medication 
(ARVs for HIV/AIDS) from hospitals and clinics. The respondent stated that this was one of 
the reasons why in 2005 the DLGSM redirected its recruitment efforts to the Caribbean 
countries. 
 
Another factor stated was that the Ministry of Health is responsible for the vetting system to 
stamp out fake applicants for medical posts but is failing to detect the impostors. In view of 
the many complex challenges, such as expatriate’s false qualifications and nobody willing to 
go and work in the outlying districts such as Kgalagadi, decentralising the recruitment of 
nurses to the councils experienced a setback and was recentralised.  
 
When asked whether the recruitment practice was geared towards achieving the 
organisation’s mission and objectives, 50 per cent of the quantitative respondents said ‘Yes’ 
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and 40 per cent said ‘No’. Only 10 per cent said they ‘Don’t know’. This supports Armstrong 
and Baron’s (2002) assertion that personnel management strategies as well are linked to 
organisational objectives (see Appendix 15). That is the linkage of organisational objectives 
and personnel management strategy is not exclusive to SHRM. 
 
The qualitative interview respondents stated that there is a significant amount of interference 
from the centre (Minister and Permanent Secretary) on the appointment of council CEOs. In 
fact, contrary to the respondents’ assertion of interference, Section 5 of the Unified Local 
Government Service Act gives the Minister of Local Government the prerogative to appoint 
LAs’ CEOs. However, it was the manner in which appointments were made that seemed to 
be problematic. The respondents stated that the Minister usually appoints the CEO from 
shortlisted candidates after interview by DLGSM, but that sometimes the Minister may 
decide to appoint the lowly ranked candidate on the list. Appointments of other staff may also 
be through transfers of staff from one LA to the other. The qualitative interview respondents 
felt that transfers sometimes disrupted the concerned council’s implementation capacity. 
Reasons for staff transfers vary. For some, as the 2005 O & M Task Force observed, could be 
used as punishment. Others may be transferred because they are due for promotion but there 
is no vacant senior post in their council into which they could be promoted. However, when 
asked if the transfer of staff between LAs is a good practice, the majority (60 per cent) of the 
quantitative respondents thought it was (see Table 6.14). About 37 per cent said it is ‘A good 
practice’ and 23 per cent said it is ‘Somewhat good practice’ with 13 per cent saying it is ‘A 






Table 6.14: Is the transfer of staff between LAs a good practice? 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
A good practice 11 37 
Somewhat good practice 7 23 
A fairly good practice 4 13 
A bad practice 8 27 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Only 27 per cent perceived transfers to be ‘A bad practice’, against 60 percent approval 
rating. The need for the transfer of staff between councils is seen as a surety against failure to 
attract qualified employees by some councils.  
 
The 2005 O & M Task Force recommended that the Appointment and Transfers 
Boards/Panels be introduced at local level to ensure the objectivity and transparency of both 
the appointment and transfer of staff. It is important to note that the 2005 Task Force did not 
recommend for any further decentralisation of HRM responsibilities to the LAs. The 
decentralised HRM responsibilities were not devolved but delegated as they could be 
withdrawn as and when the DLGSM deemed appropriate. Besides the recruitment selection 
and placement of staff, the councils are also faced with the challenges of retaining employees 
and keeping their morale high. The following subsection discusses the incentives that are 
available for this purpose, in this case rewards, promotions and other incentives.    
 
Rewards, Promotions and Other Incentives 
The qualitative respondents stated that the poor conditions of service, a unitary pay structure, 
lack of promotion, and other challenges combine to make employment in local government 
less attractive. The respondents further stated that, as a result, working for LAs has been 




A significant challenge that has been noted by the qualitative interview respondents is the 
disparity between central government and local government conditions of service and pay. 
Although there are gross disparities in the salaries between central government and local 
government, the local government salaries are clearly structured. This was reflected also in 
the way the quantitative interview respondents felt. When asked ‘are salaries clearly 
structured?’ the majority said ‘Yes’ (67 per cent) and only 33 per cent said ‘No.’ 
 
However, when asked whether local government salaries are competitive, an overwhelming 
majority of 97 per cent said ‘No’ and only three per cent said ‘Yes’. This is consistent with 
what most researchers have found and central government has also acknowledged. On 
another question, which sought to understand as to whether non-monetary benefits are clearly 
articulated and competitive the majority of the respondents (86 per cent) said ‘No’ and 10 per 
cent said ‘Yes’ with only three per cent saying they ‘Don’t know.’ These responses indicate 
that the incentives for good performance are not adequate and non-monetary benefits not well 
articulated.   
 
The qualitative interview respondents mentioned that were it not for the rigidities associated 
with the promotions process, promoting staff could be another strategy that could be used to 
reward good performers. CEOs can only promote officers up to grade C3 beyond which it is 
the responsibility of the DLGSM. Promotions into grades upward of C3 have to be 
recommended to the Promotions Board by the local authority. The Promotions Board consists 
of representatives from the DLGSM, BULGSA, and a CEO from one of the councils. The 
place of the Promotions Board in the HRM process is illustrated in Figure 6.1 above. Such 
promotions carry the high likelihood of the officer under consideration being transferred to 
any other council that may have a vacancy for a higher post. This carries the advantage that 
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opportunities for promotion will be open elsewhere if not available in the council that 
recommended somebody for promotion. However, some officers are known to have 
successfully challenged decisions to transfer them (GoB, 2005: 20). This includes both 
ordinary transfers and on some occasions even transfer on promotion. The transfer practice 
has some contradictions (as observed also in Chapter IV) in that on one hand it avails limited 
skilled HRs to all LAs equitably while on the other hand it disrupts the implementation of 
some programmes and/or projects by the abrupt removal of an officer and sometimes not 
immediately replacing them with somebody with the same skills and/or competence.  
 
On another factor, both the qualitative and quantitative interview respondents noted that 
seniority is the main criterion considered for promotion as stipulated in the Scheme of 
Service. The qualitative interview respondents stated that performance is only considered 
when there are several employees who joined the service at the same time and they are all 
due for promotion at the same period. The Scheme of Service, which was introduced to 
ensure consistency across LAs serves to disadvantage young good performers who (for lack 
of patience) end up leaving for better prospects elsewhere, such as the private sector.  
 
However, it would appear that the limitations mentioned above have not affected the vacancy 
rate at local level to the extent one would have expected. Table 6.15 presents the perceptions 
of the quantitative interview respondents. 
Table 6.15: The vacancy rate among the skilled labour 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Very low 5 16.7 
Low 7 23.3 
Moderate 13 43.3 
High  4 13.3 
Very high 1 3.3 
Total  30 100.0 




The respondents’ perceptions were as follows: 43 per cent thought the vacancy rate among 
skilled labour was ‘moderate,’ while 23 per cent said it was ‘low.’ 17 per cent indicated that 
the vacancy rate was ‘very low,’ and 13 per cent said it was ‘high’ while only three per cent 
said it was ‘very high.’ The perception that the vacancy rate is generally moderate could be 
factual due to the fact that job opportunities in the entire economy have reduced significantly 
leading to limited mobility of labour within the different sectors of the economy.  
 
When asked at what level is turnover highest, 50 per cent said ‘middle management’, 33 per 
cent pointed to the ‘Technical level’ with 17 per cent thinking it is at ‘other’ generalised 
levels. None indicated that top management and artisans were leaving in significant numbers. 
This pattern is consistent with part of the conclusions made by the Botswana Government 
about the resignations from public service that higher levels of resignations usually occur 
among the C1-C2, C3-C4 and also B1-B2 and B3-B5 posts (GoB, 2003: 376). The B salary 
bands are for artisans and semi-skilled workers, while the C bands are mainly occupied by 
diploma and degree holders. The justification for this trend was that the younger employees 
are more likely to leave as they have invested less time in the organisation (ibid: 375). It may 
also be that they are more highly qualified and employers would prefer them as they are 
younger and more skilled. Another question posed was as to whether exit interviews are 
conducted among those resigning? The responses were as follows: 50 per cent said ‘Never’, 
23 per cent ‘Rarely,’ 13 per cent ‘Sometimes,’ 10 per cent ‘Quite often’ and only three per 






Table 6.16: Do you conduct exit interviews among resigning staff  
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Never 15 50.0 
Rarely 7 23.3 
Sometimes 4 13.3 
Quite often 3 10.0 
Always  1 3.3 
Total 30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
This implies that there is no systematic way of capturing the reasons for resignations in the 
councils. Without proper and accurate knowledge of the causes for dissatisfaction among 
employees it may not be easy to find a lasting solution to the problem. The next sub-section 
presents findings on training and development.    
 
Training and Development 
Training is one of the key strategies that the government has adopted as a means to address 
the shortage of skilled labour and to mitigate its impact on service delivery. Training and 
development is a shared responsibility between the councils and DLGSM. Both are 
responsible for drawing the training plan.  
 
A respondent stated that training for local authorities is managed by a consultative committee 
known as the Training and Selection Committee. The committee is composed of members 
from the Land Boards, District Councils, Tribal Administration, Urban Councils, BULGSA, 
and DLGSM represented by the heads of the following divisions; Training and Development 
Division, Recruitment Division, Personnel Division, and Manpower Planning Division, and 
the Deputy Establishment Secretary as Chairman. The respondent stated that decisions are 
reached on consensus and are passed on to the Establishment Secretary as recommendations 
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for his consideration. This Committee is one of the decentralisation initiatives of the 
DLGSM. 
 
The other question asked related to the identification of training needs within organisations. 
The quantitative interview respondents were asked to state the clarity of the criteria used for 
identifying training needs within their organisation. The majority (60 per cent) indicated there 
is ‘no clear criteria,’ slightly over 16 per cent said there is a ‘fairly clear criteria,’ 10 per cent 
stated there is ‘no clear criteria at all’ while almost seven per cent each indicated there is a 
‘somewhat clear criteria’ and that there is a ‘clear criteria’ respectively (see Table 6.17 
below). This shows the absence of a well structured mechanism for identifying training needs 
and that training needs assessment needs to be carried out more frequently and 
recommendations from the exercise implemented. It seems having training officers in the 
councils is not enough but that policies and clearer guidelines need to be developed.  
Table 6.17: Criteria for identifying training needs 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
No clear criteria at all 3 10.0 
No clear criteria 18 60.0 
Fairly clear criteria 5 16.7 
Somewhat clear criteria 2 6.7 
There is a clear criteria 2 6.7 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
The selection for training based on seniority has created the problem of training to be 
perceived as a personal right by government employees. In accordance with the Scheme of 
Service, employees expect to be sent for training after a certain number of years in the 
service. One qualitative interview respondent stated that employees seem to have adopted 
training as a personal empowerment facility after which they can leave the service and seek 
better prospects elsewhere. Furthermore, the respondent stated that, some of those sent for 
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further training change courses without the approval of the sponsor (government) after which 
difficulties with placement emerge upon their completion of studies and return to the work 
station. The respondent stated that upon their return such employees find that their training 
did not give them the skills they needed to progress in their job. It was also stated that others 
do it deliberately targeting particular skills so that they can leave local authorities and join 
either central government, parastatals or the private sector. The respondent further stated that 
one other challenge is that when employees trained by DLGSM resign from the service they 
are normally not asked to reimburse the costs of training as required in the training 
regulations.  
 
Respondents noted that as training is local authority specific it does not address the strategic 
objectives of the unified local government service. Also, one respondent noted that it 
disadvantages those officers who are frequently transferred from one LA to the other. These 
officers, the respondent stated, miss out on training opportunities that were created for them 
at a particular LA where they were serving before being transferred to the other local 
authority that may not have identified the same training need in their training plan. Some of 
the most capable officers are transferred frequently between local authorities to address 
problems that others could not solve, and it is these who stand to lose more. Once the 
problem is resolved they are transferred to another hot spot.  
 
The councils are responsible for in-house training and institutional training is the 
responsibility of the DLGSM. In-house training has suffered in some respects. Some 
respondents noted that funds allocated for in-house training were inadequate. Respondents 
frequently mentioned that lately funds for in-house training have become very limited as a 
considerable amount of money was being diverted to the PMS workshops. However, some 
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local authorities are known to lack the capacity to utilise the funds allocated to them for in-
house training.  
 
Training is generally costly, especially training provided in developed countries. Degrees and 
diplomas also cost a considerable amount of time. Alternative approaches to training may 
have to be pursued. The Local Government Structure Commission of 1979 had recommended 
that a Local Government Institute be established to focus on training for LAs. This 
recommendation was repeated by the 2nd Local Government Structure Commission and was 
accepted by Government in its Government Paper No. 1 of 2004. Most probably, such an 
institution could focus more precisely on the needs of the local authorities and perhaps offer 
training at an affordable cost, and help improve performance. Section 6.6 below discusses 
performance management.   
 
6.6. Performance Management 
The individual performance appraisals are done regularly in Botswana’s councils, albeit 
annually, as attested to by 100 per cent of the quantitative respondents. However, the 
perception of some respondents is that the performance appraisal has lost its meaning and is 
done for the sole purpose of annual salary increase. Asked if the performance appraisal is 
linked in a significant way with rewards and sanctions for employees, the majority thought 
they were ‘not linked at all’ or they are ‘weakly linked’ at 37 per cent and 40 per cent 
respectively. About 17 per cent thought they are linked while seven per cent said they are 






Table 6.19: The Link between performance appraisal and rewards/sanctions 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Not linked at all 11 36.7 
Weakly linked 12 40.0 
Somewhat linked 2 6.7 
Linked 5 16.7 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Instances of a disjunction between performance appraisal and rewards/sanctions do occur. 
These could result from failure to follow established procedures as in the case of Leonard 
Matlhare vs Attorney General that was brought before the High Court and eventually the 
Court of Appeal in Botswana. The Establishment Secretary of the DLGSM had compulsorily 
retired Matlhare on the grounds that his performance, as Co-ordinator of the Kaudwane 
Settlement Programme, was poor. In the retirement letter the Establishment Secretary alleged 
that the progress report that Matlhare presented to visiting Ministers at Kaudwane settlement 
in 1997 ‘reflected poor performance, poor co-ordination and a weak implementation of the 
programme’ (GoB, 2003c: 3). Apparently, Matlhare had been promoted to the rank of 
Principal Remote Area Development Officer in 1996 and his last annual performance review 
was in 1998, in which his performance was rated above average (ibid). The court also found 
that none of the appellant’s supervisors had ever complained of his poor performance and that 
the respondents could not challenge the evidence that the appellant gave. The Appeals Court 
upheld Matlhare’s appeal and set aside the retirement, reinstated him and the DLGSM was 
ordered to pay both the High Court and Court of Appeal legal costs. Although the Court of 
Appeal based its decision on other reasons such as failure to act judicially and observe the 
rules of natural justice, as well as making a ruling that the allegations made in the retirement 
letter were unfounded, the Establishment Secretary stated that she acted on the Permanent 
Secretary’s observations. This latter aspect alone shows the extent to which central 
government controls HRM at local level. And as one of the respondents observed earlier, 
213 
 
when such decisions are challenged in court the Permanent Secretary does not appear before 
the court as it happened in this case.   
 
One of the qualitative interview respondents added that ‘merit assessment scores and 
comments are never considered by the Ministry (Ministry of Local Government).’ And that 
the openness of the performance appraisals remains questionable, especially with regard to 
the appraisal of senior officers. The respondent further stated that some senior officers are 
known not to perform very well and yet the departments they head have apparently done very 
well and they get the undue credit for that. Perhaps the performance appraisals should be 
opened to colleagues for other employees to give feedback on senior officers, the respondent 
said.  
 
Another question was posed to the quantitative interview respondents as to whether the 
performance appraisal and the organisational objectives are linked. Table 6.20 presents the 
results. Forty per cent said they ‘Strongly disagree,’ with 33 per cent stating they ‘disagree’ 
and 20 per cent indicated that they ‘agree’ and seven per cent said they ‘Don’t know.’ This 
indicates that organisational objectives and individual employee work objectives (if any) are 
perceived not to be aligned. What may have led these responses could be the knowledge 
among the interviewees of the impending reforms; that is PMS, Performance Based Reward 
System and a new performance appraisal tool. Already these had been implemented in the 
civil service and local government employees were aware of them and also that these were 






Table 6.20: The linkage between performance appraisal and organisational objectives 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Agree 6 20 
Disagree 10 33 
Strongly disagree 12 40 
Don’t know 2 7 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Also, the absence of measurable goals is apparent. Earlier under the subheading ‘Rewards, 
Promotions and other Incentives’, it has been shown that promotions are not based on 
performance but length of service. Performance appraisal has now become a salary increment 
ritual that has little or no value in effectively monitoring performance. This leads to the idea 
that the performance appraisal is largely subjective. Another question sought to know if the 
results from the performance reviews were used to make adjustments to employees’ work 
objectives. Fifty per cent of the respondents said ‘Never,’ 27 per cent thought ‘Rarely,’ 20 per 
cent ‘Sometimes’ and only three per cent said ‘Quite often’ with none choosing ‘Always’ for 
an answer (see Table 6.21). 
Table 6.21: Are performance reviews used to make adjustments to employees’ work objectives 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Never 15 50 
Rarely 8 27 
Sometimes 6 20 
Quite often 1 3 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Asked whether performance reviews are used to identify employees’ capacity needs, 43 per 
cent said ‘Sometimes,’ 30 per cent ‘Rarely,’ 23 per cent chose ‘Never’ and three per cent said 
‘Quite often.’ When aggregated, 53 per cent said either ‘Never’ or ‘Rarely’ and a fewer 
proportion (46%) answered in the affirmative (see Table 6.22). These responses indicated 
limitations with the performance appraisal system and the manner it is applied.  
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Table 6.22: The use of performance reviews to identify employee capacity needs 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Quite often 1 3.3 
Sometimes  13 43.3 
Rarely 9 30.0 
Never 7 23.3 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Several qualitative interview respondents stated that the key performance management 
strategies in the local authorities include the use of annual plans and the performance 
appraisal instrument. The qualitative respondents also noted performance management also 
depends on the initiative of the incumbent CEO and the various heads of departments within 
the local authorities.  
 
Asked how they would describe the performance management in their organisation, the 
majority (57 per cent) of the quantitative interview respondents said it is ‘weak,’ 23 per cent 
‘moderately successful’ and 20 per cent indicated it is ‘very weak’. There were none who 
opted for ‘successful’ and ‘very successful’ (see Table 6.23). 
Table 6.23: State of performance management in local authorities 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Very weak 6 20 
Weak 17 57 
Moderately successful 7 23 
Total  30 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
But not all was that bleak as when asked to indicate whether they think the management of 
human resources in local government has improved or not within the past 10 years, the results 
presented in Table 6.24 below posit a more positive picture. Sixty three per cent said there 
was ‘moderate improvement,’ 20 per cent indicated an ‘insignificant improvement’, 13 per 
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cent saying a ‘significant improvement’ and only three per cent saying ‘no improvement at 
all.’  
Table 6.24: Has the management of HRs improved in the past decade 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Significant improvement 4 13.3 
Moderate improvement 19 63.3 
Insignificant improvement 6 20.0 
No improvement at all 1 3.3 
Total  30 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
There was none that indicated a ‘great improvement’. It may not be easy to identify what may 
account for the perceived improved performance besides the assumption that, among some 
possibilities, the leadership and change management workshops that the local authorities’ 
CEOs have been attending since 2001 in preparation for the implementation of PMS may 
have contributed.  However, it emerges that there is a culture of performance assessment and 
management, albeit with its weaknesses.  
 
In response to the question ‘Has your organisation adopted WITS’ only 30 per cent said ‘yes’ 
and seven per cent said they ‘don’t know’. A majority of 63 per cent said ‘no’. Responding to 
the question ‘Has WITS programme been successful or not as a performance improvement 
tool?’ 33 per cent said it is ‘not applicable.’ Fifty three per cent said it has not been successful 
at all, while only 13 per cent said it was ‘moderately successful’ (see Table 6.25).  
Table 6.25: The success of WITS as a performance improvement tool 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Not applicable 10 33.3 
Not successful at all 16 53.3 
Moderately successful 4 13.3 
Total  30 100 




The government has noted that since the Commonwealth Secretariat evaluated WITS in 1998 
and adopted the recommendations thereof, there has been a positive work culture, 
commitment to work and concerns for customers’ needs which is improving for those 
agencies that took WITS seriously (GoB, 2003: 368). In spite of the positive feedback the 
government acknowledges about WITS in central government departments it has not been 
adopted by local authorities as a performance improvement strategy. How the information 
collected during the performance management process is utilised is discussed below. 
 
6.7. Information on Outcomes 
The analysis of performance outcomes at local government remains problematic. The 
qualitative interview respondents indicated that a significant factor in this regard is the one-
on-one quarterly review of performance for councils between CEOs and the Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government. The respondents stated that the Permanent 
Secretary in turn holds performance reviews with the Permanent Secretary to the President. 
The quantitative interview respondents were asked as to whether baseline data and 
performance improvement data are analysed regularly. A significant proportion of the 
respondents, about 37 per cent each, said ‘never’ and ‘sometimes’ respectively, with about 26 
per cent indicating only ‘rarely.’ None perceived it to be ‘often’ and/or ‘always’ (see Table 
6.26). The absence (or weakness at best) of a systematic analysis of performance review data 
creates a gap in the performance management process whereby data collected is not 
efficiently used to feedback into organisational performance.  
Table 6.26: Are baseline and performance improvement data analysed regularly 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Never 11 36.7 
Rarely 8 26.7 
sometimes 11 36.7 
Total  30 100.0 




If those with a negative response are combined (i.e. ‘never’ and ‘rarely’) they make a 
majority at 63 per cent. Whereas the qualitative interview respondents have indicated that 
organisational performance is dealt with at the higher levels of management (i.e. between 
CEO and PS), the findings from quantitative interviews indicate that the available data on 
performance is not analysed regularly. The lack of analysis of performance data could be 
related to the fact mentioned earlier that performance reviews are a mere ritual for salary 
increment but not necessarily to assess or measure employees’ output. The basis for rating 
performance is more about the personal traits of the appraissee than their performance against 
any objective criteria, a factor associated with the performance appraisal system. Section 6.8 
below summarises the chapter. 
 
6.8. Summary 
The chapter has shown that the top political and bureaucratic elites have kept the local 
politicians out of the executive functions of local authorities. Accountability is to the top 
bureaucrats at the centre but not the elected representatives. The practice of keeping 
councillors out of administration is an old one, justified by a constitutional assumption of 
separation of powers, and shows how historical choices and practices perpetuate themselves 
and are difficult to change. On the other hand the docility of the people leaves too much room 
for government control. This factor is also historical and there are institutions (in particular 
patronage) around it that make it difficult (but not impossible) to change. Corporate 
welfarism is widespread in the public sector, as well as ethnic or social cleavages. Perhaps 
these are indicative of African culture as already mentioned in Chapter II. The work ethic is 
deteriorating while on the other hand practices that do not auger well for improved 




The economy is perceived to be providing a fairly supportive environment for the local 
authorities. However, the lack of fiscal autonomy has left the local authorities heavily 
dependent on central government funding. Corruption and mismanagement, even though low, 
were considered to be on the increase. The national labour market was considered weak, with 
local authorities relying on expatriate labour for professional and technical skills. Poor work 
conditions making it difficult for councils to retain staff they have recruited. 
 
Decentralisation is one area where the mechanisms in place were perceived to be weak and 
the government seems not eager to adopt the more radical changes such as the introduction of 
a mayoral system.  Both achievements and failures have been noted in the decentralisation of 
HRM responsibilities to LAs. Figure 6.2 illustrates the type of HRM and extent of its 
decentralisation. The increase in both managerial and political decentralisation has been 
incrementalist, in some cases as with the rejection of some Venson Report recommendations 
the government stuck to what ‘worked well’ in the past and/or ‘the status quo’. These are a 
clear indication of path dependent and rational choices in the development of local 
government that seems aimed at accentuating and preserving past successes and avoiding 
risks.   Also, minimalist decentralisation in employee management could be seen in the 
limited increase in HRM responsibilities to local authorities as in the post of C3 and below. 
This scenario makes the Botswana HRM system to straddle the dividing line between 
centralisation and decentralisation on the matrix due to its somewhat dual system (i.e. HRM 
responsibilities centralised or decentralised for different posts). Another notable development 
is the extension of HRM responsibilities to other bodies such as extra departmental 
committees reflected in Figure 6.1. Although this enhances decentralisation of HRM 
responsibilities, these are only deconcentrated (at the discretion of the Establishment 
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Secretary), rather than devolved responsibilities, as they can be easily withdrawn. The 
centralisation of HRM responsibilities goes beyond the DLGSM as the Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Local Government can still instruct the Establishment Secretary on what 
decisions to take pertaining to employees as stated by the respondents and demonstrated in 
the Motlhale vs Attorney General case.  
 
Another important factor relates to the question as to whether local authorities in Botswana 
can be said to be moving towards Strategic aspect of HRM was in the implementation of 
Performance Management Systems. The PMS project was controlled from outside of the 
local authorities and might appear to be implemented more in practice rather than spirit.  
Officers’ assessment of the practice suggests that its strategic purpose is in practice ignored. 
The introduction of NPM-like reforms had not yet shifted Botswana’s HRM system from the 
personnel administration type, which is associated with public administration, to the SHRM 
type that is associated with NPM. In essence the HRM system was still in transition as there 
were elements of both approaches. This development indicates that in spite of the system 
being in transition the nascent moves made towards the adoption of SHRM are significant for 
a developing country. 
 
The findings indicate that the local authorities operate in a politically, economically and 
socially stable environment. Standardisation, which has centralising tendencies, is one of the 
key approaches to the management of local authorities in Botswana. Transfers are one feature 
of the centralised system. These were perceived as disruptive to the implementation process. 
Yet at the same time it was seen as facilitating the equitable deployment of limited skills 
across local authorities. Centralisation was also seen as protecting central government 
interests and self-preservation by the ruling elite. The culture of performance management is 
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not well developed but crowded out by other priorities, such as the use of performance data 
for annual salary increase. However, information from performance reviews is seldom used 
but only when there are several employees with the same length of service competing for the 
same post for promotion.  
 








FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: NORTH WEST PROVINCE 
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter analyses the North West Province case study using the analytical 
framework developed in Chapter II. The analysis is based on empirical data from 
interviews with key informants and documentary data. The interviews were separated 
into two categories, the quantitative interviews (for HR staff in the municipalities) and 
qualitative interviews for senior public officers from the national, provincial and local 
government as well as other experts. The objective was to understand what influences 
the management of human resources: how HRs are managed in the North West 
Province and why they are being managed the way they are.  The study looked at 
whether there is a trade-off between SHRM and decentralisation in a developing 
country context (i.e. can SHRM be only delivered by central government in the 
African context). Also, the study considered the factors that influence the 
management of human resources in local government and the reason behind the 
differences in outcomes with other countries adopting similar policy advice.  
 
We start with the biographical data of the respondents from both data collection 
methods, that is, the survey respondents and the qualitative interview respondents. 
 
7.2. Biographical Data of Respondents  
7.2.1. Survey Respondents 
Presented first is the biographical data of the survey respondents and then afterwards 
present that of the senior public officers who were interviewed using the qualitative 
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approach. The representation of the respondents per type of municipality shows that 
72 per cent came from the mayoral executive, whereas 28 per cent were from the 
committee executive. Table 7.1 shows that the majority of the quantitative interviews 
respondents, just less than 41 per cent, were from senior management, 38 from middle 
management and only 22 per cent were clerical staff of the human resources 
departments of the municipalities. 







Senior Management 13 40.6 
Middle Management 12 37.5 
Clerical 7 21.9 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Of the 32 respondents 12 (38 per cent) were male and 20 (63 per cent) were females 
(see Table 7.2). The composition of gender in the human resources departments of the 
municipalities studied indicates a higher proportion of women over men.  
Table 7.2: Gender of Respondents 
GENDER FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Male  12 37.5 
Female  20 62.5 
Total  32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
With regard to training, 38 per cent of the respondents indicated they possessed 
tertiary education qualifications in social sciences (e.g. public administration, local 
government studies, etc). Twenty eight per cent held human resource management 




Table 7.3: Field of Training of Respondents 
QUALIFICATIONS FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Human Resource Management 9 28 
Social Sciences 12 38 
Business Studies 8 25 
Other 3 9 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
On the length of time respondents spent in their current job posts the majority (53 per 
cent) indicated they spent about a year in their posts. About 19 per cent of respondents 
claimed to have spent about three years in their posts, while 12.5 per cent stated they 
spent two years. About 16 per cent preferred not to respond to the question. The 
employees who have spent about a year in their posts could possibly be the new 
recruits and those who have been recently promoted into new posts. In the rapidly 
changing context of South African local government, it has not been taking long for 
employees to be promoted due to the changes taking place. The following section 
briefly presents the qualitative interview respondents.    
 
7.2.2. Qualitative Interview Respondents 
The qualitative interview respondents consisted mainly of senior officers from 
municipalities, national and provincial government, the South Africa Local 
Government Association (SALGA), Municipal Leadership Training Authority 
(MULTA), and the South Africa Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU). These 
officers were selected on the basis of the role they played at the policy level both 
within local government and central government (national and provincial). The next 
section presents the data analysis from the interviews, following the outline based on 




7.3. The Environment  
This section is divided into two main subsections, the external and internal 
environment. But under these there are specific subheadings that guide the analysis. 
 
7.3.1. External Environment 
This section is divided into several subsections that analyse the various elements that 
influence the environment within which local authorities in South Africa operate. The 




Politics in the North West Province can only be interpreted within the broader context 
of the South African national politics. However, as some literature shows each 
province within the South Africa has its own political character. But it is the political 
history and the interaction between the national, provincial and local that defines what 
each sphere of governance can do and cannot do.   The respondents appreciated the 
progress made with regard to governance since majority rule in South Africa, but they 
also acknowledged that limitations are still quite significant. This perspective was 
captured in one of the respondents’ statements, that: 
There are many challenges a developmental state experiences as it 
evolves over time. Social and community structures introduced 
during the apartheid era are still there and the integration of racial 
groups has been limited. Poverty is still a major challenge, as well as 
income disparities between the racial groups, consultation at 
community level in certain contexts is problematic, police 
intimidation is frequent, democracy is not well understood and the 
judicial system shows some discriminatory practices similar to those 




Although South Africa has undergone some transformation the above statement 
indicates that some practices that were deeply entrenched in the apartheid governance 
system will not be easy to do away with. However, the racial policy has changed but 
the new government has to inherit some of the undesirable social and community 
structures of the past, and try to make them work better. This shows that what has 
gone on before may not be easy to undo and that it will influence future decisions and 
actions of both the state and society.     
 
However, responding to a question on whether the political environment in South 
Africa is conducive for the efficient operation of local government in the North West 
Province, all of the qualitative interview respondents were positive that the 
environment was conducive for the optimum performance of local government 
institutions. They stated that there are opportunities and avenues for direct 
government intervention. They identified two strategies critical in this area:  
community participation, and the holding of regular local government elections. Most 
respondents noted that the introduction of ward committees, especially in the 
previously excluded communities has been a major political development at local 
government level in enhancing participation in the development process. The 
respondents stated that these committees help councillors in the performance of their 
duties and do enhance and deepen democratic governance. One respondent stated that 
they assist particularly in identifying the needs of the communities and linking these 




The quantitative interview respondents were also positive about the political 
environment that it offers a conducive atmosphere for their organisations to operate 
fairly efficiently. When asked, does the socio-political environment provide a 
supportive environment for the efficient functioning of your organisation,  44 per cent 
of the quantitative interview respondents said the political environment offers ‘a fairly 
supportive environment’, 34 per cent perceived it to avail ‘a supportive environment’, 
16 per cent perceived it to be ‘a not so supportive environment’, and only six per cent 
said the political conditions offer ‘a very supportive environment’ (see Table 7.4 
below). However, none of the respondents felt the political environment was ‘not 
supportive at all’. These responses show that most of the officers acknowledge the 
challenges faced by local government within the context of transition to democracy.  
Table 7.4: The Socio-political Environment 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
A not so supportive environment 5 16 
A fairly supportive environment 14 44 
A supportive environment 11 34 
A very supportive environment 2 6 
Total  32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
However, some qualitative interview respondents noted the politicisation of service 
delivery as one of the negative contributors to a not-so-good environment for the 
operation of local government. This was said to be most common in areas where 
opposition parties dominate. The respondents stated that service delivery in such 
places is less than satisfactory and is deliberately designed to punish residents for 




The qualitative study respondents have also noted that factional fighting that prevailed 
within the ANC especially in the run-up to local government elections in 2005/06 
pervaded even the bureaucracy. Some municipal managers were alleged to have been 
fired not necessarily because they underperformed according to their employment 
contracts but because they belonged to the wrong faction within the ANC. 
Respondents observed that what perhaps contributes to the politicisation of 
municipalities is the not-so impressive calibre of some councillors. Their selection to 
represent their parties was said to be dependent on their loyalty to the party they 
belong to but not based on competence. These responses indicate that the allocation of 
resources within the decentralised system of government has been used for patronage 
purposes and for mobilising or maintaining political support as indicated in Chapter 




The North West province is culturally heterogeneous, but predominantly African. 
However, the qualitative interview respondents noted that African culture is not 
predominant in the public service management system. They further stated that the 
language of employment has always been Afrikaans and English for many decades, 
and blacks have been marginalised because of the discriminatory practices.  Their 
culture appears not to have been entrenched in the management systems. However, 
one respondent added that President Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance that seeks to 
bring back African norms and values, is an attempt at infusing African culture and 
values into the management of public institutions and all aspects of life. The 
respondent went on to state that:  
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The government has tried to capture and reintroduce African 
values even on corporate images. For instance, the Coat of Arms 
presents a Bushman and their language to emphasize indigenous 
culture. Office dress includes Madiba (nickname for Nelson 
Mandela) shirts and other traditional attire. In Mafikeng area, for 
example, women wear seshoeshoe (a traditional Sotho-Tswana 
women’s dress) dresses to work. The government looks at this as 
part of the cultural diversity management, which is provided for in 
Chapter 9, Section 181 (1) C of the Constitution. It is also part of 
the public service transformation and diversity management 
practice. 
 
Respondents stated that the African culture of respect and deference for seniority has 
not been significant in their organisations, although it does occur in some local 
authorities, largely due to lack of training and exposure to modern management 
practices. One respondent stated that such tendencies are mainly found among the 
traditional chiefs’ advisors, many of whom lack exposure to issues of performance 
management. This phenomenon, the respondent noted, has affected management 
significantly and has brought in the issue of traditional leadership to the fore. Some 
chiefs were said to have perceptions that they are being undermined, and that some 
important decisions are taken without their consent. Respondents mentioned that at 
times the implementation of some programmes experienced some difficulties when 
chiefs did not show their active support for them. Another respondent stated that there 
is a need for initiatives to ‘re-socialise’ people so that they could understand that the 
organisational context is different from the social context.  
 
On other issues respondents stated that some of the significant challenges that the 
municipalities in the North West Province encounter are poor service delivery, and 
boycotts and protests that sometimes disrupt service delivery. The qualitative 
interview respondents stated that the history of South African politics has been 
influenced by the experience of the liberation struggle and that protests and service 
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payment boycotts have become a culture of resistance. Some respondents felt that it 
would take many years for the people to unlearn such practices.      
 
 
Most of the qualitative interview respondents blamed payment boycotts and protests 
on capacity constraints that have led to municipalities’ failure to deliver services. The 
low calibre of some of the local politicians was mentioned by the respondents as one 
of the contributory factors to the municipalities’ inability to formulate sound policies 
and that it negatively affects their effectiveness and efficiency.  A leader of one of the 
opposition parties, Tony Leon, attributed the widespread protests against 
municipalities to the failure of the ANC councillors to deliver services (Mail & 
Guardian, 2006).  
 
In some cases the protests have turned violent. For instance, the Khutsong Township 
experienced some violent protests since late 2005 over the transfer of the township to 
the North West province. Khutsong formerly fell under the Merafong City Local 
Municipality, under the West Rand District Municipality in Gauteng Province (South 
Africa’s richest province), but was in 2005 transferred to the North West Province to 
solve the cross-border municipality problems. The residents objected and felt they 
were not listened to as the government went ahead with its proposal. According to the 
Mail & Guardian (2006) residents felt neglected and that the promise of improved 
service delivery would not be fulfilled if they are transferred to the poorer North West 
province. High school students boycotted classes, staged street protests blockading 





Violent protest is not limited to the North West province. Nor is it limited to 
dissatisfaction with municipal service delivery, but it is almost a culture (in the entire 
country) of expressing a differing opinion or concern that the residents of townships 
employ to compel government officials to act, as incidents elsewhere in the country 
would suggest. For instance, the University of Pretoria’s Mamelodi Campus students 
also went on a sometimes violent strike. Elsewhere the security guards also staged a 
violent strike over differences with their employers over pay. The U.S. State 
Department (2001) also noted violent clashes between stone throwing demonstrators 
and the police. Perhaps these violent protests that were used during the uprisings 
against the apartheid regime would take long to fizzle away and that the same 
resistance strategies that were used against the apartheid regime are being used 
against the democratically elected ANC government.  
 
It is significant to note that in spite of the widespread riots and boycotts, the interview 
respondents showed some optimism about the improvement of the situation and its 
limited impact on the performance of municipalities. Perhaps this perception could be 
summed up in one of the qualitative interview respondent’s statement, that: 
This could be a transitory stage, service delivery will improve. 
People’s expectations and demands are high. However, they are 
informed how to engage with municipalities. There is a difference 
between urban and rural dwellers in how they present their 
demands for services. Because literacy rates are low in the rural 
areas political opportunists are taking advantage of them by 
fomenting boycotts and demonstrations to cause havoc in the 
localities. The number of people paying for services has greatly 
improved. However, households with unemployed bread winners 
are experiencing difficulties keeping up with payments for 
services. But people’s attitudes have greatly improved with their 




The challenges were said to be not only limited to boycotts and riots, but the vestiges 
of apartheid as well. The qualitative interview respondents stated that a significant 
number of skilled white South Africans had resigned from the public service at the 
time when the ANC took over from the National Party. The respondents felt that some 
former white bureaucrats resist change and did not want to continue in the public 
service to serve under a black led government. They lamented the fact that most 
skilled labour is white and that many have left the public service since 1994. The 
respondents also stated that the Employment Equity Act could perhaps be a source of 
conflict, with skilled labour, who are mainly white, feeling undermined by being put 
on equal footing with the not-so-qualified or experienced black officers. The 
Employment Equity Act is an affirmative initiative to ensure equitable representation 
of races, gender and the disabled in the public service.  
 
Indeed pockets of resistance were reported from some of the former apartheid regime 
officers. In one incident at the Maquassi Hills Local Municipality at Wolmaranstad in 
the North West province, a white officer was reported to have been fired for allegedly 
uttering a racist slur against the Mayor, and he was also accused of about 20 other 
racist remarks (Mail & Guardian, 2002). One of the officials at the municipality was 
quoted as saying that ‘since the inception of the new municipality there has been 
incidents of defiance from Marais (one of the municipal employees at the time) who 
had difficulty in recognising the municipal manager and directors. Calling the mayor 
a kaffir was the last straw’ (ibid). The Maquassi Hills local municipality incident was 
not an isolated case but one of several dotted across the province, showing that racism 
was still rife in some sections of society. In Vryburg, which falls under Naledi 
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Municipality not far from Maquassi Hills and still in the North West province racial 
intolerance has been a long running problem at the Vryburg Hoërskool.  
 
The Mail & Guardian (2005) stated that in 1998 a peaceful protest march by black 
students accompanied by their parents turned violent when white parents, at the 
instigation of some school board members, attacked the black students with sjamboks 
(whips made of strong rubber/plastic material). Although some of the white parents 
were prosecuted the cases dragged on until it was dropped, and racial tensions 
exploded again in 2000 after a black student stabbed his white colleague with a pair of 
scissors and was sentenced to a jail term (ibid). According to Mail & Guardian  the 
main problem at the school was the alleged school management’s racism in which 
white and black students had ‘two different timetables’ and ‘parallel-language 
medium’ of instruction – Afrikaans for whites and English for blacks, and white 
students would only sing the Die Stem part of the national anthem ignoring the other 
part with African words. The problems were effectively resolved when a former head 
teacher, Andries Du Toit, was recalled from retirement to manage the school. By 2005 
Du Toit was hailed as having taken the school ‘a long way towards creating a culture 
of racial tolerance and integration’ (ibid). These two incidents may appear to be old 
but the respondents indicated that a number of racial intolerance incidents go 
unreported, and that this is the tip of the iceberg, implying that changing the mindset 
would not be a short term thing.  The next section discusses the economy.      
 
Economy 
This section discusses the perception of the respondents about the economic context 
within which the local authorities operate. Table 7.5 below presents the views of the 
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quantitative study respondents. A question was posed as to whether or not the national 
economy provides a supportive environment for the efficient functioning of the local 
authorities.  Forty seven percent indicated that the economy provides ‘a fairly 
supportive environment’, with a significant 28 percent thinking that it provides ‘a 
supportive environment’. A minority of about 19 percent thought that it either does 
not provide ‘a supportive environment at all’ or ‘a not so supportive environment’, 
with only six percent saying it provides ‘a very supportive environment’. 
Table 7.5: National economy and supportive environment for local authorities 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Not supportive at all 1 3 
A not so supportive environment 5 16 
A fairly supportive environment 15 47 
A supportive environment 9 28 
A very supportive environment 2 6 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Another question was posed to the quantitative interview respondents concerning the 
procedures for the allocation of resources between local authorities, and the responses 
are presented in Table 7.6 below. Forty seven per cent viewed the government 
procedures for the allocation of resources as ‘fairly equitable’. Thirty one per cent 
thought it was ‘moderately equitable’ and 13 per cent perceived it as ‘rarely equitable’ 
while only nine per cent saw it as ‘fully equitable distribution’. None of the 
quantitative respondents opted for the ‘not equitable distribution’.  
Table 7.6: Procedures for the allocation of resources to local authorities 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
A rarely equitable distribution 4 13 
A fairly equitable distribution 15 47 
A supportive environment 10 31 
A very supportive environment 3 9 
Total  32 100 




Coupled with these views are those of the qualitative interview respondents. One 
mentioned that the South African government is committed to rebuilding the 
economy, and that at the national level there is the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme which aims to achieve that objective. And that local government reform is 
central and important to introducing economic development programmes at the local 
level. The respondent went on to state that: 
 
SA is now entering the consolidation phase. This is a phase meant 
to introduce programmes such as the developmental local 
government programmes. For instance, there is the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant (MIG) running into billions of Rands meant 
for municipal infrastructure development. These programmes are 
implemented at municipal level to grow the economy. There is also 
the Municipal Finance Management Act which introduces supply 
chain management. The tendering process is central to the 
provision of services, creates jobs through the reservation policy in 
which a certain percentage of projects is reserved for local 
economic development, and we are beginning to see the spin offs. 
 
Most qualitative interview respondents felt that the national economy does offer a 
conducive environment for the municipalities to operate efficiently. The respondents 
noted that the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) which is geared towards the 
development of infrastructure at municipal level is an instrumental facility in this 
regard. MIG is part of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) (based on 5 year 
development planning) process at municipal level. Local Economic Development 
(LED) is another process that has been developed to ensure the sustainability of local 
economies. IDPs and LED processes are targeted at service delivery and 
development. Qualitative interview respondents noted that local communities are 
involved in these planning processes. They also mentioned that priorities differ from 
one municipality to the other and that these priorities/preferences are reflected in the 
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annual budgets. Most of the funding, they said, is provided by the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government.  
 
However, respondents stated that municipalities do not have the same income 
generating ability, largely owing to their economic base. Examples were given of the 
Mafikeng Local Municipality which is surrounded by rural villages and Klerksdorp 
which is surrounded by mines. But the main problem cited by respondents was the poor 
economic situation among the predominantly African settlements, such as those around 
Mafikeng and the rural municipalities, which makes the payment for services 
problematic. This situation is a legacy of the apartheid system, (see Chapter V), in 
which black communities were located in peripheral regions without any viable 
productive economic activities. Poverty and low incomes were said, by the respondents, 
to constrain the financial viability of some rural municipalities and their ability to raise 
revenue from own sources.  But in some cases the lack of institutional capacity to 
collect revenue has contributed to serious financial difficulties. 
 
An illustrative case of a municipality in the North West province that experienced 
severe financial difficulties is the Mamusa Local Municipality in Schweizer-Reneke 
under the Bophirima District Municipality. The municipality experienced debilitating 
financial problems that had been running for three years at the time of reporting in 
July 2006. In addition to financial problems the situation had deteriorated so badly 
that there were ‘divisions and conflicts within its administration and council’ to the 
extent ‘… the then councillors turned their council chamber into a boxing arena’ 
(North West Government, 2006). The council was dissolved and from 23 June to 3 
September 2004 the municipality was placed under an administrator (ibid). In June 
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2005 employees could not be paid their salaries in time due to lack of funds and the 
provincial Department of Developmental Local Government and Housing (DLG&H) 
had to intervene for the salaries to be paid. The report further states that due to lack of 
capacity the municipality was found to have failed to collect taxes and rates which 
form the basis of its revenue and budget.  
 
The problems persisted and in June 2006 the provincial government appointed an 
acting municipal manager, Seth Magaga, from its Monitoring and Intervention 
division in the department of DLG&H to work at the municipality for three months 
(North West Government, 2006). Furthermore, the report states that a financial expert, 
Professor George Williams, was also appointed to help turn around the municipality’s 
financial management and develop a long term financial strategy in 12 months. The 
situation, however, was so dire that the provincial department of DLG&H decided to 
send more personnel consisting of labour relations professional and legal experts to 
sort out the problems, and another financial expert to assist Williams.  When probed 
about instances of this nature, one respondent said that: 
Municipalities are operating under very challenging conditions. 
They are cash strapped. Their income base has not increased 
whereas the service areas they cover have increased significantly. 
Close to 70 per cent of the municipalities are in rural areas and 
unemployment is currently very high at about 45 per cent. There is 
an equitable share of funds from national government which is 
aimed at assisting with the provision of free services. But the R20 
million availed is just a drop in the ocean, it is not enough. The 
MIG Funds are also available but a lot has to be done as there is a 
serious back log of projects to be implemented. Implementation 
backlog is estimated at 70 per cent. This is mostly on roads and 
storm water drainage. The Central District Municipality is 
spending R11m on water reticulation, and intends to increase its 
spending to about Rl5m the following year. This may be good as 
well but it will take a long time to alleviate the problem as capacity 
is a major challenge. The national objective is to eliminate the 
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bucket toilet system by 2007, distribute electricity to all by 2010, 
and water by 2012. 
 
The national government had recognised the potential challenges and disparities in the 
financial viability and managerial capacity of the different types of municipalities and 
provided for national and provincial intervention as the need may arise. Section 99 of 
the Constitution empowers a Cabinet member to assign powers or functions to a 
provincial Executive Council or to a Municipal Council. And more specifically, 
Section 139 provides for Provincial supervision of local government and for direct 
intervention, for among other things, to safeguard the continuous provision and 
maintenance of national standards of essential services. Although the Municipal 
Systems Act and other legislations have decentralised many responsibilities to the 
municipalities, the constitutional provisions cited above tend towards centralisation on 
the basis of safeguarding services and maintaining service standards.  
 
The qualitative interview respondents indicated that IDPs and LED programmes focus 
on development of local communities, which would result in economically prosperous 
local government. However, they stated that these programmes are still nascent and 
that they have not yet matured or borne any results yet. They also lamented the lack of 
capacity and necessary skills at local level to effectively implement these 
programmes. In the words of one, these are: 
Very good policies which if properly implemented may boost the 
operation of municipalities. LED is geared towards creating job 





In addition to the identified capacity gaps, one of the main challenges that the 
qualitative interview respondents said may derail the effective implementation of the 
good policies and programmes is corruption and mismanagement, especially in the 
tendering process. In a dramatic case involving the suspected corrupt award of an R80 
million construction tender, the police swooped on the Mafikeng Local Municipality 
in November 2005 confiscating computers for forensic investigations (City Press, 
2005a). In another case the Speaker of the Bojanala Platinum District Municipality 
based in Rustenburg appeared in court accused of alleged corruption. According to 
the City Press (2005b) the accused official allegedly sought to extort R5, 000 from a 
businesswoman who had won a catering tender of R24, 000 for a function organised 
by the Bojanala Platinum District Municipality in May 2005. It is alleged in the paper 
that the mayor threatened violence and that if the lady did not pay her she will never 
again win any tender from her (the mayor’s) municipality.  
 
 
In spite of the challenges and occasional setbacks, most of the qualitative interview 
respondents were optimistic, arguing that the positive aspects outweigh the negative. 
The respondents opined that given the economic climate in South Africa it does offer 
good climate for local government’s economic prospects. They further mentioned that 
even rural municipalities are also benefiting from the economic boom through 
economic activities such as farming and the economic linkages between urban and 
rural settlements. One further argued that there are instruments and systems in place 
to support a robust economic turnaround in the rural municipalities. These were said 
to be the March 1998 White Paper on Local Government that provides for efforts to 
be taken for local economic development; the Municipal Systems Act and the 
Municipal Structures Act. The respondent stated that the Municipal Structures Act 
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requires local government to create a good atmosphere for the economy to grow. For 
example, every local municipality has local economic development programme such 
as Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs) programme.  
 
Related to economic growth and the performance of the municipalities is the 
availability of labour to the municipalities, in this context the labour market. The next 
section discusses the labour market in the North West province. 
 
The Labour Market 
A question was posed to the qualitative interview respondents as to whether the 
labour market provides the municipalities with the required skills.  Respondents noted 
that there are scarce skills which are mostly found only among the white population 
due to past racial inequalities in access to education. For instance, training in 
engineering, quantity surveying, accounting qualifications were a preserve of the 
white training institutions the respondents indicated.  However, respondents stated 
that municipalities have now come up with bursary schemes and study loans in order 
to build the capacity of their labour force. The Skills Development Act and the 
Employment Equity Act 1998 were pointed out as some of the targeted responses by 
government at addressing the previously disadvantaged social groups such as the 
disabled, blacks and women.  
 
However, respondents stated that there are pockets of resistance to this strategy from 
sections of the white population. Respondents highlighted that most skilled labour is 
white and that white South Africans resist change. Many were said to have left the 
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public service after 1994. Respondents further explained that acquiring the services of 
the skilled labour was very costly for municipalities. They stated that most of the 
technically skilled whites resigned to establish their own companies and they are now 
engaged by municipalities as consultants on contract at high cost. This was said to be 
creating financial difficulties for many municipalities. But another respondent, 
contrary to others, was very critical of the municipalities, and he said: 
Municipalities are spending too much money on consultants 
claiming that they do not have the necessary skills. Even HR 
Managers are not representing their municipalities claiming they 
don’t have the necessary skills to represent their municipalities in 
labour hearings. This has negatively affected their budgets and 
they have to prioritise and stop paying consultants for the basic 
tasks they must be doing themselves. 
 
Respondents noted that the Employment Equity Act has helped transform the racial 
balance in many municipalities, but women and the disabled still hold fewer senior 
positions than envisaged. One respondent noted that the idea is not about race but 
getting the best qualified person for the job in such a way that principles of 
affirmative action, equity and fairness, and competence are observed. However, some 
respondents indicated that there are many skilled people who remain unemployed 
because of the rigidities in the recruitment process. For example, the organisation 
structure could be such that the municipality cannot create a post that can absorb a 
particular skill that a municipality needs because they might have reached the 
maximum number of posts they can afford. Respondents stated that the labour market 
has many unemployed graduates but local municipalities are unable to absorb them as 




Other respondents argued that the general lack of the required skills in the 
municipalities is a result of poor planning. Some stated that there is a lack of a skills 
inventory for the province. Respondents noted that each municipality develops its 
own skills plan, which would only be specific to them but there is no coordination of 
the process across the various municipalities in the province. This, they stated, is a 
fragmented approach and is not coordinated at all. Because of this the respondents 
said the labour market fails to satisfy the labour needs of the municipalities. Perhaps 
the issue is not so much about the labour market failure but the not so well managed 
labour policy. The analysis now presents the labour movement.    
 
The Labour Movement/Trade Unions 
Associations and trade unions are an important stakeholder in the South African local 
government employee relations system. As mentioned earlier, in Chapter IV of 
Labour Relations Act 1995, SALGBC is constituted by organisations within local 
government and that the SALGBC is the custodian of all agreements entered into with 
its partners.  
 
However, respondents noted that there are significant challenges in executing 
agreements entered into by the parties. Resistance from employer organisations and 
problems of communication between employers and employees were mentioned as 
some of the frequent problems. Other related problems were said to emanate from 
dual loyalties wherein some employees of municipalities are seconded to committees 
that have to carry out the SALGBC mandate. These may clash with the performance 
of their employers’ tasks/assignments and therefore impact on their performance, a 




Respondents said one key agreement entered into between SALGBC, SAMWU, 
SALGA and IMATU is the implementation of the Task Job Evaluation System. 
SALGBC was tasked with overseeing the implementation of the ‘Task Job Evaluation 
System’. However, respondents indicated that there was resistance to it by some 
municipalities. Respondents mentioned that the agreement was entered into way back 
in 2002 but still in the first quarter of 2006 about 108 of the local municipalities had 
not completed implementing it. The project was borne out of the fact that previously 
the Group Areas Act favoured certain municipalities to the exclusion of others and 
concentrated skills in those areas.  
 
According to the respondents, the Task Job Evaluation System requires the 
deployment of employees with these skills to those municipalities without the 
required skills. A respondent stated that there is the Project Job Evaluation Committee 
which consists of labour/trade unions and the employer. Its mandate is to oversee the 
smooth implementation of the Task Job Evaluation, job descriptions and placement. 
The committee consists of representatives from SAMWU, IMATU, SALGA, and 
SALGBC, and is responsible for the deployment of skilled employees across the 
municipalities.  It was stated in the interviews that the objective of the project was to 
distribute skilled labour equitably across municipalities. However, respondents stated 
that there was some limited resistance to this arrangement.  
 
Where there is no skilled labour they find somebody from within a district 
municipality within which the needy local municipality falls and they may place the 
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employee where their skills are urgently needed. Respondents stated that there have 
been disputes related to this and in some cases matters have had to be resolved in the 
courts. The decision to deploy employees in the needy municipalities is taken by all 
the stakeholders. Information from respondents indicated that most of the disputes 
that arose were usually related to the amount of compensation, challenges to the 
deadlines for relocation, etc., but not the principle behind the skills transfer. In this 
arrangement line managers cede their authority to deploy skilled labour to the Project 
Job Evaluation Committee. 
 
Informants mentioned that racial issues are still rife in the management of 
municipalities, and that the SALGBC’s skills transfer programme is another strategy 
aimed at redressing such maladies. An example was given of a power station in Cape 
Town that was failing to perform optimally due to lack of skilled labour. The 
qualified white employees were said to have resigned their posts when senior 
management positions changed hands from whites to blacks. Respondents further 
stressed that confining essential skills to a particular race has badly affected the 
performance of municipalities. Another example of ‘sabotage’ was given, that, the 
layout maps of water and sewage pipes, electrical cables, etc., were not passed over to 
blacks when they assumed senior positions in local government. Some whites also 
resigned and offered their services as sub-contractors or consultants with much higher 
charges now that they knew municipalities were desperate to have their services. And 
that they were determined not to share/pass over the skills they have to blacks. In this 
instance, the respondents stated that the SALGBC plays a pivotal role in ensuring that 
municipalities run efficient and effective services through a well coordinated skills 
sharing and transfer process. This arrangement indicates that the role played by the 
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centre in HRM is significant and the justification for this is the correction of historical 
anomalies. In this leading role SALGBC acts more like a surrogate/proxy for the 
centre.  
 
SALGA is another major player in labour relations. SALGA constitutes a collective 
voice for the employers. While SALGBC deals with issues of skills development, 
SALGA represents employers on labour matters relating to conditions of service, 
annual salary increase, etc. Qualitative interview respondents stated that SALGA also 
plays an influential role in the skills development for municipal employees to the 
extent the training programmes run by MULTA are sanctioned by them. However, 
respondents noted that some municipalities feel MULTA does not satisfy their needs, 
perhaps because it is not independent. MULTA is a division of the Business School of 
the University of the North West.  
 
Respondents noted that SALGA plays a pivotal role in providing guidance and 
support to municipalities, especially technical advice. One area that respondents noted 
as being supported by SALGA is human resources management. A number of areas in 
HRM were mentioned in which SALGA gives support. These included the 
development of unified conditions of service in the municipalities; assisting in labour 
disputes especially when municipalities are faced with litigation and; annual salary 
negotiations.  However, a major challenge that has been noted was the shortage of HR 
specialists and some of those that are available were said to be not well exposed to 
local government. A respondent mentioned that, as such, it is a big challenge to assist 
them but municipalities were said not to be using SALGA which has the technical 
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expertise to help them. The SALGBC and SALGA are surrogates for enforcing 
national policies.  
 
SAMWU and IMATU are the two main trade unions that represent the interests of 
municipal workers. Respondents indicated that these relate to issues such as 
discipline, negotiating working conditions (health & safety), salaries, benefits 
(medical aid, housing schemes, etc). Membership is open to all municipal employees. 
However, municipal managers and managers directly accountable to them as provided 
for in Section 57 of the Municipal Systems Act are excluded due to SALGBC 
Regulations that do not allow senior officers to join trade unions. However, some 
were said to be members but could not be represented on any issues due to the 
restrictions imposed by the said regulations. Some of the achievements that trade 
unions pride themselves with are holding effective strikes such as the wage strike that 
was organised by SAMWU in 2005.  
 
The trade union movement in the North West Province is well entrenched as 
SAMWU claimed to have provincial and branch offices across the North West 
province. SAMWU was said to be well established and organised in every 
municipality in the North West Province and also nationwide. Also, SAMWU is an 
affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which is an ally 
of the ANC government. However, respondents noted that its major challenge is in 
reconciling employee interests and those of the employer due to the structure of its 
relationship with the ANC and COSATU. But one respondent was adamant that the 
ANC government understands that its existence and policy making capability is 
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linked to a vibrant trade union movement. This, they argued, guarantees SAMWU the 
leverage to influence key decisions that affect employees without having to play 
double fiddle to the ANC led government. SAMWU was said to have a Provident 
Fund which is controlled by workers even though it was said to be small. The 
following section deals with public sector reforms, emphasising decentralisation as 
one of the key reforms that the government has undertaken. 
 
Decentralisation 
Decentralisation in South Africa is entrenched in the constitution as already 
mentioned in Chapter V. Chapter 3 of the Constitution on Cooperative Government 
also guarantees the distinctiveness of the local government sphere but states that it 
must operate within the scope of cooperative government. According to the ideals of 
cooperative government as entailed in the constitution, the relationship between the 
three spheres of government should be cordial and on an equal basis (i.e. there is no 
senior partner) in spite of the constitutional provision. For instance, the constitution 
stipulates that in the event there is a dispute between any spheres of government none 
can dictate terms to the other but that differences should be negotiated and only where 
negotiations fail can the matter be resolved in a court of law. However, the 
Constitution and Municipal Systems Act establish national standards and monitoring 
regimes (especially through the PMS) that municipalities have to abide by. The 
insistence by the centre upon national standards is a form of centralisation. Adherence 
to national standards is achieved through the supervisory responsibilities bestowed 
upon the provincial government by the constitution over local government. On the 
other hand the adoption of PMS (in view of what PMS entails as outlined in Chapter 
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II) indicates the desire by the government to introduce SHRM (stated or not) in the 
municipalities. 
  
Responding to a question as to whether ‘the mechanisms in place to ensure the 
autonomy of local government are efficient and effective’ the quantitative respondents 
gave the following responses summarised in Table 7.7 below. 
Table 7.7: Mechanisms to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in local administration 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Don’t know 1 3 
Strongly disagree 1 3 
Disagree 18 56 
Agree 7 22 
Strongly Agree 5 16 
Total  32 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
The majority, 56 per cent, indicated that they ‘disagree’ that the mechanisms in place 
ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of local government administration. Twenty 
per cent said they ‘agree’ that the mechanisms enable local government to be efficient 
and effective in its operations. Sixteen per cent felt they ‘strongly agree’, while only 
three per cent each either ‘strongly disagreed’ or ‘don’t know’. 
 
Some of the qualitative interview respondents also felt that the national and provincial 
governments intervene excessively in local government affairs. Others felt, however, 
that such interference is sanctioned by the law. Indeed, Chapter 6 of the Constitution 
Section 139 (1) empowers the national government to take away the executive 
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functions of a municipality that fails to execute its mandate effectively. One 
respondent observed that:  
All this is done within the context of the law. Local government is 
autonomous but within the confines of the existing legislative 
framework. Intervention by provincial government is executed 
according to the legal framework. So far there have been two such 
interventions, one in Mamusa Local Municipality when they were 
bankrupt. Another was in November 2005 when the MEC for 
Developmental Local Government and Housing took over the 
executive functions of the Mafikeng Local Municipality to deliver 
housing. The main challenge is that municipalities which have a 
problem and where the provincial government feels it should 
intervene always resist such interventions. The intervention 
consists of the appointment of an Administrator, who the 
Department gives a set of Terms of Reference and he/she reports 
back to the department on their progress. 
 
Although respondents argued that the structures and mechanisms are in place for the 
national and provincial government intervention. They stated that there are other 
covert ways in which the governing party’s political leaders intervene to determine 
the managerial leadership in the municipalities. They also mentioned that the top 
politicians also interfere in other ways in the running of local affairs, including 
matters that should be the preserve of management. An example was given of 
majority political parties ‘meddling’ in the municipal budgets, by way of dictating to 
its councillors what proportion of the budget should be for recurrent expenditure and 
how much for development projects and programmes. Another example given was 
that of the debate surrounding the change of the name of the City of Pretoria to 
Tshwane (in Gauteng Province), in which the national government intervened 
whereas it should be the residents who should decide on the name they wanted.  
 
Qualitative interview respondents further stated that the infighting within the ANC is 
spilling over into the municipalities and making things unnecessarily tough. Another 
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problem was said to be that perhaps there are many governance structures that have 
become a financial burden. Some felt that perhaps the suggested phasing out of 
provincial government would enhance local government. Another area of contention 
was the district municipalities. Respondents felt that the district municipalities were 
sometimes helpful but argued that they are not so relevant if municipalities could have 
adequate funding and capacity. In fact, they stated, some of the funds and personnel 
availed to district municipalities could be more useful if diverted to local 
municipalities. And that there would be no need for district municipalities as the 
capacity of the local municipalities would have been enhanced.  
 
When asked if local government has adequate capacity to manage decentralised 
responsibilities effectively, the survey interviewees gave the following responses (see 
Table 7.8).   
Table 7.8: Does local government have capacity to manage decentralised responsibilities  
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Don’t know 3 9.4 
Strongly disagree 2 6.3 
Disagree 7 21.9 
Agree 18 56.3 
Strongly agree 2 6.3 
Total 32 100.0 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Fifty six per cent of the respondents stated that they ‘agree’ there is adequate capacity. 
About 22 per cent said they ‘disagree’ and nine per cent said they ‘don’t know’ while 
six per cent each said they ‘strongly disagree’ and/or ‘strongly agree’. The majority 
felt that local authorities have the capacity to manage their own affairs, in spite of the 
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fact that more than half of the municipalities in the North West province were 
beneficiaries of the Project Consolidate programme (see Chapter V) that is meant for 
the rescue of ailing municipalities.  
 
When asked ‘does your organisation have the technical capacity to manage the 
decentralised HRM responsibilities?’ the responses turned out as follows; 50 per cent 
felt there was ‘limited capacity’, 34 per cent thought there is ‘some capacity’, nine per 
cent thinking ‘poor capacity’, and only six per cent saying there was ‘adequate 
capacity’.  
Table 7.9: Does local government have the technical capacity to manage decentralised HRM 
responsibilities  
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Poor capacity 3 9.4 
Limited capacity 16 50.0 
Some capacity 11 34.4 
Adequate capacity 2 6.3 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Perhaps this indicates that there is a lack of skilled HR personnel in the 
municipalities. The lack of skilled HR experts perhaps leads to the weak 
implementation of agreements between municipalities and their partners (e.g. 
SALGA). 
 
Figure 7.1 below presents an illustration of the dispersal of HRM responsibilities in 
the South African municipalities. The Municipal Systems Act bestows executive 
powers in the office of the mayor or equivalent as the case may be. These powers 
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include HRM responsibilities for the appointment of line managers and first line 
reporting managers. The appointment of the latter is a shared responsibility between 
the mayor and the CEO. The Act devolves HRM responsibilities for all other staff to 
the municipal managers. 
Figure 7.1: Dispersal of HRM responsibilities in the Local Authorities of South Africa 
Source: Author’s Own Construct (2008) 
 
HRM responsibilities under the above model are vertically decentralised as the 
responsibilities are devolved to local authorities and can only be revoked through the 
amendment of the law. The HRM responsibilities at local level are further 
decentralised or dispersed from the mayors to CEOs, while some are shared between 
the two as indicated above. Some of the HRM responsibilities have been delegated to 
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Movement/Trade Unions sub-heading above. This is further discussed in Section 7.5 
where it is shown that the standardisation of salaries in the municipalities was 
achieved through the involvement of SALGA as a proxy for the national government. 
As more and more municipalities comply with SALGA’s requirements they are 
brought into uniform practice and are brought under indirect central control.  
 
The degree of HRM decentralisation is illustrated in the decentralisation/centralisation 
and SHRM/personnel management matrix in Figure 7.2 below. As already discussed 
in Chapter II, personnel management is associated with public administration while 
SHRM is associated with NPM. In the matrix below it is shown that the 
municipalities in the North West vary in their HRM practice, in particular the 
variation is related to the size of the municipality. The smaller, rural and poorer 
municipalities had their HRM functions centralised at, and performed on their behalf 
by, the district municipalities. In Figure 7.2 the smaller municipalities are placed in 
the upper right hand quadrant that depicts a centralised SHRM system. 
 
 
The bigger and well resourced municipalities on the other hand are placed in the 
lower right hand quadrant indicating their HRM approach depicts a decentralised 
SHRM system. However, there is evidence of increasing centralisation through the 
requirement for them to adhere to national standards and controls brought through 
SALGA and SALGBC. Also, as it is demonstrated in Section 7.7 municipal managers 
account for their municipalities’ performance to both provincial government and 
national government ministers of local government. It is on the basis of these reports 
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made to the centre that intervention strategies are developed. These developments 
indicate a gradual shift among the larger municipalities from the lower right hand side 
 
Figure 7.2: Types of Municipalities and their Present HRM System 
 
Source: Author’s Own Construct (2008) 
quadrant to the upper right hand side one (i.e. from a decentralised SHRM practice to 
a centralised system) as indicated by the arrow in Figure 7.2. Although there are 










Large local Municipalities  








          
              SHRM 
   Decentralised 
        SHRM 
       Centralised 
  
255 
municipalities to a centralised SHRM system, the overall trend is that there is 
convergence under a centralised SHRM system. Further evidence is provided in 
Section 7.4 below that places South Africa’s municipalities on the right hand side of 
the personnel management (PA) / SHRM (NPM) axis. The following section looks at 
the internal environment of the municipalities. 
 
7.3.2. Internal Environment 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
The qualitative respondents were asked about what they think are the strengths and 
weaknesses of the municipalities. Some of the strengths mentioned were that local 
municipalities generally have a nearly full staff complement, and they enjoy support 
from the provincial and national governments. Also mentioned was that the 
municipalities fully manage their own staff, they are able to hire and fire their own 
staff. And that these staff are not transferable, hence capable employees with 
experience are retained in the service of the particular municipality. It was also 
mentioned that the lack of transfers enable people to get to know and understand their 
colleagues very well. Trust develops and team spirit strengthens. Once somebody is 
transferred from outside it is difficult to integrate them in, they said.  
 
The weaknesses or potential threats for municipalities were said to be lack of 
technical skills among the labour force, and the inadequacy of funding. Respondents 
blamed lack of funds on the failure by residents to pay for municipal services and 
some municipalities’ failure as well to collect revenue. Other problems identified 
included the lack of promotion opportunities which is compounded by the lack of 
transfers. Some respondents stated that staying too long in one place without the 
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possibility of being transferred lead to people developing comfort zones and 
becoming rigid and resistant to change. A question was asked as to whether there are 
adequate material resources at the disposal of local authorities, and Table 7.10 
presents the results. 
Table 7.10: Adequacy of material resources in local authorities 
 FREQUENCY PER CENT 
Inadequate material resources 7 22 
Fairly adequate material resources 9 28 
Moderately adequate material resources 14 44 
Adequate material resources 2 6 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
When asked about the adequacy of material resources about 44 per cent of the 
quantitative interview respondents indicated that the resources are ‘moderately 
adequate’ and 28 per cent opted for ‘fairly adequate’. About 22 per cent thought there 
were ‘inadequate material resources’ and only six per cent thought there were 
‘adequate material resources’.  
 
Organisational Culture  
Another question was asked: ‘to what extent is your organisation responsible for the 
welfare of its employees?’ about 38 per cent said to a ‘significant extent’ and 31 per 
cent ‘moderately involved’. Twenty five per cent thought it was to a ‘limited extent’, 







Table 7.11: Organisation’s responsibility for staff welfare 
 FREQUENCY PER CENT 
Limited extent 8 25 
Moderately involved 10 31 
Significant extent 12 38 
To a great extent 2 6 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
The qualitative interview respondents were asked to what extent municipalities are 
involved in corporate welfare. Respondents indicated that municipalities are not 
involved in activities where public resources are expended on matters of a personal 
nature, such as the use of official vehicles and other resources during the burial of an 
employee’s relative. This managerial practice was inherited from the previous 
government, and it shows some degree of Western management ideals and culture. 
 
7.4. Concept of Human Resource Management  
When asked about the HR policy in local government, the qualitative interview 
respondents stated that the current local government arrangement allows for variations 
from one municipality to the other. They also mentioned that it is a requirement for 
municipalities to develop their own HR policies. Another respondent said the guiding 
principle is the Batho Pele (People First) concept, which focuses on the customer. The 
respondent went further to say that ‘this principle emanates from Chapter 10 of the 
Constitution which deals with the public service’. Section 195 (1) of the Constitution 
establishes the values and guiding principles for the public service. Section 50 (1) of 
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the Municipal Systems Act 2000 which establishes the basic values of local public 
administration and human resources also states that local public administration is 
governed by the values and principles set out in Section 195 of the Constitution. In 
essence, the HR policy ethos for municipalities is based on the democratic values and 
principles stated in the constitution.   
 
A question was asked to the quantitative interview respondents, as to whether ‘clear 
systems exist that clarify each stakeholder’s role in the management of human 
resource management policy’ About 47 per cent said they ‘agree’ and 34 per cent 
opted for ‘disagree’, while 19 per cent chose ‘strongly agree’. Associated with this 
question is the one about the role played by trade unions and/or staff associations in 
the HR policy process (see Table 7.12). Forty seven per cent thought these 
organisations play ‘a significant role’. About 34 per cent opted for ‘a not-so 
significant role’; while nine per cent each thought ‘a minor role’ and some ‘a major 
role’. Overall this shows respondents’ perception that the stakeholders are involved in 
the HR policy process.    
 
Table 7.12: The role of trade unions in the HRM policy process  
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
A minor role 3 9.4 
A not so significant role 11 34.4 
A significant role 15 46.9 
A major role 3 9.4 
Total 32 100 




A few questions were asked about the strategic planning framework. When asked, 
‘does your organisation have the mission and vision statements?’ 94 per cent said 
‘yes’ and only six per cent said ‘no’. Another question was asked as to whether these 
statements are accessible to all members of staff. The majority, 56 per cent said ‘yes’ 
and 28 per cent ‘no’, with only 16 per cent indicating they ‘don’t know’. When asked 
if these strategic plans are operational, about 63 per cent said ‘yes’ and 28 per cent 
indicated they ‘don’t know’ with only nine per cent saying ‘no’. The majority of the 
respondents indicated that the strategic plans are operational but a significant 
proportion of HR officers also did not know as to whether the strategic plans are 
operational.  These responses and the government documents indicate that the South 
African government is committed to the transformation of its HRM system and the 
overall management of the public service. This places South Africa’s municipalities 
on the right hand side of the matrix (SHRM / NPM) on the PA/NPM axis in Figure 
7.2.   
 
However, there are indications that the South African government wants to integrate 
the public service in the national, provincial and local spheres into a single public 
service (see Section 5.2.1). This initiative is indicative of the centralising tendency of 
the ANC led government in which local government HRM strategy making will be 
heavily influenced by external contingencies/factors as opposed to internal resources. 
On the centralisation/decentralisation axis of Figure 7.2 already some of South 
Africa’s municipalities are placed on the upper right hand side quadrant. These other 
developments such as the integration of the national, provincial and local public 
services would further cement South Africa’s HRM system’s move up from the lower 
right hand side quadrant (decentralised) to the upper right (centralised).  It will be 
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further illustrated in the following sections how the current thinking in the South 
African public service has influenced the HRM practices. The HRM practices are 
discussed in the following section below. 
 
7.5 HRM Practices 
Human Resources Planning  
Planning is considered one of the most important HR practices, and how HRs are 
linked to organisational strategy and the labour market is dependent on HR planning. 
Quantitative interview respondents were asked if ‘the staffing plans reflect 
congruence with the organisation’s strategic plan’ A majority, of 53 per cent, said 
‘yes’, 31 per cent chose ‘don’t know’ and only 16 per cent said ‘no’. Although more 
than half of the respondents indicated that there was congruence between their 
municipalities’ HR plans and the strategic plans, a significant proportion of 31 per 
cent indicated they were uncertain. Some of those municipalities that had HRM 
policies, clearly articulated their recruitment targets, reflecting their Employment 
Equity Plans with quantitative targets for a given period (e.g. five year plans). These 
plans guided the recruitment and selection processes. 
 
Recruitment and Selection  
According to the Municipal Systems Act the recruitment of the municipal manager 
and first line reporting managers is the responsibility of the municipality in 
consultation with the municipal manager for the latter. The recruitment and 
appointment of all other staff is the responsibility of the municipal manager. The 
qualitative interview respondents stated that the recruitment and selection processes 
are performed in an open and competitive way, with vacant posts being advertised. 
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Respondents stated that for middle management positions downwards, they are 
supposed to be appointed as interns to give them the opportunity to familiarise 
themselves with the systems. However, the qualitative interview respondents stated 
that there are many challenges in the recruitment process such as political influence 
and corruption. And that these problems are increasing. Respondents mentioned that 
many municipal managers do not have the necessary experience and exposure to do 
their job properly as many are merely political appointees. And that political 
interference pervades all levels of the municipalities. 
 
Remuneration and Rewards 
The questions in this subsection sought an understanding of the respondents’ views 
about the appropriateness of the salaries and non-monetary rewards and their roles in 
motivation. The first question asked if salaries are clearly structured and 56 per cent 
said ‘yes’, 34 per cent ‘no’ and nine per cent ‘don’t know’.  When asked ‘Are salaries 
competitive?’ 44 per cent said ‘no’, 40 per cent ‘yes’ and 16 per cent said they ‘don’t 
know’. Perhaps this shows that although the salaries are well structured but they are 
perceived as not competitive. Respondents noted that although the salaries are well 
structured, they entrench an unequal pay system across municipalities to the 
disadvantage of the smaller ones. According to Circular 68/2005, Ref. 4.3.10.5, dated 
August 17, 2005 addressed to all executive mayors and municipal managers of 
municipalities in the North West province, SALGA advised municipalities to 
implement new salary scales. The salary scales featured an across the board salary 
increase of 6 per cent excluding officers on contract such as the CEOs and managers 
responsible to him/her. The salary scales graded municipalities from 1 to 10, with 1 
being the smallest and its municipal manager being the lowest paid and 10 being the 
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largest and its municipal manager most highly paid in the province (see Table 5.2 in 
Chapter V). The least paid municipal manager got R104, 376 per annum while the 
highest paid got R267, 696 which translates into a ratio of 1: 2.6. Bigger 
municipalities got better grading and therefore higher pay for their managers. 
 
Despite the criticism from the quantitative respondents the remuneration system 
rewards managers according to the level of responsibility they are performing. In fact, 
one of the qualitative respondents noted that in the metropolitan municipalities such 
as those in Gauteng province, municipal managers are paid annual salaries of over 
R900, 000 per annum. The respondent stated that such municipalities, unlike the less 
resourced ones, have attracted some employees from both the provincial and national 
government. 
 
There was yet another question, about whether non-monetary benefits are clearly 
articulated and competitive. About 41 per cent said ‘no’, 31 per cent ‘don’t know’ and 
28 per cent said ‘yes’. When probed, some of the quantitative respondents said that 
senior managers are the only employees entitled to some benefits in the form of 
bonuses. And that they often award themselves, in the words of one respondent, ‘big 
bonuses’ even when the performance of the municipality is deficient. This was 
corroborated by a statement on the Democratic Alliance (one of the opposition 
political parties) website, which stated that: 
A reply to a DA parliamentary question reveals that 67% or 93 
out of the 138 Municipal Managers that run municipalities under 
government's Project Consolidate rescue programme for 
dysfunctional municipalities were awarded performance bonuses 
in the past financial year … In Bophirima municipality in the 
North West province, where 73% of residents have no access to 
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basic sanitation, the Municipal Manager was awarded a 
performance bonus of R377 665. 
 
The bonus culture in the South African municipalities is derived from the idea of 
incentivisation inherent in NPM. However, although the idea behind incentivisation is 
to reward good performance in South Africa it does not achieve that objective but 
rather it is linked to the patronage system discussed in Chapter II. Earlier in this 
chapter views from the respondents have indicated that many of the municipal 
managers are political appointees.   
 
The other questions wanted to establish the perceptions of the respondents on 
turnover, vacancy rate and the level at which turnover is most likely to be highest. On 
the turnover rate,  about 72 per cent of respondents thought the turnover rate was 
‘moderate’, 13 per cent ‘low’, nine per cent ‘very high’ and only six per cent ‘very 
low’ (see Table 7.13).  
Table7.13: The turnover rate in local municipalities  
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Very high 3 9 
Moderate 23 72 
Low 4 13 
Very low  2 6 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
The vacancy rate among skilled labour was perceived to be ‘moderate’ by 59 per cent 
of the respondents. About 22 per cent thought the vacancy rate was ‘low’, while only 
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16 per cent said it was ‘high’. A negligible three per cent thought it was very ‘high’ 
(Table 7.14).  
Table 7.14: How would you describe the vacancy rate among skilled labour? 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Very high 1 3 
High  5 16 
Moderate 19 59 
Low 7 22 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
However, when asked at what level in their organisation is turnover heaviest, 28 per 
cent each indicated ‘technical level’ and ‘middle management’. 25 per cent chose 
‘other’, 13 per cent ‘top management’ and six per cent ‘artisan’ level (see Table 7.15).  
Table 7.15: At what level of the organisation is turnover heaviest? 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Top management 4 13 
Middle management 9 28 
Technical level 9 28 
Artisan level 2 6 
Other 8 25 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
It will be shown in the next subsection on Training and Development that local 
municipalities are having a challenge retaining some of their newly trained personnel 
especially those in the technical fields as they are in high demand across the economy. 
Asked if they conduct exit interviews for those who have resigned, 28 per cent said 
‘never’, 22 per cent ‘rarely’, 19 per cent ‘sometimes’, 13 per cent ‘quite often’ and 16 
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per cent ‘always’. Although obvious assumptions as to why employees leave may be 
made, such as dissatisfaction with pay and other working conditions, but to know 
exactly which aspects of the conditions of service need to be attended to, a more 
accurate assessment can be made with exit interviews. Perhaps this points to some of 
the weaknesses or gaps in the HRM strategic planning process.  The next discussion 
focuses on training and development. 
 
Training and Development 
This subsection presents the strategies adopted by the municipalities to build their 
capacity through training and development of their employees. The first question was 
about whether the HR policy contains clear guidelines for training and development. 
About 41 per cent of respondents said they ‘strongly agree’, 38 per cent ‘agree’, nine 
per cent ‘don’t know’ and six per cent each ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ (see 
Table .16).  
Table 7.16: Guidelines for training and development are clear  
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Don’t know 3 9 
Strongly disagree 2 6 
Disagree 2 6 
Agree  12 38 
Strongly agree 13 41 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
Another question asked if the respondents felt there is a clear criteria for identifying 
training needs. Thirty eight per cent said there is a ‘somewhat clear criteria’, 34 per 
cent ‘clear criteria’ and 28 per cent a ‘fairly clear criteria. Generally respondents felt 
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the criteria for identifying training needs within their organisations is clear.  Another 
question asked about the adequacy of funding for training and development. 
Respondents indicated that there is adequate funding. About 47 per cent said there is 
‘adequate funding’, 22 per cent ‘somewhat adequate funding’, 16 per cent fairly 
adequate funding’, 13 per cent said ‘funding is rarely available’, and only three per 
cent said ‘not adequate at all’ (see Table 7.17). Perhaps the reported adequacy of the 
availability of funding is related to the SETA intervention strategy.  
Table 7.17: Is there adequate funding for training and development in your organisation 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Adequate funding 15 47 
Somewhat adequate funding 7 22 
Fairly adequate funding 5 16 
Funding is rarely available 4 13 
Funding is not adequate at all 1 3 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
As to whether employees are deployed in positions where they will apply their newly 
acquired skills after training, about 34 per cent said they ‘disagree’. Twenty eight per 
cent indicated that they ‘agree’, 22 per cent ‘strongly disagree’ and 16 per cent opted 
for ‘strongly agree’ (see Table 7.18). The majority, 56 per cent altogether, were of the 
view that employees were not deployed in positions where they can apply the skills 








Table 7.18: Employees deployed in positions where they will apply their newly  
acquired skills after training 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Strongly agree 5 16 
Agree 9 28 
Disagree 11 34 
Strongly disagree 7 22 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
It is not clear why this is so but a number of possibilities are plausible. Perhaps this 
shows that contrary to what respondents said earlier, training is not linked to 
organisational objectives or that employees are trained for skills they do not really 
need. In the latter case it may imply that employees could be seeing training as a form 
of entitlement or a form of holiday from work which they should get irrespective of 
its relevance to their jobs. Coupled with the alleged inappropriate deployment of 
newly trained employees, the qualitative interview respondents stated that 
municipalities are facing serious challenges with the training of technical staff such as 
fire and emergency personnel. Respondents said their training is more expensive and 
when these employees complete their studies, other employers such as airports recruit 
them leaving the less economically endowed municipalities empty handed, and with a 
vacant post for which they have to recruit afresh. At this juncture the study turns its 




7.6. Performance Management 
This section seeks to understand performance management in the municipalities. The 
questions sought to understand how performance management is carried out and 
whether it is linked with other HR practices and organisational objectives.  The sub-
section seeks to understand the linkage between other HR practices performance 
management, in particular performance appraisal.  
 
A question was posed as to how often has performance appraisal always been 
performed in a year in the municipalities. As presented in Table 7.19 a significant 
proportion of 47 per cent of the respondents said ‘never’, 25 per cent said ‘once’ and 
22 per cent said ‘quarterly or more’ with about three per cent each indicating ‘twice’ 
and ‘three times’.  
Table 7.19: How often is performance appraisal carried out in your organisation in a year? 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Never 15 47 
Once 8 25 
Twice 1 3 
Three times 1 3 
Quarterly or more 7 22 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
However, it is important to note that the qualitative interview respondents indicated 
that performance appraisals were conducted only among the senior officers who were 
on contract but not all members of staff. When asked if the appraisals were linked to 
rewards and sanctions for employees, 47 per cent indicated that it was ‘not linked at 
all’. About 25 per cent indicated it was ‘somewhat linked’ and 16 per cent ‘weakly 
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linked’. And only six per cent each indicated that it was ‘linked’ and/or that there are 
‘strong links’ (see Table 7.20).  
Table 7.20: Is performance appraisal linked to rewards and sanctions for employees? 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Not linked at all 15 47 
Weakly linked 5 16 
Somewhat linked 8 25 
Linked  2 6 
Strongly linked 2 6 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
As for the linkage between performance appraisal and organisational objectives, 31 
per cent indicated that they ‘disagree’ that these are linked. But 28 per cent said they 
‘agree’, and 19 per cent indicated that they ‘strongly disagreed’, with 13 per cent 
stating they ‘don’t know’ and only nine per cent saying they ‘strongly agree’. 
Altogether those who ‘strongly disagree’ and/or ‘disagree’ accounted for 50 per cent 
of the respondents, making them the largest single group. Earlier it has been shown 
that there are no performance appraisals among the junior staff. Based on the views 
expressed above, it is safe to assume that whenever performance appraisals are 
performed they are not carefully aligned to organisational objectives. During the 
course of the fieldwork, it was indicated by some respondents that at the Mafikeng 
Local Municipality the then municipal manager was dismissed on what was perceived 
to be politically motivated grounds. Therefore it would not be surprising that 
sometimes performance appraisals are used to justify some other actions/decisions 
that may not necessarily be directly related to the performance of the job. That is 
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performance appraisals can be used to meet other ulterior objectives, say political 
objectives.    
Table 7.21: The linkage between performance appraisal and organisational objectives 
 FREQUENCY PER CENT 
Don’t know 4 13 
Strongly disagree 6 19 
Disagree 10 31 
Agree 9 28 
Strongly agree 3 9 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
 
Asked whether the results of the performance reviews were used to make adjustments 
to employees’ work objectives, 41 per cent indicated ‘never’, 19 per cent ‘quite 
often’, 16 per cent ‘sometimes’, 13 per cent ‘rarely’ and nine per cent ‘always’ (see 
Table 7.22). 
Table 7.22: Are the results from the performance reviews used to adjust employees’ work 
objectives? 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Never  13 41 
Rarely 4 13 
Sometimes 5 16 
Quite often 6 19 
Always 3 9 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
When asked if there has been an improvement of employee performance due to 
performance reviews, 34 per cent indicated that they ‘agree’, 28 per cent ‘disagree’, 
16 per cent ‘don’t know’ while 13 per cent ‘strongly agree’ and nine per cent 
‘strongly disagree’. Those who ‘agree’ and/or ‘strongly agree’ represented 47 per cent 
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of the respondents (see Table 7.23). The proportion of respondents who felt there has 
been improvement on employee performance is significantly large despite the earlier 
views that performance reviews are either never or rarely performed. It is plausible 
that the dismissal of other senior officers may have prompted others to improve their 
performance as a bargaining chip for them to retain their jobs irrespective of political 
affiliation. 
Table 7.23: Has there been improvement to employee performance due to performance reviews? 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Strongly agree 4 13 
Agree  11 34 
Disagree  9 28 
Strongly disagree 3 9 
Don’t know 5 16 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
The last question in this subsection wanted the respondents to express their views 
about the linkage between remuneration and employee performance. Respondents had 
to indicate whether they agreed or not and the degree of their opinions. The statement 









Table 7.24: The remuneration in your organisation is not strongly linked to the employees’ 
performance. 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Strongly agree 12 38 
Agree 6 19 
Disagree 10 31 
Strongly disagree 3 9 
Don’t know 1 3 
Total 32 100 
Source: Field Survey (2006) 
 
About 38 per cent felt they ‘strongly agree’ with the statement. Thirty one per cent 
said they ‘disagree’ and 19 per cent ‘agree’ and nine per cent ‘strongly disagree’ with 
only three per cent saying they ‘don’t know’. Overall, about 57 per cent either 
‘strongly agree’ and/or ‘agree’ that individual performance is not aligned with pay. 
Some qualitative respondents indicated that because there is a lack of performance 
appraisal there is no way performance can be linked with salaries.  
 
Asked if there is a functional performance management system in place or not, about 
47 per cent of the quantitative interview respondents said ‘yes’ there is a functional 
performance management system in place, and 38 per cent said ‘no’, with 16 percent 
saying they ‘don’t know’. Qualitative interview respondents stated that each 
municipality is required to develop a strategic plan and identify critical areas of 
service delivery. And that PMS is a policy that all municipalities have to adhere to. 
But they further stated that although the PMS was legislated for, its implementation 
has not been successful. A typical example was that of the Mafikeng Local 
Municipality in which one respondent stated that:  
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In 2005 the Mafikeng Local Municipality engaged a 
Transformation Manager who is under the direct supervision of the 
Municipal Manager. This manager has not been able to produce 
the performance management tool. It is the Municipal Manager 
who is responsible for performance management. 
 
Trade union resistance was also mentioned by respondents as an impediment to the 
successful implementation of PMS. Respondents indicated that these were in spite of 
efforts made by SALGA to steer the implementation of PMS. Respondents indicated 
that SALGA conducted workshops in 2001 on PMS but still in 2006 the 
municipalities were asking for assistance at the time when they were supposed to be 
implementing the programme. This is in spite of SALGA having developed and 
published a PMS toolkit in 2005 and conducted workshops for municipalities across 
the country. Chapters have been established in the municipalities to assist them with 
the implementation of the programme. 
 
In a move that showed government’s frustration with the pace at which PMS was 
being implemented, the government was said to be coming up with proposals to 
improve service delivery. According to Mail & Guardian (2006c) these were said to 
include having the municipal managers being ‘forced to sign performance agreements 
… Legislation to introduce salary bands for municipal and senior managers at 
municipalities …’ and ‘… job descriptions, employment contracts and performance 
contracts entered into between municipalities, municipal managers and those 
accountable to them’. The Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Sydney 
Mufamadi,  was quoted as having said that ‘now there will be a direct relation 
between what managers do and what the community expects of them’ and that there 
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have been some concerns about his (Minister Mufamadi) ability to regulate 
performance for municipal managers (ibid).  
 
Indeed the qualitative interview respondents also confirmed that municipal managers 
and departmental mangers were hired on contract already. However, it is surprising 
that the Minister of Provincial and Local Government was quoted in the media 
proposing to introduce contractual employment for municipal mangers and other 
senior staff members when it was already there. Perhaps the matter to be addressed is 
about ensuring that the legal and policy provisions in existence are adhered to and that 
information on performance outcomes is made available.  The next section discusses 
feedback on performance management.     
 
7.7. Information on Outcomes 
This section presents the feedback process on performance management of the 
municipalities. First we consider the linkages of performance with the national 
economy.  
 
Linkages with the National Economy 
The qualitative interview respondents stated that performance management in the 
municipalities is linked to the national economy through the Integrated Development 
Plan. Respondents stated that municipalities identify their own objectives and also 
have to draw the Key Performance Areas and set targets for service delivery. Then 
quarterly reviews are set and departmental managers report to the municipal manager 
who in turn reports once every six months to the council. Respondents mentioned that 
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the performance of programmes such as the public works programme and the level of 
joblessness are used as proxies for performance.  
 
In addition to the municipal managers’ biannual reports to their councils, respondents 
stated that internal auditing is carried out monthly on Key Performance Areas and 
targets and reports submitted to the councils once every six months. These audit 
reports are intended to confirm or corroborate what the municipal managers would 
have reported to their respective councils. In addition to the biannual reports to their 
councils, municipal managers report annually to the MEC for Developmental Local 
Government and Housing in their province and also to the Minister of Provincial and 
Local Government at national level as well. And they do get feedback from both the 
provincial and national governments on their performance reports. Qualitative 
interview respondents stated that the reports that municipalities prepare are used to 
identify problems, both potential and actual, and to develop intervention strategies to 
assist the municipalities. When asked as to whether baseline data and performance 
improvement data are analysed regularly, 34 per cent indicated ‘never’, 28 per cent 
‘quite often’, 16 per cent ‘sometimes’, 13 per cent ‘rarely’ and only six per cent 
‘always’ and only one non-response (see Table 7.25).  
Table 7.25: Are baseline data and performance improvement data analysed regularly? 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Always 2 6 
Quite often 9 28 
Sometimes 5 16 
Rarely  4 13 
Never  11 34 
Total 31 100 




A significant percentage of the respondents indicated that baseline data on 
performance is not used to the extent that may help the municipalities to improve on 
their performance in a well informed manner. 
 
However, respondents noted that there are challenges in the monitoring and 
evaluation of the performance management process. They stated that the Key 
Performance Indicators are informed by the IDP and that budgets are developed to 
finance the development plans. The main problem, respondents noted, was that the 
programme was not well coordinated. They stated that several municipalities and 
sector departments are not well interlinked and that this has negatively affected the 
linkages between the national economy and the municipalities’ performance. 
 
7.8. Summary 
This chapter has shown how the external and internal environments influenced HRM 
in local government in the North West province. In particular political concerns drive 
administrative decisions in a significant way. According to the ideals implicit in the 
HRM policy and the Municipal Systems Act line managers are responsible for HRM, 
HRM flexibility is enshrined in the same legislation, there is emphasis on the 
measurement of performance and, individualisation and incentivisation are also part 
of the HRM system. All these are defining characteristics of SHRM as defined in 
Chapter II.  However, in practice this study found out that some HRM decisions were 
contingent upon political concerns. For instance, in South Africa there are genuine 
concerns for affirmative action, that every employer has to factor in and ensure are 
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part of their HRM policy and practice. But there have also been some HRM decisions, 
as the respondents indicated, that were based solely on patronage. This relates mainly 
to the appointment of the municipal managers and first line reporting managers. The 
study shows that the ANC factional fighting played a significant role in this 
development.  
 
In South Africa the HRM scenario is complex and is governed by an array of 
legislations and many actors are involved in the HRM process. The multiplicity of 
legislations and other instruments that govern the management of HRs is a product of 
South Africa’s political history.  Due to the inequity of resource endowment, in both 
material and human resources terms, there has been a need to standardise HRM 
practices as well as the physical distribution of skilled HRs among municipalities. 
These were effected through the direct involvement of national and provincial 
government through a programme known as Project Consolidate as well as by proxy - 
SALGA and SALGBC.  
 
Another factor that has had a significant impact on HRM is social culture. The 
previous regime in South Africa applied European management practices, although 
within a racist system. An important aspect of these management practices is 
individualisation and the absence of, or limited, corporate welfarism. In a way that 
shows path dependent HRM decisions, in spite of radical reforms after 1994, this 
practise has been inherited and perpetuated by the new regime. Also related to social 
culture and its bearing on organisational culture is the ANC led government’s 
decision to introduce a policy, and intention to legislate, for a single public service. In 
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South Africa this indicates a major shift towards uncertainty avoidance, which is 
closely associated with developing countries (see Hofstede’s cultural typologies in 
Chapter II). The findings indicate that there is a move towards centralisation as a 
solution to uncertainties posed by the weak labour market and also perhaps the 
national government’s fear of loss of political control over the provinces and 
municipalities as the current system gives them formal powers in the choice of senior 
staff.  
 
The culture of violent protests and service payment boycotts disrupted service 
delivery and created financial loss to the affected municipalities. The lack of own 
financial resources was also blamed on poverty and historical factors that also limited 
the municipalities abilities to raise revenue. The HRM system in the municipalities is 
also influenced by their economic strength, with the bigger and economically strong 
municipalities having well developed HRM departments and policies. Economic 
constraints such as the inability to offer competitive salaries led to the loss of skilled 
personnel to organisations that could afford higher remuneration packages. Direct 
intervention has been used in severe situations as in the case where the Mamusa Local 
Municipality was put under administration. Yet another was when   a municipality 
could not carry out one of the delegated functions (housing) efficiently and the 
provincial government intervened by providing the service itself. As indicated in 
Chapter II this shows the difficulties unfunded mandates create for municipalities. 
 
The monitoring of individual performance through the use of the performance 
appraisal instrument is virtually non-existent in the municipalities except for the top 
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managers. The findings indicate that the performance reviews for managers were not 
solely based on objectively verifiable criteria but political considerations took 
precedence. Neither were rewards linked to performance reviews as even managers 
whose municipalities underperformed were awarded performance bonuses. 
Performance management was based on PMS which is embedded in the legislative 
framework. However, its implementation has been inconsistent across the 
municipalities. SALGA which is responsible for the facilitation of the implementation 
of PMS has no powers to enforce the implementation but can only persuade and 
encourage. The trade unions interfered with the implementation process for PMS by 
their resistance to it. The national government has noted the slackness in the 
implementation process and the Minister of Provincial and Local Government 
responded in a way that seeks to tighten up things and make municipal managers 
more accountable. These developments point to centralised control of HRM at local 
level through performance standards decided at the top. Municipalities concentrate 
their efforts on those aspects of HRM and general management that are of 
consequence to the national and provincial governments, neglecting those that are 
internal.  
 
Feedback on performance management is linked to the national economy through the 
IDPs. Also, municipal managers produce biannual reports to their councils. These are 
supplemented by audit reports that either confirm or refute what the managers may 
have presented. Municipal managers also have to report on an annual basis to the 
MEC for Developmental Local Government and Housing, the Auditor General, and 
the Minister of Provincial and Local Government. Although there is structured 
information on organisational performance, there is none for individual performance. 
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Compliance to the reporting mechanism was weak with very few municipalities 










This study has analysed the linkages between decentralisation and human resource 
management in Botswana and South Africa (focusing on the North West province). 
The SHRM conceptual model and the path dependency theory were applied to both 
case studies to understand the dynamics of HRM and decentralisation in particular 
contexts. This chapter presents the conclusion of the preceding chapters, analysis of 
empirical data and concludes by drawing the significance of the findings and 
recommendations for further research. To refresh the mind of the reader, the 
discussion begins first by revisiting the Statement of the Problem and then explores 
the research questions. 
 
8.2 Statement of the Problem  
Chapter I introduced the research problem, the questions and hypotheses. These are 
repeated here for the convenience of the reader. The challenges associated with public 
management are related to poor service delivery and the pursuit of solutions to these. 
In developing countries the proposed solutions have always come from the West in 
the form of management ideas propagated by donors, development banks and 
consultants. The transferability, adoption and/or adaptability of these ideas across the 
world are what scholars seek to understand.  As already noted the problem of poor 
service delivery is a complex one as it arises from multiple interrelated causes. Key 
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among them are: lack of capacity, limited financial resources and, inappropriate 
institutional frameworks, policies and systems.  
 
The problem of poor service delivery is more complex than just its association with 
resources. There are many factors at play (such as the environmental context) and 
how these shape the HRM policies and practice in a particular country. Nevertheless, 
HRM in most developing countries remains weak. The qualitative and quantitative 
capacity of the human resources that could effectively deliver services remains 
unfulfilled. In the face of limited resources and structural problems there is a limited 
scope for long term planning in the management of human resources. These problems 
are most severe at local government level where resources are generally limited and 
their interface with other variables has not produced the much needed improvements 
in service delivery. However, from the case studies at hand it shows that there are no 
simple or straight forward answers to the questions that this study attempted to 
answer.  Presented below are the key findings from the study in relation to the 
research questions.  
 
8.3. Main Findings of the Study 
This section is divided into three subsections that address each of the research 
questions. The first focuses on addressing the primary research question: 
 
Is there a trade-off between SHRM and decentralization or local democracy in 
Botswana and South Africa? 
 
The key factors that determine HRM in Botswana and South Africa are multifaceted. 
What this study sought to understand is whether these factors lead to trade-offs in 
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HRM techniques and autonomous decision-making or is it possible for developing 
countries to have both SHRM and decentralisation, that is does having one preclude 
having the other? This study has found that in both countries the centre decides on the 
nature of the HRM reforms while local authorities are the implementers. The study 
has also shown that contingent factors (such as politics, economy, socio-cultural 
issues, etc) and path dependent policy choices have significantly influenced 
decentralisation in the two countries. These influences have tended to be at the 
expense of the requirements of the SHRM model (as outlined on page 41) in that the 
latter anticipates that the desired flexibility will be introduced via decentralisation of 
decision-making about HRM. However, from a cursory look there seems to be a lot of 
similarities between the two countries although a closer look sees significant 
differences emerge.  
 
These emerging differences could be ascribed to external factors in each country 
(such as politics, socio-culture, economy, history, traditions, processes, etc) that 
according to the contingency theory have a bearing on HR policies (see pp46, 47). 
The following discussion summarises how these factors in the external environment 
influence the nature of HRM.  Both Botswana and South Africa are politically stable 
and have close economic and cultural ties. Besides these ties there is some evidence 
of the transfer of ideas between the two countries. This phenomenon of the transfer of 
ideas between countries is an aspect of the external environment and ideas are known 
to impact on virtually every aspect of human life be it culture, traditions and many 
other factors (that have already been identified under the contingency theory). In this 
study the sharing/transfer of ideas between countries has had a significant influence 
on HR philosophy such as with the infusion of the concept of Ubuntu and Botho in 
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South Africa and Botswana respectively.  These two countries are among some of the 
few sub-Saharan Africa countries that have committed themselves to the adoption of 
NPM-like reforms. Associated with NPM reforms is PMS which both countries have 
adopted as the main civil service reform. Here we realise the role played by donors 
and consultants (e.g. World Bank) in the transfer of ideas, but most significantly at 
least according to the contingency theory is the role played by the external factors in 
shaping HRM policy.  However, the practice of HRM in Botswana and South Africa 
takes different approaches, with the former being bureaucratic and centralised while 
the latter is decentralised in approach (see sections 6.3.1., 6.8., 7.3.1 and 7.8). This 
leads to the discussion on the types of HRM approaches, applied in Botswana and 
South Africa, and the extent of their decentralisation. As we shall see, despite their 
differences our findings suggest that it is likely that the two countries will converge 
around a centralised version of human resources management (identified in Figure 8.1 
as Centralised SHRM) on account of their emphasis on PMS.  
 
The following discussion shows further the significance of the contingency theory in 
helping us understand the significance of the external environment on HRM policy 
and practice. In theory the external factors create a particular context of the 
organisation that is directly linked to its HR policies.  In Botswana, for instance, the 
external factors interacted in a complex way that influenced HRM to move from a 
decentralised personnel management system shortly after independence to a 
centralised personnel management system before experiencing what appears to be 
competing pressures in terms of centralisation and decentralisation, as depicted in 
Figure 8.1 below. However, with regard to the diagram, it is not of course possible for 
a two-dimensional diagram to convey the full complexity of the interplay of these 
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competing pressures. The diagram shows HR policy in Botswana pursuing a zigzag 
path between decentralisation and centralisation and this may be the reality. However 
it is also possible to interpret these results as demonstrating the degree to which policy 
in this area is subject to contradictory imperatives – with performance management 
encouraging centralisation whilst other aspects of the SHRM menu might be taken to 
imply managerial decentralisation. The outcome cannot be easily predicted as it 
depends on the relative strengths of the drivers behind centralisation and 
decentralisation.  Donor (World Bank) advice, which was influential in both countries 
(although conditionality was not involved) perhaps underplays the degree to which 
priorities such as performance management and administrative decentralisation may 
conflict at different stages of reform. 
 
However, the reform process is ongoing and indications are that the performance 
monitoring requirement inherent in PMS would probably shift Botswana’s position 
across to the upper right hand side of the PM/SHRM axis (see Figure 8.1) once the 
implementation of PMS has been completed.  
 
As already indicated in Chapter II, PMS and SHRM are closely associated. PMS is 
the platform for SHRM in the study countries because through it the public services 
implement systems that enable them to link HR strategy to organisational objectives. 
In Botswana this direction is implicit in the PMS philosophy that enunciates the 
public service vision, mission and values, against which local authorities are tying or 
developing theirs. Also, there is a shift in the HRM ethos to the one that emphasises 





Figure 8.1: The Decentralisation/Centralisation and Personnel Management (PA) / SHRM 
(NPM) Matrix 
 
Source: Author’s Own Construct (2008) 
On the other hand the South African experience indicated a shift away from the 
personnel management system in 1994 (at least in principle) to strategic human 
resource management (see Figure 8.1). However the municipalities have different 
experiences, with the bigger municipalities managing their own HRM affairs while 
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Municipalities for their HRM.  In terms of the matrix South African municipalities are 
placed in the lower right hand side quadrant having moved from the upper left hand 
side quadrant. Yet the indications are that once all municipalities have adopted the 
standards set by SALGA and SALGBC, which they had started doing, albeit slowly, 
South African municipalities will move in the direction of the upper right hand side 
quadrant, denoting an approach that combines both centralisation and SHRM. As with 
Botswana this combination would be a result of an emphasis on the PMS component 
of SHRM, It could be argued that the South African government is seeking to use 
SALGA (responsible for PMS coordination) and SALGBC as proxies for central 
control. This scenario again attests to the significance of the contingency theory in 
being able to capture the dynamics of the external factors that are beyond the purview 
of organisations that nevertheless influence their HRM policies. 
 
There are other strong indications that HRM is gradually being centralised in South 
Africa, for example where transfers of skilled HRs between local municipalities are 
handled by SALGA and the district municipalities. The approval of the Single Public 
Service Policy by Cabinet in 2006 signals a major shift towards centralisation (see 
Section 5.2.1 and 7.4) in which the top management in all spheres of government will 
effectively belong to a single public service and will be transferable between them. 
South Africa also uses a multi-stakeholder approach in its HRM systems (see Section 
7.3.1). These developments in South Africa have been ascribed to history (an aspect 
of the external environment) as discussed in Chapters V and VII. 
 
Thus, although at the time of data collection the two countries had different 
approaches to the implementation of a similar policy (PMS), there was also evidence 
  
288 
that they are both still in a transitory stage and that their HRM systems are gradually 
moving towards convergence in that both may be seen to be moving towards a system 
in which PMS will be centrally coordinated so that the HRM in both cases will be 
situated in the quadrant characterised by what we have termed ‘centralised SHRM’. In 
Figure 8.1 this convergence is represented by the bold arrows pointing towards 
‘SHRM centralised’ quadrant. 
 
Thus the need to monitor performance tends, in the cases of both South Africa and 
Botswana, to centralisation of HRM. Thus, while from a theoretical point of view, 
SHRM is expected to involve decentralisation of decision-making (e.g. to line 
managers), in both of these cases, the move towards SHRM seems to be accompanied 
by greater centralisation of HRM decision-making. 
 
The adoption of PMS brought about centralisation of the coordination mechanism 
through the performance targets set by the centre, for instance through the Municipal 
Systems Act in South Africa. The mechanism in place to ensure compliance, that is 
the performance audit, ensures central control. This is particularly evident in South 
Africa where performance auditing is a requirement for all municipalities, even 
though only three attempted to do it (see Section 5.6) but many others experienced 
problems due to capacity constraints. In Botswana performance auditing is still being 
developed. Also in Botswana the coordination of the implementation of PMS was 
directly driven by the centre and this contrasts with South Africa’s case where the 
centre was indirectly involved, showing the varying degrees and styles of 
intervention. In South Africa the bigger and well-resourced municipalities that have 
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better capacity and resources, have developed their HRM strategies that show some 
external fit with organisational strategy.  
 
The configuration of HRM systems in the two countries is summarised in Figures 6.1 
and 7.1 in Sections 6.3.1 and 7.3.1 respectively. The evidence indicates that in 
Botswana HRM reforms are determined and driven by the centre (see Section 4.3 and 
6.3.1) while in South Africa the evidence indicates that HRM reforms are determined 
by the centre through instruments such as the Municipal Systems Act but the 
implementation is driven by SALGA, a proxy for the centre (see Sections 5.3 and 
7.3.1). These arrangements undercut the HRM flexibility at local level, which 
indicates that there is to a significant extent a trade-off between SHRM and 
decentralisation or local democracy in Botswana and South Africa.  Therefore, the 
findings support the proposition that: The adoption of SHRM reforms is likely to be 
driven by the centre rather than by local authorities themselves. 
 
What are the main factors/elements that influence HRM in local government in 
Botswana and South Africa? 
 
The sub-section above has shown some of the differences and similarities to the HRM 
approaches between Botswana and South Africa. In answering the second research 
question this sub-section focuses on those key features of the HRM systems between 
the two countries that hold some explanation to the variance. Table 8.1 presents a 
comparative summary of the case studies about their approaches to HRM and 
decentralisation. South Africa gained inclusive democratic governance just over a 
decade and a half ago, while Botswana has over 40 years of uninterrupted democratic 
rule. In South Africa the motives behind decentralisation emphasised identity, 
representation and broader participation/local decision-making in the planning and 
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budgetary processes. On the other hand Botswana emphasises improving service 
delivery, efficiency and poverty reduction over democratic processes such as identity 
or representation. These differences are largely due to the political histories of the two 
countries as reflected in chapters IV, V, VI and VII. Some of the differences between 
the two countries are presented in Table 8.1 below. These are explained in the rest of 
the section below.  
 
Table 8.1 Key Features of Decentralisation in Botswana and South Africa 
SOUTH AFRICA (POST APARTHEID) BOTSWANA 
Democracy/Representation Efficiency 
Separated HRM System Unified HRM System 
Politicisation/Patronage Professionalism 
Personalisation Standardisation 
Autonomy in decision-making Implementation of Techniques 
Strategic management framework Nascent strategic management framework 
Political commitment Political commitment 
     Source: Author’s Own Construct (2008) 
 
In view of the aforesaid Devas and Delay’s (2006) multiplicity of motives for 
decentralisation, shows that South Africa has similar motives to those found in newly 
democratising states as in Eastern Europe. Botswana, with a long history of stable 
governance since independence is more concerned with efficiency. Political stability 
is a rare historical condition in Africa, and unique historical conditions according to 
the RBV theory are known to be essential for the creation of sustained efficiency and 
effectiveness in public organisations (see pp48-50). This internal environment within 
local government organisations in Botswana created inimitable or imperfectly mobile 
  
291 
resources or assets such as unique experiences, organisational culture and unique 
personalities that are a source of sustained efficiency and effectiveness in service 
delivery. However, the concern for efficiency in Botswana has led to a centralised 
HRM system that is inclined towards standardisation to ensure the quality of HRs 
across municipalities and ensure professionalism. This standardisation has led to 
efficiency in the implementation of management techniques across municipalities as 
demonstrated in the implementation of the PMS project. This approach is unique in 
Africa in that centralisation here is not used to ensure patronage but efficiency and 
effectiveness in service delivery. On the other hand, the South African HRM system 
is decentralised and allows for variation from one municipality to the other, but 
appointments are often politicised and decision-making is more personalised largely 
because of ANC factionalism. Patronage has emerged as a significant factor in South 
Africa, whereas in Botswana it was mentioned but not as significant in the 
employment system. 
 
However, congruence between HRM and organisational strategy in both countries 
was weak. The reasons for that are varied. In South Africa it is because managerial 
decisions are often interrupted for political expediency while in Botswana it is 
because the systems were still being developed and implementation still ongoing. 
History accounts for most of the differences between the two countries. For instance, 
while Botswana’s local government and HRM systems evolved over time, South 
Africa has had to transform its own in a short period of time – beginning in 1994 
when gaining democratic governance. This shows that the critical junctures or initial 
forces that set things in motion in Botswana took place much earlier, in 1966 and 




Decentralisation in both Botswana and South Africa enjoys political commitment. In 
Botswana there is however some reluctance to decentralise executive functions to 
local politicians (see Section 6.3.1) in order for the centre to be able to ensure that its 
objectives are achieved – in particular efficiency and effectiveness. Municipalities in 
Botswana have in some cases performed better than central government field agencies 
such as in the delivery of district housing (see Chapter VI). However, in South Africa 
commitment to decentralisation has come at a cost of municipal capacity and 
efficiency in service delivery. This has led to intervention from the national and 
provincial governments through Project Consolidate and direct intervention at 
provincial level as in the case of Mamusa Local Municipality (see Sections 7.3.1) and 
some failures in housing delivery. Although South Africa is committed to reforms, the 
strategy for implementing the reforms through local government associations poses 
significant challenges due to their lack of powers to impose sanctions for non-
compliance and the varying capacities of municipalities to effectively implement the 
reforms. Perhaps in terms of the RBV theory these developments indicate that in 
South Africa the internal resources (in particular intangible resources such as 
organisational culture, skills and experiences) that should account for sustained 
efficiency and effectiveness are still developing and being reshaped and are not yet 
well entrenched in the administrative system.  
 
South Africa and Botswana have chosen divergent paths and strategies 
(decentralisation and legislation, and centralisation and a project management 
approach respectively) to the improvement of performance management in their local 
governments but the intended means and ends are the same – PMS and the 
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improvement of service delivery respectively. While Botswana adopted NPM reforms 
at the instigation of technical advice from the World Bank10, South Africa did so with 
advice from consultants during the transition period.  The South African approach to 
HRM is participatory and involves autonomous decision-making. However, the 
Botswana government adopted a unilateralist (top-down) approach to the 
implementation of productivity improvement reforms. Perhaps the differences here 
could as well be explained by the size of the entities involved: South Africa is a large 
multi-ethnic country while Botswana is less ethnically diverse and its population is 
smaller than that of the North West province and also its municipalities were fewer in 
number.  
 
The approach to HRM in local government in both countries tends to limit the role 
played by line managers contrary to what SHRM theory and PMS envision. In both 
SHRM and PMS concept the significance of the line manager is assumed, however, in 
the two countries the concerns to establish viable institutions, assurance for 
accountable use of limited resources and the delivery of basic services tend to 
override theoretical assumptions and emphasise the directing of the employment 
systems. In the North West province and perhaps the entire South Africa, where the 
HRM system for local government is separated, on face value it strengthens 
decentralisation. But, at a closer look at the separated system in South Africa shows 
that it too works counter to decentralisation but in a different fashion from that in 
Botswana. In South Africa external contingencies exerted some pressures that were 
compounded by the municipalities’ limited financial resources and poor capacity, and 
they could not perform their functions efficiently (as in most of the North West 
                                               
10
 Botswana is not serving any Structural Adjustment Programmes and therefore has the leverage to 
customise recommendations from the World Bank according to its needs and capabilities. 
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municipalities) and the centre was more likely to intervene – therefore undermining 
decentralisation. Curtis (1999) raised more or less similar concerns even though he 
referred specifically to the viability of performance management in the South African 
local government. The factors raised by Curtis (and stated below) have an inverse 
relationship with decentralisation. He raised two issues: 
• ‘Externally imposed contradictions and constraints: for instance, 
municipalities must balance their budgets but are under pressure not to 
sack anyone’. Presently this still stands as this is not only about salaries 
but also the municipalities’ ability to raise revenue. Lack of adequate 
funding has lead to weak capacity and failure to perform executive 
functions. Where they have failed the national and/or provincial 
government have intervened or there is always the threat/possibility of 
intervention.  
• ‘Lack of leadership experience in handling the political-administrative 
interface’. This weakness has persisted and is compounded by political 
interference and the ANC factional fighting that has been taken to the 
council chambers and board rooms. Municipal managers were appointed 
along partisan and factional lines at the expense of merit and performance.   
 
The implications to theory, specifically RBV, and its significance in this case are that 
the weakness of the internal resources have led to an imbalance in the pressures 
applied from the external factors vis-a-vis the internal factors. Although centralisation 
has always been referred to pejoratively and as having failed (see Mawhood, 1983), 
Botswana has built a local civil service that is among the most efficient and effective 
in the developing world (see Olowu and Wunsch, 2004) in spite of it being relatively 
centralised. Perhaps the case of Botswana local government, albeit it weaknesses, 
reflects the relative strength of its internal resources that have been painstakingly built 
over time. The interventions from central government in both countries indicate that 
external contingencies are more important in influencing HRM in local government 
than the internal resources and any HRM theories. Although, according to theory, 
SHRM requires the devolution of managerial authority, in both South Africa and 
Botswana the introduction of SHRM is within contexts that are somewhat centralised. 
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In the following sub-section the discussion addresses the third research question, as to 
what really underlies the choices made by the two countries.     
     
 
Why do countries adopting similar policy advice end up with different 
outcomes? 
The political, social and economic history of Botswana and South Africa differ 
greatly even though the majority of the people of the North West province belong to 
the same ethnic group as their northern neighbours. Both countries have stable 
growing economies, thriving democracies and are socially stable. But South Africa 
emerged out of a traumatic political experience not a long time ago and influences of 
this experience are still evident in its management systems and the broader socio-
political environment. The new South African regime inherited existing public 
institutions which had a history. This history creates some of the constraints and 
opportunities that the new regime encounters. HRM in the North West province is 
largely influenced by the transformational process in South Africa and this 
transformation process is informed by history and politics. The considerations for 
affirmative action, which understandably is justifiable not only politically but also 
morally weight down on the strategies that can be adopted in HRM. At the same time 
politics has played a significant role especially in the recruitment process in the 
municipalities. Perhaps this is related to patronage which in a way is an instinctive 
reaction to the desire for self-preservation by the top politicians. Similar political 
strategies have been practised in Botswana with regard to the appointment of 
municipal CEOs in which the centre had the prerogative to appoint. However, in 
Botswana the appointment of top municipal managers was not politicised to the extent 
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it was in South Africa. On the other hand Botswana started off after independence 
with few skilled HRs and had to build these from nothing, hence the unified HRM 
approach aimed at the equitable distribution of skilled labour across municipalities. 
South Africa inherited established municipalities that existed on an ethnically diverse 
country with a history of segregation, hence identity took precedence. Politicisation of 
HRM over time becomes part of organisational culture. 
 
Management techniques are being applied in contexts where there is history and 
institutional factors. As a result organisations become locked in their old traditions 
and become path dependent in their decision making. Particular occurrences at the 
initial stages (critical junctures) have influenced later managerial practices in a major 
way in both countries (see Sections 4.2.2., 5.2.1. and 6.5). Perhaps these account for 
the reluctance of central government in Botswana to devolve executive powers to 
local politicians and also to decentralise more HRM responsibilities to local 
authorities (see Section 6.3). However, both South Africa and Botswana have been 
influenced by modern management thought in particular NPM ideas. Although both 
Botswana and South Africa are not under the Structural Adjustment Programmes, 
they do receive technical advice from both the Bretton Woods institutions and 
international consultants respectively. This indicates the significance of external 
contingencies in their management thought. There is also some sharing of ideas 
portrayed in this case by the role played by Pelonomi Vesnon, the former Permanent 
Secretary in the then Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing (Botswana), 
in the roles she played both as a consultant in Western Cape and as Chairperson of  
the Second Local Government Structure Commission in Botswana. The South African 
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influence on the adoption of the Botho concept in Botswana also attests to this 
borrowing.   
 
Resource constraints are some of the significant factors in the evolution of 
management in the two countries. The top politicians and top bureaucrats in both 
countries have made decisions that try to balance the political and administrative 
concerns. This in particular applies to the appointment of managers in both Botswana 
and South African municipalities. South Africa introduced the Single Public Service 
policy to ensure that there is an optimal allocation of qualified and competent HRs in 
the top public service posts at all levels of government, while in the lower rungs it is 
through the transfer of skilled labour through SALGA. In Botswana this is assured 
through the continued centralised appointments of top, and some senior and middle 
management, local authority officers. Tendencies towards centralisation in both 
countries appear to come from uncertainty avoidance (see Section 2.5).   
 
Management practices and values are an expression of culture. Moving away from a 
managerial culture based on discrimination the Batho Pele White Paper on Local 
Government in South Africa has become pivotal to the reengineering of 
organisational culture across the public service (see Section 5.2). In some respects 
South Africa also exhibits a Western culture of management in which there is very 
limited corporate welfarism (see Section 7.3) in contrast to Botswana’s elaborate 
corporate welfarism (see Section 6.5). These differences are due to the historical 
experiences of the two countries. This difference is ascribed to the different historical 
experiences of the two countries and the different managerial approaches and 
management thinking that have been perpetuated from periods past. Performance 
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management is not well entrenched in both countries even though Botswana has an 
established tradition of performance appraisal that includes all levels of the public 
service. There is also the Scheme of Service that insists that the length of service takes 
precedence, as well as deference to the superior (also an aspect of African culture) 
(see sub-section 4.2.2. and Section 6.5). However, the performance management 
culture in Botswana seems to be effective as the literature and interviews have shown 
that Botswana relied on qualified expatriate labour from other countries to 
compensate for the skills they lacked. Many of these expatriate personnel come from 
countries that Adamolekun (2005) has categorised as underperforming (see Chapter 
II). Perhaps what accounts for their performance in Botswana would be the relatively 
suitable organisational culture in which they operate. As a result Botswana has been 
credited by scholars as having one of the most efficient local civil services.   
 
In South Africa performance appraisal is limited to the top management cadre and is 
yet to be introduced at the lower levels of the municipalities. There is also a culture of 
awarding bonuses to municipal managers irrespective of the performance of the 
organisations they manage (see Section 7.5). These bonuses could perhaps be linked 
to the patronage system that seeks to reward nothing but political party loyalty.  But a 
significant development in both countries is the involvement of various stakeholders 
in the management of HRs (see Sections 6.5 and 7.5). These stakeholders involve 
trade unions as well and are intended to ensure fairness, and this approach could be 
used as a corruption control strategy. The organisational culture in Botswana indicates 
that HRM in that country still carries more of the features of the personnel 
management type (as indicated in Figure 8.1) than otherwise, albeit the strong 
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indications that the HRM system is in transition. South Africa on the other hand was 
adopting SHRM (see Figure 8.1 above). 
  
This study has shown that there are multiple factors that influence HRM, such as 
politics, social culture, economy, organisational culture, history and other contingent 
factors. Although political stability and economic prosperity can be achieved by any 
country, there are some factors peculiar to particular countries that cannot be acquired 
by other countries such as history and culture (and competencies that are influenced 
by organisational culture and account for efficiency).  These are some of the internal 
organisational resources that are inimitable or cannot be copied by others and 
therefore are immobile resources that account for sustained efficiency and 
effectiveness in service delivery in the public sector. These factors lead to the 
conclusion that: the inimitable resources and immobile resources of local authorities 
will lead to different approaches to the management of human resources. As stated in 
Chapter I inimitable and immobile resources refer to organisational resources 
(tangible/intangible assets) that cannot be easily copied and/or transferred to other 
organisations. The subsection below presents the implications of these findings. 
 
8.4. Implications           
 HRM in local government is influenced by a combination of factors such as politics, 
economy, resource availability, culture, and laws, which are factors in the immediate 
environment. Also, there are influential external contingencies such as management 
ideas. These management ideas were adopted at the advice of the World Bank in the 
case of Botswana, and during transition in the case of South Africa, while the other 




The inefficiency in applying these ideas has been explained within the context of the 
countries within which the reforms inspired by those ideas are implemented. Adopting 
new practices is not easy as bureaucracies are large organisations that change over 
time. Also, the bureaucrats are an interest group that has its own interests to protect, 
that at times may be threatened by change – change from the known (comfort zones) 
to the unknown. These may result in management culture shock, scepticism, and 
resistance to change by public employees. In both countries, attempts were made to 
ameliorate the potentially negative factors, by ensuring that the implementation of the 
HRM reforms was preceded by the immersion of the leadership into the new concept 
behind the reform, after which followed implementation. This process unfolded in 
Botswana beginning in 2001 as a change management strategy (see Section 6.3.1) and 
the central government had to use ‘carrot and stick’ approach for local authorities to 
comply. In South Africa, a much larger and complex country, the process was 
different but nonetheless unfolded in a similar fashion but without sticks or carrots 
attached. However, because the approach depended more on persuasion it took longer 
for the local authorities to adopt PMS and/or implement the Task Job Evaluation 
System (see Section 7.3.1).  There are, however, many variables and considerations at 
play in the public sector that influence the implementation of reforms. In Chapter II 
we noted, McCourt and Ramgutty-Wong’s (2002) observation that SHRM was a 
Western solution to Western private sector problems, the implication being that 
application in the public sector in developing countries would run counter to their 
management cultures. Whether further movement in the direction of SHRM is 




It is possible that culture may play a positive rather than merely restraining role 
regarding the adoption of innovations in management. The introduction of the Batho 
Pele concept and Ubuntu in South Africa and its equivalent, Botho, in Botswana in 
their management systems are attempts at blending new management techniques with 
national cultures (i.e. adaptation).  
 
This study has shown that in both countries there was a strategic framework in place. 
However, in South Africa municipalities were at different stages of applying it to their 
HRM systems as the poorer municipalities were lagging behind. In Botswana the 
municipalities were moving at the same pace in applying the strategic framework to 
the HRM system. In both countries the process of operationalising the strategic 
framework was still being rolled out.  
 
8.5. Conclusion: Contribution to Research and Future Research           
This study’s main finding is that although SHRM and decentralisation are frequently 
assumed to go together and are both (implicitly) advocated by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, in the cases researched reforms which may broadly be categorised as 
moving towards SHRM, have been accompanied by a tendency towards managerial 
centralisation. This is noteworthy not least because centralisation is characteristic of 
the recent traditions of one of the countries, but not of the other.  This study also 
suggests that good contemporary employee management is not dependent on 
introduction of SHRM. Traditional personnel management can still achieve good 
results, as shown in both cases.  Nevertheless, this study has shown that the two 
countries have shown the desire and determination to implement NPM-style reforms, 
the implementation of which seems to require movement in the direction of SHRM 
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principles – although it could debated whether in these cases SHRM would be a 
vehicle for NPM style reforms or a by product of these. However, they have taken 
different approaches to implementing their reforms, in spite of their policies (e.g. 
PMS) and/or reform objectives being more or less similar.  The different approaches 
result from the countries’ peculiar contexts and history. Both countries’ HRM systems 
were still in transition, but at different stages. This study argues that, from the cases 
studied, even though developing countries may implement similar reforms based on 
similar policy advice or prescription, a combination of factors such as social and 
organisational culture that are not transferable between countries account for the 
difference in outcomes (as shown in Figure 8.1 and the accompanying text, it seems 
likely that in the longer term the outcomes may converge, however, as the emphasis in 
both cases, although implemented differently, is likely to increase or reinforce 
centralisation).  
 
The study has also shed some light on the dynamics of HRM in the local government 
of, in the economic sense, fairly successful sub-Saharan African countries. Mosley 
(2008) found that in the developed countries the national governments were more 
inclined to refine the directing (emphasis added) of the public employment system 
organisation instead of doing away with the controls. In Botswana and South Africa 
the national governments have shown the intention to direct and/or participate 
actively in the human resource management of the local authorities. However, in the 
relatively more decentralised South Africa participation/intervention is somewhat 
indirect (by proxy) while in Botswana it is direct. For a defining characteristic this 
development in both countries could be considered as ‘paternalistic decentralisation’. 
Local government in these countries has not matured, in South Africa because of the 
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reconstitution of municipalities after 1994 while in Botswana because of what has 
been described as the deliberate underdevelopment of local government capacity (see 
Picard and Tordoff, op.cit.). 
 
The findings suggest that in countries where local governments are experiencing a 
lack of resources, as is the case with many SSA countries, and/or where local 
government has not matured, a more centralised approach to the administration of 
HRM is the most likely to be preferred by policy makers, even though in both 
countries government policy favours decentralisation as a general principle.   
 
There were two significant factors related to the study countries that create 
opportunities for further research. First it was the fact that the implementation process 
of PMS was still ongoing in both Botswana and South Africa as reform is an ongoing 
process. The second was that neither country produced adequate data on performance 
management. It would be opportune in future, once the performance auditing systems 
in Botswana and South Africa are fully operational, for them to be reviewed. Since 
this study limited itself to researching the process of external fit (HR strategy and 
organisational strategy), it would also be of interest in future to consider internal fit 







Organizational strengths and 
weaknesses 
Core competencies and 
capabilities 





Political and legal factors 














Equity and consideration 

































Incentives and motivation 
Merit-seniority balance 





Training needs assessment  
Teambuilding 
Skill-formation and competence 
enhancement 
Managing development 














   Strategy Formulation Strategy Implementation in HRM 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. A processual, strategic model of HRM in Africa 
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Source: Jackson and Schuler, 1999. 
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Appendix 3: District Map of Botswana      
           







Appendix 4: Provincial Map of South Africa  
 
 
































• Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 (Act no. 13 0f 2005) 
• Local Government: Remuneration of Public Officer Bearers Act, 1998 (Act No. 
20 of !998) 
• Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004 (Act No. 6 of 2004) 
• Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (Act No. 56 of 
2003) 
• Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act, 2003 (Act No. 44 of 
2003) 
• Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Act, 2003 (Act NO.1 of 
2003) 
• Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act No. 32 of 2000) 
• Disestablishment of the Local Government Affairs Council Act, 1999 (Act No. 59 
of 1999) 
• Skills Development Levies Act, (Act No. 9 of 1999) 
• Skills Development Act, 1998 (Act No. 97 of 1998) 
• Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act No. of 117 of 1998) 
• Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act No. 27 of 1998) 
• Transfer of Staff of Municipalities Act, 1998 (Act No 17 of 1998) 
• Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act No. 55 of 1998) 
• Organised Local Government Act, 1997 (Act No.52 of 1997) 
• Repeal of Local Government Laws Act, 1997 (Act No. 42 of 1997) 
• Remuneration of Town clerks Act Repeal Act, 1996 (Act No. 61 of 1996) 
• Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No.66 of 1995) 







Appendix 7: Economic Indicators – Botswana and South Africa 
 






GDP in million constant 1995 US 
dollars 
6,330 170,568 362,493 34,109,900 
GDP PPP (million current 









Gross National Income (PPP, in 










GDP per capita, 2000 









in current international 
dollars 
7,467 9,291 1,797 7,416 
Average annual growth in GDP, 1991-
2000 
    
Total 4% 2% 2% 3% 
Per capita 2% 0% 0% 1% 
Per cent of GDP earned by: 
 
    
Agriculture 4% 3% 17% X 
Industry 44% 31% 31% X 
Services  52% 66% 53% X 
     
International Trade     
Trade in goods and services (million 
current $US 
    
Imports X 32,842 80,986 X 
Exports X 36,572 78,438 X 
Exports as a percent of GDP, 2000 X 29% 33% X 
Balance of Trade, 2000 (million 
current $US) 
X 3,730 1,213 X 
     
Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) and Financial Flows 
    
ODA in million US dollars, 1998-
2000{b} 
66 514 8,040 59,073 
ODA per capita in US dollars, 1998-
2000{b} 
44 12 17 10 
Current Account Balance (million 
$US), 2000  
X -469 X X 
Total external debt, million $US, 
1998-2000 
468 24,507 224,885 X 
Debt service as a % of export 









Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows 









International Tourism Receipts, 1995-




















Gaborone City Council 
 
Francistown City Council 
 
Selebi-Phikwe Town Council 
 
Lobatse Town Council 
 
Jwaneng Town Council 
 





Central District Council 
 
Ghanzi District Council 
 
Kgalagadi District Council 
 
Kgatleng District Council 
 
Kweneng District Council 
 
North East District Council 
 
North West District Council 
 
South East District Council 
 





Appendix 9: Categories of the Municipalities of the North West Province  
 
 
Category B Municipalities (Local Municipalities) 
 
 Mayoral Executive System 
 
Mafikeng Local Municipality 
Klerksdorp City Council 
Potchefstroom City Council 
Madibeng Local Municipality 
Rustenburg City Council 
 
Collective Executive System 
 
Ramotshere Moilwa (Zeerust) Local Municipality  
Moretele Local Municipality 
Moses Kotane Local Municipality 
Ratlou local Municipality 
Tswaing Local Municipality 
Distobotla Local Municipality 
Kagisano Local Municipality 
Naledi Local Municipality 
Greater Taung Local Municipality 
Molopo Local Municipality 
Maquissi-Hills Local Municipality 
 
Plenary Executive System 
 
Kgetleng River Local Municipality 
Ventersdorp Local Municipality 
Mamusa Local Municipality 
Molopo Local Municipality 
Lekwa Teemane Local Municipality 
 
Category C Municipalities (District Municipalities) 
 
Mayoral Executive System 
 
Central District Municipality 
Southern District Municipality 
Bojanala Platinum District Municipality 





Appendix 10: Distribution of HRM Responsibilities between DLGSM and LAs 
 
 
RESPONSIBILITY LAS DLGSM SHARED 
Appointments of temporary and industrial 
employees and other officers up to C3 
√   
Internal postings and deployment 
arrangements 
√   
Leave administration √   
Supervision and conduct of officers √   
Disciplinary matters for industrial employees √   
Authorisation and payment of all of the 
approved establishment 
√   
Specific recommendations on most other 
personnel management issues 
√   
Approval of unpaid leave for officers up to 
C3 
√   
Issuance of Certificate of Service for 
resigning and retiring officers up to grade C3 
√   
Promotion of staff in grades up to C4 √   
Powers of interdiction and dismissal in grades 
up to C3 
√   
In-house training √   
Salary administration √   
Consultations on staff welfare   √ 
Vacancy monitoring   √ 
Training needs assessment and preparation of 
training plan 
  √ 
Performance monitoring and appraisal   √ 
Disciplinary matters   √ 
All powers relating to confirmation to 
pensionable service specified in Section 9 of 
the LGS Act 
  √ 
Manpower budgeting   √ 
Training (in-service and institutional) and 
selection 
  √ 
Processing of terminal benefits   √ 
Discretion in determining the salary entry 
point in recognition of previous relevant 
experience and qualifications 
 √  
Appointments of officers above C3  √  







Appendix 11: List of Officers Interviewed – North West Province 
 








Appendix 12: List of Officers Interviewed – Botswana 
 



































Botswana 6.0 31 5.9 32 5.6 37 5.4 38 5.8 36 
South 
Africa 
4.6 44 4.5 46 4.6 51 5.1 43 4.9 54 
Mauritius 4.1 54 4.2 51 5.1 42 4.7 53 5.5 41 




 145  158  163  179  180 
Source: Abridged from Transparency International multi-year.  
 
Note: The total number of countries ranked varies each year as more countries are 





Appendix 14: Number of Posts and Salary/Grades for CEOs from    




 GABORONE CITY COUNCIL      
       
scale  2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Totals  
 Town Clerk's Office      
       
E1 Town Clerk 1 1 1 
  
E2 Deputy Town Clerk  1 1 1 2  
 
 
 SOWA TOWNSHIP AUTHORITY      
       
scale  2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Totals  
 Town Clerk's Office      
       
E1 Town Clerk 1 1 1 
  
E2 Deputy Town Clerk  1 1 1 2  
 
 
 NORTH EAST DISTRICT COUNCIL      
       
scale  2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Totals  
 Council Secretary's Office      
       
E1 Council Secretary 1 1 1   
E2 Deputy Council Secretary  1 1 1 2  
 
 








Personnel management strategies, like 
HRM strategies, flow from business 
strategy 
HRM places more emphasis on strategic 
fit and integration. 
Personnel management, like HRM, 
recognizes that line managers are 
responsible for managing people. The 
personnel function provides the necessary 
advice and support services to enable 
managers to carry out their 
responsibilities. 
HRM is based on a management-and 
business-oriented philosophy. 
The values of personnel management and 
at least the ‘soft’ version of HRM are 
identical with regard to ‘respect for the 
individual’, balancing organizational and 
individual needs, and developing people 
to their maximum level of competence 
both for their own satisfaction and to 
facilitate the achievement of 
organizational objectives. 
HRM attaches more importance to the 
management of culture and the 
achievement of commitment (mutuality). 
Both personnel management and HRM 
recognize that one of their most essential 
functions is that of matching people to 
ever-changing organizational 
requirements – placing and developing 
the right people in and for the right jobs. 
HRM places more emphasis on the role 
of line managers as the implementers of 
HR policies. 
The same range of selection, competence 
analysis, performance management, 
training, management development and 
reward management techniques are used 
both in HRM and in personnel 
management. 
HRM is a holistic approach concerned 
with the total interests of the business – 
the interests of the members of the 
organization are recognized but 
subordinated to those of the enterprise. 
Personnel management, like the ‘soft’ 
version of HRM, attaches importance to 
the processes of communication and 
participation within an employee 
relations systems. 
HR specialists are expected to be 
business partners rather than personnel 
administrators. 
 





Appendix 16: Questionnaire (North West Province) 
 
The questions in this questionnaire are designed to solicit your opinion on a number 
of issues pertaining to human resource management in your local authority. There is 
no right or wrong answer. You may indicate your opinion by an ‘X’ in one of the five 
options aligned to the right of every question. Please make only one selection except 
where instructed otherwise. In the event your opinion does not match any of the 
available options, please choose the one that is closest to your considered judgement, 
and one that best describes the situation as it prevails in your organisation but not 
what you feel should be the case. 
 
The confidentially of your responses is guaranteed. Your identity will not be passed 
over to any third party without your consent. The biographical data requested below is 




1. Name of Respondent: ……………………………………………………………….. 
2. Gender: Male     1 Female           2 3. Age ……………… 
4. Educational Level …………………… 5. Field of Training ……………………...... 
6. Position Held ………………………………… 7. Number of Years in Post ……..... 
8. Name of Organisation ………………………………………………………………. 
9. Type of Municipality:  
Mayoral Executive           1 Committee Executive    2    
Plenary Executive         3           
 




1. Does the national economy provide a supportive environment for the efficient 
functioning of your organisation? 
 
a) A very supportive environment          5 
b) A supportive environment           4 
c) A fairly supportive environment          3 
d) A not so supportive environment          2 







2. Does the socio-political environment provide a supportive environment for the   
efficient functioning of your organisation? 
 
a) A very supportive environment          5 
b) A supportive environment           4  
c) A fairly supportive environment                     3  
d) A not so supportive environment          2 
e) The environment is not supportive at all         1 
 
3. Mechanisms to ensure the autonomy of local government/administration are 
efficient and effective. 
 
a) Strongly agree                        5  
b) Agree                          4  
c) Disagree                        3  
d) Strongly disagree            2 
e) Don’t know                        1  
 
4. Government procedures for the allocation of resources between local authorities 
provide for:  
                                                                                                                                   
a) A fully equitable distribution                      5      
b) A moderately equitable distribution                     4  
c) A fairly equitable distribution           3 
d) A rarely equitable distribution                      2  






5. Do local governments/administrations have clear organisational structures with 
clearly defined lines of authority? 
 
a) Clear organisational structures           5  
b) Somewhat clear organisational structures                    4  
c) Fairly clear organisational structures                     3  
d) Not so clear organisational structures          2 





6. Local governments/administrations have adequate capacity to manage the 
decentralised responsibilities 
 
a) Strongly agree             5 
b) Agree               4 
c) Disagree             3 
d) Strongly disagree            2  
e) Don’t know                        1  
 
7. Are there adequate material resources at the disposal of your organisation for it to 
perform its functions efficiently?  
 
a) Adequate material resources              5  
b) Moderately adequate material resources            4 
c) Fairly adequate material resources             3 
d) Inadequate material resources              2 
e) Not adequate at all               1 
 
8. To what extent is your organisation responsible for the welfare of its employees? 
 
a) To a great extent               5  
b) Significant extent               4 
c) Moderately involved               3 
d) Limited extent                 2 
e) Not involved at all               1 
 
9. In dealing with staff matters in your organisation, do you ordinarily deal with 
them  
 
Collectively       1   Individually         2 
 
 
10. When you have a different opinion with your superior and he/she insists on their 
position even when the facts show s/he may be in the wrong, what would you 
consider as the most important factor that could determine your next action? 
Please order the following possible responses according to the most important to 
the least important in this regard, with 1 representing the most important, 2 the 
next, until 4 which is the least important. 
 
Respect for seniority        
The interest of the organisation       
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II. HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY 
 
11. Does your organisation or the government have a human resource management 
policy? 
 
Yes       1  No         2  I don’t know            3 
 
 
12. Who is responsible for your organisation’s human resource management policy? 
 
a) The council/municipality           5 
b) HR Unit/department                       4   
c) The Ministry responsible for local government                   3  
d) A local government association                                2  
e) I don’t know                        1  
 
 
13. Clear systems exist that clarify each stakeholder’s role in the management of 
human resource management policy? 
 
a) Strongly agree                                   5  
b) Agree              4 
c) Disagree                        3  
d) Strongly disagree            2  
e) Don’t know             1 
 
14. Are there some decentralised human resource management responsibilities that 
your organisation is responsible for? 
 
Yes              1    No         2  I don’t know            3 
 
15. To what level have the human resource management responsibilities been 
decentralised to your organisation? 
 
a) Fully decentralised                       5  
b) Decentralised all the posts below top management posts                  4  
c) Only decentralised middle management positions to below                  3  
d) Only the junior positions decentralised                     2  







16. Does your organisation have the technical capacity to manage the decentralised 
responsibilities? 
 
a) Adequate capacity             5 
b) Some capacity              4 
c) Limited capacity                        3  
d) Poor capacity                         2  
e) Not applicable              1 
 
17. If the answer is not ‘A’ above, who performs the responsibilities which your 




18. What role do trade unions or staff associations have in the HR policy process? 
 
a) A major role                        5  
b) A significant role                       4  
c) A not so significant role           3 
d) A minor role                        2  
e) No role at all                        1  
 
19. Does the organisation have the mission and vision statements? 
 
Yes                 1  No         2  I don’t know           3  
 
20. If yes, are these statements readily accessible to all staff members in the 
organisation? 
 
Yes      1  No         2   I don’t know         3 
 
21. Does your organisation have a functioning strategic plan? 
 










III. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
Human Resource Planning 
 
22. Does your organisation do the staffing plans? 
 




23. Do the staffing plans reflect congruence with the organisation’s strategic plan? 
 
Yes      1  No         2  I don’t know         3 
 
24. Who is responsible for the approval of staffing plans in your organisation? 
 
a) A special committee            5 
b) HR Unit/department            4 
c) Unit/departmental Heads           3 
d) Chief Executive Officer           2  
e) The ministry/department responsible for local government       1 
 
25. Is HIV/AIDS a factor to reckon with in the HR planning process? 
 
a) A serious factor to consider           5 
b) A somewhat serious factor to consider         4  
c) Moderately considered            3  
d) Rarely considered            2  
e) Never considered             1  
 
Recruitment, Deployment and Promotion 
 
26. Who is responsible for the recruitment of the staff that serve in your organisation? 
 
a) HR Unit/department            5 
b) Outsourced              4 
c) Chief Executive Officer           3 
d) The ministry/department responsible for local government       2 






27. Is the current recruitment practice geared towards the achievement of the 
organisation’s mission and objectives? 
 
Yes      1  No         2  I don’t know         3  
 
 
28. The recruitment processes in your organisation are transparent and competitive? 
 
a) Strongly agree                5 
b) Agree                   4  
c) Disagree             3 
d) Strongly disagree            2 
e) Don’t know              1 
 
29. Are staff deployed according to job descriptions? 
 
a) Always              5 
b) Very often             4 
c) Sometimes             3 
d) Rarely              2 
e) Not at all             1 
 
30. Who is responsible for the promotion of the staff in your organisation? 
 
a) A special committee within the local authority        5 
b) HR Unit/department            4 
c) Unit/departmental Heads           3 
d) Chief executive Officer           2 
e) The ministry/department responsible for local government       1  
  
 
31. If there is the practice of transferring staff in your local authority, who is 
responsible for that? 
 
a) The local authority         5 
b) HR Unit/department          4 
c) The ministry/department responsible for local government    3  
d) Chief Executive Officer        2  
e) I don’t know          1  
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32. Do you find the practice of transferring staff between local authorities a good 
practice? 
   
a) A good practice          5 
b) Somewhat good practice                    4  
c) A fairly good practice         3 
d) A bad practice           2  
e) Not applicable          1 
           
  
 
33. Please rank the following problems from 1 to 8, giving one to the most serious 
human resource management problem in your local authority within the box 
opposite to your preferred choice, 2 to the next most serious, … and so on, until 8 
to the least serious. 
 
Corruption          
Inadequate funding        
Lack of skilled labour     
HIV/AIDS          
Lack of job security        
Uncompetitive salaries        
Uncompetitive work conditions 
Lack of autonomy         
  
           
Remuneration and Rewards 
 
34. Are salaries clearly structured? 
 
Yes      1  No            2 I don’t know            3 
   
 
35. Are salaries competitive? 
 
Yes   1  No      2  I don’t  know            3 







36. Are non-monetary benefits clearly articulated and competitive? 
 
Yes   1  No      2  I don’t know            3 
   
 
37. The remuneration in your organisation is not strongly linked to the employee’s 
performance? 
 
a) Strongly agree          5 
b) Agree           4 
c) Disagree          3 
d) Strongly disagree         2 
e) Don’t know          1 
   
 
 
Training and Development  
 
 
38.  There are clear policy guidelines for training and development. 
 
a) Strongly agree          5 
b) Agree           4  
c) Disagree           3 
d) Strongly disagree         2 
e) Don’t know          1 
  
 
39. Is there a clear criteria for identifying training needs within the organisation? 
 
a) There is a clear criteria         5 
b) Somewhat clear criteria        4 
c) Fairly clear criteria         3 
d) No clear criteria         2 
e) No criteria at all         1 






40. Please order the following possible factors that may be used for selecting staff for 
training, from 1 to 5 with 1 being the most relevant and 5 the least relevant. 
 
Seniority of staff         
Organisational capacity needs       
Prerogative of the ministry/department responsible for     
local government          
Performance review        
Personal relationships         
Employee initiative        
     
 
41. Who determines or identifies the staff members’ training needs? 
 
a) Individual staff initiative        5 
b) Heads of Departments/Units        4 
c) HR department/unit         3 
d) A special committee         2  
e) Ministry/department responsible for local government    1 
           
  
42. Does your organisation have adequate funding for training and development of its 
staff? 
 
a) Adequate funding                    5 
b) Somewhat adequate funding                   4 
c) Fairly adequate funding        3  
d) Funding  rarely available        2 
e) Not adequate at all         1 
           
  
43. Do staffs participate in decisions about their training and development? 
 
a) They always participate        5 
b) They participate quite often       4 
c) Sometimes they do participate        3 
d) They rarely participate                    2 






44. Order the following modes of training from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most common 
and 5 the least common method of training in your organisation.  
 
On the job training        
Workshops/seminars         
Short courses (eg 3 months, 6 weeks, etc)      
Distance education         
Long term training (eg certificate, diploma, degree, etc)     
 
 
45. After training staffs are not deployed in positions where they will apply their 
newly acquired skills. 
 
a) Strongly agree          5 
b) Agree           4 
c) Disagree          3 
d) Strongly disagree         2 




46. How would you describe the turnover rate in your organisation? 
 
a) Very high          5  
b) High           4 
c) Moderate                     3 
d) Low                      2 
e) Very low          1 
  
 
47. The vacancy rate in your organisation is … 
 
a) Very high          5 
b) High                      4 
c) Moderate                     3 
d) Low                      2 
e) Very low                     1 
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48. According to the organisation structure of your organisation at what level is 
turnover heaviest? 
 
a) Top management          5 
b) Middle management          4 
c) Technical level           3 
d) Artisan level           2 
e) Other (specify) …………………………………………    1 
  
 
49. Do you conduct exit interviews among your staffs that are resigning from their 
posts? 
 
a) Always           5 
b) Quite often          4  
c) Sometimes          3 
d) Rarely           2  





50. If you have conducted exit interviews in the past, what are the most common 
factors that make employees to leave your organisation? Please order the factors 
stated below from 1 to 8, beginning with the most prevalent to the least common 
factor. 
 
Dissatisfaction with remuneration     
Lack of promotion prospects       
Poor working conditions        
Level of development of town in which organisation located   
Distance/remoteness of town from national/provincial capital    
Employee relations        
Distance from home town or ethnic cleavages     









IV. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT  
 
51. Does the organisation have a functional performance management system in 
place? 
 
Yes         1  No            2 I don’t know            3 
   
 
 
52. If yes, how often is performance appraisal performed annually? 
 
a) Quarterly or more         5 
b) Three times          4 
c) Twice           3 
d) Once           2 
e) Never           1 
  
 
53. Is the performance appraisal/review linked in a significant manner with rewards 
and sanctions for employees? 
 
a) There are strong links         5 
b) Linked           4 
c) Somewhat linked         3 
d) Weakly linked          2  
e) Not linked at all         1 
 
 
54. The performance appraisal/review and the organisational objectives are strongly 
linked. 
 
a) Strongly Agree          5 
b) Agree           4  
c) Disagree          3  
d) Strongly disagree         2  






55. Is the performance review of employees used to identify their capacity needs? 
 
a) Always           5  
b) Often times          4 
c) Sometimes          3 
d) Rarely           2  
e) Not at all          1 
     
 
56. Are the results from the performance reviews used to make adjustments to 
employees’ work objectives? 
 
a) Always           5 
b) Often times          4  
c) Sometimes          3  
d) Rarely           2  
e) Not at all          1 
  
 
57. Employee performance in your organisation has improved because of the 
performance reviews? 
 
a) Strongly agree          5 
b) Agree           4  
c) Disagree          3  
d) Strongly disagree         2 
e) Don’t know          1 
  
 
58. Are baseline data and performance improvement data analysed regularly? 
 
a) Always           5 
b) Often times          4 
c) Sometimes          3 
d) Rarely           2 




59. Who drives the performance management system in your organisation? 
 
a) Top management of the local authority      5 
b) Managers and supervisors in the local authority     4  
c) The ministry/department responsible for local government    3  
d) Politicians          2  
e) Other (specify) ………………………………………………    1 
  
 
60. Are there any of your staff members on fixed-term employment? 
 
Yes   1 No         2  Not applicable            3  
   
 
 
61. Are those not on fixed term employment also involved in the performance 
management system? 
 
Yes   1 No         2  Not applicable            3  
 
 
62. How would you describe the performance management in your organisation? 
 
a) Very successful                  5  
b) Successful                  4  
c) Moderately successful                 3  
d) Failing                    2  
e) Totally failed                  1 











Appendix 17: Questionnaire (Botswana) 
 
The questions in this questionnaire are designed to solicit your opinion on a number 
of issues pertaining to human resource management in your local authority. There is 
no right or wrong answer. You may indicate your opinion by an ‘X’ in one of the five 
options aligned to the right of every question. Please make only one selection except 
where instructed otherwise. In the event your opinion does not match any of the 
available options, please choose the one that is closest to your considered judgement, 
and one that best describes the situation as it prevails in your organisation but not 
what you feel should be the case. 
 
The confidentially of your responses is guaranteed. Your identity will not be passed 
over to any third party without your consent. The biographical data requested below is 




1. Name of Respondent: ……………………………………………………………….. 
2. Gender: Male            1 Female              2  3. Age ……………… 
4. Educational Level …………………… 5. Field of Training ……………………...... 
6. Position Held ………………………………… 7. Number of Years in Post ……..... 
8. Name of Organisation ………………………………………………………………. 
9. Type of Council: Urban           1     District              2 
 




1. Does the national economy provide a supportive environment for the efficient 
functioning of your organisation? 
 
a) A very supportive environment          5 
b) A supportive environment           4 
c) A fairly supportive environment          3 
d) A not so supportive environment          2 
e) Not supportive at all                       1  
 
2. Does the socio-political environment provide a supportive environment for the   
efficient functioning of your organisation? 
 
a) A very supportive environment          5 
b) A supportive environment           4  
c) A fairly supportive environment                     3  
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d) A not so supportive environment          2 
e) The environment is not supportive at all         1 
 
3. Mechanisms to ensure the autonomy of local government/administration are 
efficient and effective. 
 
a) Strongly agree                        5  
b) Agree                          4  
c) Disagree                        3  
d) Strongly disagree            2 
e) Don’t know                        1  
 
4. Government procedures for the allocation of resources between local authorities 
provide for:  
                                                                                                                                   
a) A fully equitable distribution                      5      
b) A moderately equitable distribution                     4  
c) A fairly equitable distribution           3 
d) A rarely equitable distribution                      2  






5. Do local governments/administrations have clear organisational structures with 
clearly defined lines of authority? 
 
a) Clear organisational structures           5  
b) Somewhat clear organisational structures                    4  
c) Fairly clear organisational structures                     3  
d) Not so clear organisational structures          2 
e) Organisational structures not clear at all         1 
 
6. Local governments/administrations have adequate capacity to manage 
decentralised responsibilities effectively 
 
a) Strongly agree             5 
b) Agree              4 
c) Disagree             3 
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d) Strongly disagree            2  
e) Don’t know                        1  
 
7. Are there adequate material resources at the disposal of your organisation for it to 
perform its functions efficiently?  
 
a) Adequate material resources              5  
b) Moderately adequate material resources            4 
c) Fairly adequate material resources             3 
d) Inadequate material resources              2 
e) Not adequate at all               1 
 
8. To what extent is your organisation responsible for the welfare of its employees? 
 
a) To a great extent               5  
b) Significant extent               4 
c) Moderately involved               3 
d) Limited extent                 2 
e) Not involved at all               1 
 
9. In dealing with staff matters in your organisation, do you ordinarily deal with 
them  
 
Collectively       1   Individually         2 
 
 
10. When you have a different opinion with your superior and he/she insists on their 
position even when the facts show s/he may be in the wrong, what would you 
consider as the most important factor that could determine your next action? 
Please order the following possible responses according to the most important to 
the least important in this regard, with 1 representing the most important, 2 the 
next, until 4 which is the least important. 
 
Respect for seniority        
The interest of the organisation       
The merits of the case        
 
II. HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY 
 
11. Does your organisation or the government have a human resource management 
policy? 
 





12. Who is responsible for your organisation’s human resource management policy? 
 
a) The council/municipality           5 
b) HR Unit/department                       4   
c) The Ministry responsible for local government                   3  
d) A local government association                                2  
e) I don’t know                        1  
 
 
13. Clear systems exist that clarify each stakeholder’s role in the management of 
human resource management policy? 
 
a) Strongly agree                                   5  
b) Agree              4 
c) Disagree                        3  
d) Strongly disagree            2  
e) I don’t know             1 
 
14. Are there some decentralised human resource management responsibilities that 
your organisation is responsible for? 
 
Yes              1    No         2  I don’t know            3 
 
15. To what level have the human resource management responsibilities been 
decentralised to your organisation? 
 
a) Fully decentralised                       5  
b) Decentralised all the posts below top management posts                  4  
c) Only decentralised middle management positions to below                  3  
d) Only the junior positions decentralised                     2  
e) Not decentralised at all                       1  
 
 
16. Does your organisation have the technical capacity to manage the decentralised 
HRM responsibilities? 
 
a) Adequate capacity             5 
b) Some capacity              4 
c) Limited capacity                        3  
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d) Poor capacity                         2  
e) Not applicable              1 
 
17. If the answer is not ‘A’ above, who performs the responsibilities which your 




18. What role do trade unions or staff associations have in the HR policy process? 
 
a) A major role                        5  
b) A significant role                       4  
c) A not so significant role           3 
d) A minor role                        2  
e) No role at all                        1  
 
19. Does the organisation have the mission and vision statements? 
 
Yes                 1  No         2  I don’t know           3  
 
20. If yes, are these statements readily accessible to all staff members in the 
organisation? 
 
Yes      1  No         2   I don’t know         3 
 
21. Does your organisation have a functioning strategic plan? 
 
Yes      1  No         2  I don’t know           3  
 
III. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
Human Resource Planning 
 
22. Does your organisation do the staffing plans? 
 
Yes      1  No         2   I don’t know         3 
 
23. Do the staffing plans reflect congruence with the organisation’s strategic plan? 
 










24. Who is responsible for the approval of staffing plans in your organisation? 
 
a) A special committee            5 
b) HR Unit/department            4 
c) Unit/departmental Heads           3 
d) Chief Executive Officer           2  
e) The ministry/department responsible for local government       1 
 
 
25. Is HIV/AIDS a factor to reckon with in the HR planning process? 
 
a) A serious factor to consider           5 
b) A somewhat serious factor to consider         4  
c) Moderately considered            3  
d) Rarely considered            2  
e) Never considered             1  
 
 
Recruitment, Deployment and Promotion 
 
26. Who is responsible for the recruitment of the staff that serve in your organisation? 
 
a) HR Unit/department            5 
b) Unit/departmental Heads           4 
c) Chief executive Officer           3 
d) The ministry/department responsible for local government       2 
e) I don’t know             1 
 
27. Is the current recruitment practice geared towards the achievement of the 
organisation’s mission and objectives? 
 
Yes      1  No         2  I don’t know         3  
 
28. The recruitment processes in your organisation are transparent and competitive? 
 
a) Strongly agree             5 
b) Agree              4 
c) Disagree             3 
d) Strongly disagree            2 




29. Are staffs deployed according to job descriptions? 
 
a) Always              5 
b) Very often             4 
c) Sometimes             3 
d) Rarely              2 
e) Not at all             1 
 
30. Who is responsible for the promotion of the staff in your organisation? 
 
a) A special committee within the local authority        5 
b) HR Unit/department            4 
c) Unit/departmental Heads           3 
d) Chief Executive Officer           2 
e) The ministry/department responsible for local government       1  
  
 
31. If there is the practice of transferring staff in your local authority, who is 
responsible for that? 
 
a) The local authority         5 
b) HR Unit/department          4 
c) The ministry/department responsible for local government    3  
d) Chief Executive Officer        2  
e) I don’t know          1  
           
  
32. Do you find the practice of transferring staff between local authorities a good 
practice? 
  5 
a) A good practice         
b) Somewhat good practice                    4  
c) A fairly good practice         3 
d) A bad practice           2  
e) Not applicable          1 







33. Please rank the following problems from 1 to 8, giving one to the most serious 
human resource management problem in your local authority within the box 
opposite to your preferred choice, 2 to the next most serious, … and so on, until 8 
to the least serious. 
 
Corruption          
Inadequate funding        
Lack of skilled labour     
HIV/AIDS          
Lack of job security        
Uncompetitive salaries        
Uncompetitive work conditions 
Lack of autonomy         
  
           
Remuneration and Rewards 
 
34. Are salaries clearly structured? 
 
Yes      1  No            2 I don’t know            3 
   
 
 
35. Are salaries competitive? 
 
Yes   1  No      2  I don’t  know            3 
   
 
36. Are non-monetary benefits clearly articulated and competitive? 
 
Yes   1  No      2  I don’t know            3 
   
 
37. The remuneration in your organisation is not strongly linked to the employee’s 
performance? 
 
a) Strongly agree          5 
b) Agree           4 
c) Disagree          3 
d) Strongly disagree         2 
e) Don’t know          1 




Training and Development  
 
 
38.  The HR policy contains  clear guidelines for  training and development. 
 
a) Strongly agree          5 
b) Agree           4  
c) Disagree           3 
d) Strongly disagree         2 
e) Don’t know          1 
  
39. Is there a clear criteria for identifying training needs within the organisation? 
 
a) There is a clear criteria         5 
b) Somewhat clear criteria        4 
c) Fairly clear criteria         3 
d) No clear criteria         2 
e) No criteria at all         1 
   
 
40. Please order the following possible criteria used for selecting staff for training, 
from 1 to 5 with 1 being the most relevant and 5 the least relevant. 
 
Seniority of staff         
Organisational capacity needs       
Prerogative of the ministry/department responsible for     
local government          
Performance review        
Personal relationships         
Employee initiative        
     
41. Who determines or identifies the staff members’ training needs? 
 
a) A special committee         5 
b) Heads of Departments/Units        4 
c) HR department/unit         3 
d) Ministry/department responsible for local government    2  
e) Individual staff initiative        1 
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42. Does your organisation have adequate funding for training and development of its 
staff? 
 
a) Adequate funding                    5 
b) Somewhat adequate funding                   4 
c) Fairly adequate funding        3  
d) Funding  rarely available        2 
e) Not adequate at all         1 
           
  
43. Do staffs participate in decisions about their training and development? 
 
a) They always participate        5 
b) They participate quite often       4 
c) Sometimes they do participate        3 
d) They rarely participate                    2 
e) Not at all          1 
  
 
44. Order the following modes of training from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most common 
and 5 the least common method of training in your organisation.  
 
On the job training        
Workshops/seminars         
Short courses (e.g. several weeks to a few months)     
Distance education         
Long term training (e.g. certificate, diploma, degree, etc)   
           
  
45. After training staffs are not deployed in positions where they will apply their 
newly acquired skills. 
 
a) Strongly agree          5 
b) Agree           4 
c) Disagree          3 
d) Strongly disagree         2 







46. How would you describe the turnover rate in your organisation? 
 
a) Very high          5  
b) High           4 
c) Moderate                     3 
d) Low                      2 
e) Very low          1 
  
 
47. The vacancy rate in your organisation is … 
 
a) Very high          5 
b) High                      4 
c) Moderate                     3 
d) Low                      2 
e) Very low                     1 
           
  
48. According to the organisation structure of your organisation at what level is 
turnover heaviest? 
 
a) Top management          5 
b) Middle management          4 
c) Technical level           3 
d) Artisan level           2 
e) Other (specify) …………………………………………    1 
  
 
49. Do you conduct exit interviews among your staffs that are resigning from their 
posts? 
 
a) Always           5 
b) Quite often          4  
c) Sometimes          3 
d) Rarely           2  





50. If you have conducted exit interviews in the past, what are the most common 
factors that make employees to leave your organisation? Please order the factors 
stated below from 1 to 8, beginning with the most prevalent to the least common 
factor. 
 
Dissatisfaction with remuneration     
Lack of promotion prospects       
Poor working conditions        
Level of development of town in which organisation located   
Distance of town from national/provincial capital    
Employee relations        
Distance/remoteness from home town or ethnic cleavages    
Ill health          
 
 
IV. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT  
 
51. Does the organisation have a functional performance management system in 
place? 
 
Yes         1  No            2 I don’t know            3 
   
 
 
52. If yes, how often is performance appraisal performed annually? 
 
a) Quarterly or more         5 
b) Three times          4 
c) Twice           3 
d) Once           2 
e) Never           1 
  
53. Is the performance appraisal/review linked in a significant manner with rewards 
and sanctions for employees? 
 
a) There are strong links         5 
b) Linked           4 
c) Somewhat linked         3 
d) Weakly linked          2  




54. The performance appraisal/review and the organisational objectives are strongly 
linked 
 
a) Strongly agree           5 
b) Agree           4  
c) Disagree          3  
d) Strongly disagree         2  
e) Don’t know          1 
  
 
55. Is the performance review of employees used to identify their capacity needs? 
 
a) Always           5  
b) Often times          4 
c) Sometimes          3 
d) Rarely           2  
e) Not at all          1 
     
 
56. Are the results from the performance reviews used to make adjustments to 
employees’ work objectives? 
 
a) Always           5 
b) Often times          4  
c) Sometimes          3  
d) Rarely           2  
e) Not at all          1  
 
57. Employee performance in your organisation has improved because of the 
performance reviews. 
 
a) Strongly agree          5 
b) Agree           4  
c) Disagree          3  
d) Strongly disagree         2 





58. Are baseline data and performance improvement data analysed regularly? 
 
a) Always           5 
b) Often times          4 
c) Sometimes          3 
d) Rarely           2 
e) Never           1 
  
 
59. Who drives the performance management system in your organisation? 
 
a) Top management of the local authority      5 
b) Managers and supervisors in the local authority     4  
c) The ministry/department responsible for local government    3  
d) Politicians          2  
e) Other (specify) ………………………………………………    1 
  
 
60. Are there any of your staff members on fixed-term employment? 
 
Yes   1 No         2  Not applicable            3  




61. Are those not on fixed term employment also involved in the performance 
management system? 
 
Yes   1 No         2  Not applicable            3  
 
 
62. How would you describe the performance management in your organisation? 
 
a) Very successful                  5  
b) Successful                  4  
c) Moderately successful                 3  
d) Failing                    2  
e) Totally failed                  1 





63. Has your organisation adopted the Work Improvement Teams strategy (WITS)? 
 
Yes      1 No         2  Not applicable       3  
 
 
64. Has the WITS programme been successful or not as a performance management 
tool? 
 
a) Very successful          5 
b) Somewhat successful         4  
c) Moderately successful         3  
d) Not successful at all         2  























1. Please explain as to whether in your opinion the economy offers or does not offer 
a conducive environment for the efficient operation of the local governments? 
 
2. Please explain as to whether the socio-political environment offers or does not 
offer a conducive environment for the efficient and effective performance by the 
local governments. 
 
3. In your opinion do you think the government system in your country guarantees 
the autonomy of local governments? 
 
4. Are the central-local government relations in your country appropriate for the 
efficient management of social and economic development? 
 
5. Are there any significant socio-cultural factors that you think may have influenced 
the character or nature of the management of your country’s public institutions? 
 
6. Does the labour market satisfy the demand for labour especially for local 
governments?  
 
7. Do trade unions play any role in the management of human resources? 
 
8. What role do local government associations play in the management of human 
resources? 
 
9. Do international or regional organisations play any major role in local government 
issues in your country? 
 
10. If they do, can you identify which ones they are? 
 
11. If they don’t can you explain why they don’t play any significant role in local 




12. What would you consider as the organisational strengths and weaknesses of local 
governments in terms of human resource management? 
 
13. Is seniority an important value when considering people for promotion from one 
post to another or from one salary band to another? 
 
14. Are there any cultural values and beliefs that may have been adapted for use in the 






Human Resource Management Concept 
 
15. Do local governments have a distinctive human resource management policy? 
 
16. Are there any linkages between HRM policy and the organisation’s strategy? 
 
17. If there are linkages, how are those linkages established? 
 
18. Who else besides government is involved in HR policy formulation?  
 
Human Resource Management Practices 
 
19. Are there any HRM practices that are performed outside of the local authorities? 
If so, which are these and why are they performed by another entity other than the 
local authorities? 
 
20. Do you find the current arrangement efficient for the running of local 
governments? 
 
21. Of the HRM practices that you are responsible for, do you think the local 




22. How is performance managed in the local governments? 
 
23. Do the local governments manage performance effectively? 
 
24. Is there a feedback process on information on performance management outcomes 
for employees and the organisation? 
 
25. Is there an analysis of, and linkages of the performance management outcomes 






Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A. (2001) An African Success 
Story: Botswana. Department of Economics Working Paper No. 01-37. Massachussets 
Institute of Technology (MIT).  http://ssm.com/ 
 
Adamolekun, Ladipo. (2005) Re-Orienting Public Management in Africa: Selected Issues and 
Some Country Experiences. Economic Research Working Paper No. 81. African 
Development Bank. 
 
Ahmed, Junaid., Devarajan Shantayanan, Khemani Stuti and Shah Shekhar. (2005) 
Decentralization and Service Delivery.  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3603, May. World Bank.  
 
Alreck, Pamela L. and Settle, Robert B. (1995) The Survey Research Handbook: Guidelines 
and Strategies for Conducting a Survey. New York. McGraw-Hill. 
 
Andrews, Matthew and Larry Schroeder. (2003) Sectoral Decentralisation and 
Intergovernmental Arrangements in Africa. Public Administration and Development, 
Vol. 23, pp29-40.  
 
Armstrong, Michael and Baron, Angela. (2002) Strategic HRM: The Key to Improved 
Business Performance. London. Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.  
 
Armstrong, Michael. (2006) Strategic Human Resource Management: A Guide to Action (3rd 
edition). London and Philadelphia. Kogan Page. 
 
Arthur, Brian W. (1989) Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by 
Historical Events. The Economic Journal, 99, pp116-131. 
 
Ayee, Joseph. (2004) Ghana: A Top-Down Initiative. In Dele Olowu and James S. Wunsch, 
(eds.), Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization. 
Boulder and London. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
BNPC (2005) Botswana National Productivity Centre. Services Overview. 
http://www.bnpc.bw/index.php 
 
Bach, Stephen. (2001) HR and New Approaches to Public Sector Management: Improving 
HRM Capacity. Workshop on Global Health Workforce Strategy. World Health 
Organisation. 
 
Bach, Stephen. (2000) Decentralization and privatization in municipal services: The case of 
health services. Sectoral Activities Programme, Working Paper. Geneva, International 
Labour Office. 
 




Baker, B. (2002). Living with Non-State Policing in South Africa: The Issues and Dilemmas. 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 40: 27-53. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab and Mookherjee, Dilip. (2006) Decentralization and Local Governance in 
Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, Massachussets. The 
Massachussets Institute of Technology Press. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab. (2002) Decentralization of Governance and Development. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp 185-205.  
 
Barney, Jay. (1991) Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of 
Management, Vol. 17, No 1, pp99-120. 
 
Bartlet, Dean and Dibben Pauline. (2002) Public Sector Innovation and Entrepreneurship: 
Case Studies from Local Government. Local Government Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 
(Winter), pp107-121. London. Frank Cass. 
 
Batley, R. and Larbi, George. (2004) The Changing Role of Government: The reform of 
Public Services in Developing Countries. Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Beattie, Rona and Waterhouse, Jennifer M, (2007) Human Resource Management in the 
Public Sector: Getting the Mix Right. In Proceedings 11th International Research 
Symposium of Public Management (IRSPM XI), pp1-10, Potsdam, Germany. 
 
Beardwell, Ian, Holden Len and Claydon Tim, (Editors). (2004) Human Resource 
Management: A Contemporary Approach (4th Edition). Harlow. Prentice Hall.  
 
Becker, Brian and Gerhart, Barry. (1996) The Impact of Human Resource Management on 
Organizational Performance: Progress and Prospects. The Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp779 – 801. 
 
Blunt, P. and Poopola, O. (1985) Personnel Management in Africa. London and New York. 
Longman. 
 
BIDPA. (2004). The State of Governance in Botswana: Final Report. Gaborone. BIDPA and 
UNECA.  
 
Bolton, Nicola and Steve, Leach. (2002) Strategic Planning in Local Government: A Study of 
Organisational Impact and Effectiveness. Local government Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 
(Winter), pp1-21. London. Frank Cass. 
 
Bond, Rod and Smith Peter B. (1996) Culture and Conformity: A Meat-Analysis of Studies 
Using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgement Task. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 119, 
No. 1, pp111-137.  
 
Boychuk, G.W. (2006) Historical Institutionalism and Health Insurance: Path Dependence 
and Public Health Insurance in the United States and Canada. Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, 




Boxall, Peter. (1999) The Strategic HRM Debate and the Resource-based View of the Firm. 
In Schuler, Randall S. and Jackson, Susan E (eds). Strategic Human Resource 
Management. 
 
Brown, Chris. (1999). Decentralisation in Botswana: An Assessment and Proposals for the 
Future. Unpublished Paper. Charlton Univiersity, Ottawa, Canada.   
 
Brown, Kerry. (2004) Human Resource Management in the Public Sector. Public 
Management Review, Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp303-309. Tailor and Francis, Ltd. 
 
Bryman, Alan. (1988) Doing Research in Organisations. London. Routledge. 
 
Buchanan, James M. (1978) Markets, States, and the Extent of Morals. The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 364-368. 
 
Budhwar, Pawan S and Debrah, Yaw A., (eds). (2003) Human Resource Management in 
Developing Countries. London and New York. Routledge. 
 
Budhwar, Pawan S and Debrah, Yaw A. (2003) Introduction. In Budhwar, Pawan S and 
Debrah, Yaw A., (eds) Human Resource Management in Developing Countries. 
London and New York. Routledge. 
 
Budhwar, Pawan S., and Debrah, Yaw. (2001) Rethinking comparative and cross-national 
human resource management research. International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, Vol., 12, No. 3, (May), pp 497-515. 
 
Burgess, Robert G. (Ed.) (1982) Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual. London. 
George Allen and Unwin. 
 
CDC (1999) Central District Council Policy on Decentralistion of 12th August 1999. Central 
District Council. 
 
Campbell, Colin. (1998) Lessons from the Failure of Managerialism in Britain.  In Halligan, 
John, (ed.) Public Service Reform. IASIA. 
 
Carmeli, A. and Cohen, A. (2001) The Financial Crisis of Local Authorities in Israel: A 
Resource-Based analysis. Public Administration and Development, Vol. 79, No. 4, 
pp893-913. 
 
Cesh Maria, Ardichvili Alexandre, Gasparishvili Alexander, and Krisztián Béla, and 
Nemeskéri Zsolt. (2004) Organisational Culture and Socio-cultural Values: 
Perceptions of managers and employees in five Economies in Transition. 
Performance Improvement Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp5-27. 
 
Charney, Craig. (1999). Civil Society, Political Violence and democratic Transitions: 
Business and the Peace Process in South Africa, 1990 to 1994. Society for 
Comparative Study of Society and History, http://journals.cambridge.org/ 
 





City Press. (2005b) Speaker faces corruption and intimidation charges. 21 August 2005. 
Johannesburg. 
 
City Press. (2005c) 28 August 2005. 
 
Collier, R.B. and Collier, D. (2002). Shaping the Political Agenda: Critical Junctures, the 
Labour Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Notre Dame, IN. Notre 
Dame University Press.  
 
Creswell, John W. (2003) Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (2nd ed.). London. SAGE Publications. 
 
Crook, Richard C. (2003) Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of 
Local-Central Relations. Public Administration and Development, Vol. 23, pp77-88.  
 
Crook, Richard C. and Manor, James. (1998) Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia 
and West Africa: Participation, accountability and Performance. Cambridge. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Curtis, Donald (1999). Performance management for participatory democracy: thoughts on 
the transformation process in South African local government. International Journal 
of Public Sector Management, Vol. 12, Issue 3, pp260-273. 
 
Daily News (2006) Council Pays for Ghost Development Projects. Vol. No. 218. Botswana 
Press Agency. Gaborone. 
 
Daily News. (2006) Daisy Loo Dismisses 34 Workers. Gaborone. BOPA.  
 
Daily News. (2006) Govt urged to reconsider moratorium on manpower growth. Gaborone. 
BOPA. 
 
Daley, Dennis M. (2002) Strategic Human Resource Management: People and Performance 
Management in the Public Sector. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. Prentice Hall. 
 
Daley, Dennis M. and Michael, L., Vasu. (2005) Supervisory Perceptions of the Impact of 
Public Sector Personnel Practices on the Achievement of Multiple Goals: Putting the 
Strategic into Human Resources management. American Review of Public 
Administration, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp157-167. 
 
David, Paul A. (1985) Clio and the economics of QWERTY. The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 75, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association, pp 332-337. American Economic 
Association. 
 
David, Paul, A. (2000) Path dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical economics’. 




David, Paul, A. (1997) Path Dependence and the Quest for Historical Economics: One More 
Chorus of the Ballad of QWERTY. Discussion Papers in Economic and Social 
History. University of Oxford 
 
de Bruijn, Hans. (2002) Managing Performance in the Public Sector. London and New York. 
Routledge. 
 
Delery, John E, and Doty, Harold D. (1996) Modes of Theorizing in Strategic Human 
Resource Management: Tests of Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational 
Performance Predictions. The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 
pp802 – 835. Academy of Management. 
 
Democratic Alliance (2006) Latest news on municipal issues. Two-thirds of managers of 
dysfunctional municipalities still awarded performance bonuses. 
http://www.da.org.za/ 
 
Devanna, Mary Anne, Charles J Fombrun, and Noel M. Tichy. (1984) A Framework for 
Strategic Human Resource Management. In Charles J. Fombrun, M. A. Devanna and 
N.M. Tichy (eds) Strategic Human Resource Management. New York. John Wiley 
and Sons. 
 
Devas, Nick and Delay, Simon (2006). Local democracy and the challenges of decentralising 
state: An international perspective. Local Government Studies, Vol. 32 Issue 5, 
pp677-695.  
 
Devas, Nick (2005). The Challenges of Decentralization. Paper Presented at Global Forum 
on Fighting Corruption. Brasília, June 2005. 
 
Dolan, S. L., Mach, M., Sierra, V. (2005) HR contribution to a firm’s success examined from 
a configurational perspective: An Exploratory Study Based on The Spanish CRANET 
Data, Management Review (The International Review of Management Studies) (2): 
272-290.   
 
Dyer, Lee and Reeves, Todd. (1995) Human resource strategies and firm performance: what 
do we know and where do we need to go? The Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 6: 3, pp656 – 670. Routledge.  
 
ECA (Economic commission for Africa) (2003). Performance Management in the Botswana 
Public Service. Annex III. Ad-Hoc Expert Group Meeting (AEGM) on “Public Sector 
Management: Lessons Learned.”Workshop Report. 28-29 May. Addis Ababa. ECA.  
 
Eriksson, Kent, Majkgard, Anders, and Sharma, deo D., (2000) Path Dependence and 
Knowledge Development in the Internationalization Process. Management 
International Review, 40, 4, pp307-328. 
 
Farnham, David and Horton, Sylvia. (1996) Managing People in the Public Services. 




Fiol, Marlene, C. (1991) Managing Culture as a Competitive Resource: An Identity-Based 
View of Sustainable Competitive Advantage. Journal of Management, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
pp191-211. 
 
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge. (2004) What’s trust got to do with it? Non-payment of service charges 
in local authorities in South Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 42, 4, pp539-
562.  
 
Fjeldstald, Odd-Hege and Semjoba, Joseph. (2000). Dilemmas of Fiscal Decentralisation: A 
Study of Local Government Taxation in Tanzania. Forum Development Studies, No. 
1, pp7-41. 
 
Fombrun, Charles J., Tichy, Noel M. and Devanna, Mary Anne. (1984) Strategic Human 
Resource Management. New York. John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Forster-Seba, Sean. (2003) Africa’s Best Kept Secret: Botswana as “a shining liberal 
democracy”. Country Report: Botswana. The Courier ACP-EU, No. 198. May-June. 
Gaborone. 
 
Foss, Nicolai J. (1999) Edith Penrose, Economics and Strategic Management. Contributions 
to Political Economy, Vol. 18, pp87-104. 
 
Fowler, Alan. (1995) Human Resource Management in Local Government: Its special 
purposes, conditions and tasks (2nd Edition). London. Pearson Professional Limited. 
 
Francis, Elizabeth. (2002). Rural livelihoods, Institutions and Vulnerability in North West 
Province, South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp531-
550. 
 
Freyss, Seigrun Fox. (Ed). (1999) Human Resource Management in Local Government: An 
Essential Guide. Washington, D.C. International City/County Management 
Association.  
 
Gains, Francesca., John, Peter C., and Stoker, Gerry (2005) Path Dependency and the Reform 
of the English Local Government.  Public Administration, Vol., 83, No. 1, pp25-45. 
 
Gillham, Bill. (2000) Case Study Research Methods. London and New York. Continuum. 
 
Gilliomee, H. (2003) The Afrikaner. Cape Town. Tafelburg. 
 
Golding, Nicky. (2004) Strategic Human Resource Management, in Beardwell, Ian., Holden 
Len and Claydon Tim (eds). Human Resource Management: A Contemporary 
Approach (4th Edition). Harlow. Prentice Hall. 
 
Gomm, Roger., Hammersley, Martin and Foster, Peter. (2000) Case Study Method. London. 
Sage Publications. 
 
Good, K. and Hughes, S. (2002) Globalization and Diversification: two cases in Southern 




Good, Kenneth. (2002). Interpreting the exceptionality of Botswana. Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp69-95. 
 
Gow, J.I. and Dufour, C. (2000) Is the new public management a paradigm? Does it matter? 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp573-597. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2008) Adjustment of Salary Scales and Review of Allowances 
2008. Public Service Management Directive No. 1 of 2008. Gaborone. Government 
Printer. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2006a) Estimated Number of Paid Employees by Sector and 
Economic Activity. Central Statistics Office. Gaborone. http//www.cso.gov.bw. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2006b) Implementation Strategy – Approved Structure for Local 
Authorities. Gaborone. DLGSM. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2005a) Report of the Task Force on the O & M Study of the Local 
Authorities (LAs): Department of Local Government Service Management. Gaborone. 
Government Printer. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2005b) Report of the Auditor General on the Accounts of the 
Botswana Government for the Year Ended 31st March, 2005. Gaborone. Government 
Printer. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2003a) National Development Plan 9: 2003/04 – 2008/09. 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. Gaborone. Government Printer. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2003b) Second Presidential Commission on Local Government 
Structure in Botswana: Government Paper No. 1 of 2003. Ministry of Local 
Government. Gaborone. Government Printer. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2003c) Matlhare vs Attorney General, No. 7/2002 (The Court of 
Appeal of Botswana, 31st January, 2003). 
 http://www.saflii.org/bw/cases/BWCA/2003 
 
Government of Botswana. (2002) Botswana Public Service: Implementation of the 
Performance Management System (PMS) – The PMS Philosophy Document. 
Gaborone. Directorate of Public Service Management. 
 
Government of Botswana. (2001) 1999 -2001 Organisation and Methods Study of Local 
Authorities (LAs): Councils. Gaborone. Government Printer.  
 
Government of Botswana. (1997) National Development Plan 8 1997/98 – 2002/03. Ministry 
of Finance and Development Planning. Gaborone. Government Printer. 
 
Government of Botswana. (1993) Decentralization in Botswana: Policy Paper and Action 





Government of Botswana. (1993) Decentralization in Botswana: Situation Assessment and 
Policy Review. Draft Discussion Paper. Ministry of Local Government, Lands and 
Housing, 25th August, 1993. Gaborone. 
 
Government of Botswana. (1973) Unified Local Government Service Act. Gaborone. 
Government Printer. 
 
Grant, Robert M. (1991) The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: 
Implications for Strategy Formulation. Carlifornia Management Review, Vol. 33, 
Issue 3, pp114-136. 
 
Gray, Andrew and Jenkins, Bill. (1995) From Public Administration to Public Management: 
Reassessing A Revolution? Public Administration, Vol. 73, pp75-99. 
 
Gray, David E. (2004) Doing Research in the Real World. London. Sage Publications. 
 
Greener, I. (2005). State of the art – The potential of path dependence in political studies. 
Politics, 25 (1) 62-72. 
 
Grindle, Merilee S and Hildebrand, Mary E. (1995) Building sustainable capacity in the 
public sector: what can be done? Public Administration and Development, Vol. 15, 
pp441 - 463.  
 
Grix, Jonathan. (2001) Demystifying Postgraduate Research: From MA to PhD.  
Birmingham. University of Birmingham Press. 
 
Guest, David E. (1997) Human Resource Management and Performance: a review and 
research agenda. The Journal of International Human resource Management. 8:3 
pp263 – 276. Chapman and Hall. 
 
Guest, David E. (1987) Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations. Journal of 
Management Studies, 24: 5, pp503 – 521. 
 
Hadingham, Tim. (2003) Decentralisation and Development Planning: Some Practical 
Considerations. Scott Wilson. www.transport-
links.org/transport_links/filearea/publications/1_802_Decentralisation%20and%20De
velopment%… January 2003. Accessed on 19/07/2005. 
 
Hall, Peter A., and Taylor, Rosemary C.R. (1996) Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms. Political Studies, Vol., 44, pp936-57. 
 
Hamel, Jacques, Dufour Stéphane and Fortin Dominic. (1993) Case Study Methods. 
Qualitative Research Methods. Volume 32. Newbury Park, London, New Delhi. Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
 
Harvey, Michael. (2002) Human Resource Management in Africa: Alice’s Adventures in 





Harvey, Charles and Lewis, Stephen R. (1990) Policy Choice and Development Performance 
in Botswana. Basingstoke. Macmillan.  
 
Harris, Lynnette. (2002). The future of HRM function in local government: Everything has 
changed – but has anything changed. Strategic Change, Vol. 11, pp369-378. DOI: 
10.1002jsc.612. 
 
Harrison-Rockey, Samantha. (1999) What stage has been reached in the reform and 
transformation of the structures and systems of government? The case of South 
Africa. International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 65, pp169 – 182.  
 
Hawker, Geoffrey. (2000) Political Leadership in the ANC: The South African Provinces 
1994-1999. Journal of Modern African Studies, December, 38: 631-658. 
 
Hayes, M.T. (1991). Incrementalism and Public Policy. New York. Longman. 
 
Hendry, Chris. (2003) Applying employment systems theory to the analysis of national 
models of HRM. The International Journal of Human Resource Management 14:8, 
1430 – 1442.  
 
Hofstede, Geert. (1993) Cultural constraints in management theories. Academy of 
Management Executive, Vol. 7, No. 1. pp81 – 94. 
 
Hood, F. (1991) A public management for all seasons. Public Administration and 
Development, Vol., 69, No 1, pp3-19. 
 
Hoopes, David. G, Madsen Tammy. L., and Walker, Gordon. (2003) Guest Editors’ 
Introduction to the Special Issue: Why Is There a Resource-Based View? Towards A 
Theory of Competitive Heterogeneity. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 24, 
pp889-902.  
 
Hope, K.R. (2002) The New Public Management: A perspective from Africa. In Kate 
McLaughlin, Stephen P. Osborne and Ewan Ferlie (eds) New Public Management: 
Current trends and future prospects. London and New York. Routledge. 
 
Hope, K.R. (2000) Decentralisation and local governance theory and the practice in 
Botswana. Development Southern Africa, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp519-534. 
 
Hope, K.R. (1998) Development Policy and Economic Performance in Botswana: Lessons 
for the Transition Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of International 
Development. Vol. 10, pp 539-554. 
 
Hope, K.R. (1995). Managing development policy in Botswana: implementing reforms for 
rapid change. Public Administration and Development, Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp41-52. 
 
Hughes, Owen E. (1998) Public Management and Administration: An Introduction. (2nd ed). 
Basingstoke. MacMillan Press, Ltd.  
 
Hussein, M.K. (2003) Local governance and human resource capacity: The case of district 




Jackson, Susan., and Schuler, Randall S. (eds). (1999) Strategic Human Resource 
Management. Oxford and Massachusetts. Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
 
Jackson, Terence. (2002) International HRM: A Cross Cultural Approach. London, 
Thousand Oaks, New Delhi. SAGE Publications. 
 
Jaeger, Alfred M. and Rabindra N. Kanungo (eds). (1990) Management in Developing 
Countries. London and New York, Routledge. 
 
Jarvis, Chris. (2003) What is this thing called organisational culture? 
http://www.brunel.ac.uk/~bustcfj/bola/culture/culture.html, accessed 3rd April 2005. 
 
Jinabhai, Dinesh C. (2004) Empirical Findings on the Impact of Affirmative Action on the 
Training and Development of Black Managers for Corporate Organisations in South 
Africa. Public Personnel Management, Volume 33, No. 1, pp 121-135.  
 
Johnson, Nancy Brown and Droege, Scott. (2004) Reflections on the generalization of agency 
theory: Cross-cultural considerations. Human Resource Management Review, Vol. 14, 
pp325-335. 
 
Johnston, Judy. (1998) Managerialism and Strategic Management: A Guided or Misguided 
Approach to Public Sector Reform? In Halligan, John, (ed.) Public Service Reform. 
IASIA. 
 
Jones, Merrick L., Blunt, Peter and Sharma, Keshav C. (1996). Management perceptions of 
leadership and management in an African public service organisation. Public 
Administration and Management, Vol. 16, Issue 5, pp455-467.    
 
Jones, Peris Sean. (1999) From ‘Nationhood to Regionalism to the North West Province: 
‘Bophuthatswananess’ and the Birth of the ‘New’ South Africa. African Affairs, Vol., 
98, pp509-534. 
 
Jütting Johannes, Kauffmann Céline, McDonnell Ida, Osterrrieder Holger, Pinaud Nicolas, 
and Wegner Lucia. (2004) Decentralisation and Poverty in Develping Countries: 
Exploring the Impact. Working Paper No. 236. OECD Development Centre. Paris. 
OECD. 
 
Kamoche, Ken. (2001) Human Resource Management in Kenya. In Budhwar, Pawan S and 
Yaw A. Debrah (eds) Human Resource Management in Developing Countries. 
London and New York. Routledge. 
 
Kamoche, Ken. (1993) Toward a Model of HRM in Africa. In Ferris, Gerald R. (ed.).  
Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management. Supplement 3. 
Greenwich Connecticut and London, Jai Press Ltd. 
 
Kanungo, Rabindra N. and Jaeger, Alfred M. (1990) Introduction: the need for the 
indegenious management of developing countries. In Jaeger, Alfred M. and Kanungo, 





Kay, Adrian. (2005) A Critique of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies. Public 
Administration, Vol., 83, No. 3, pp553-571. 
 
Kay, Adrian. (2003) Path Dependency and the CAP. Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol., 10, No. 3, pp405-420. 
 
Kiessling, Timothy and Michael Harvey. ( 2005) Strategic global human resource 
management research in the twenty first century: an endorsement of the mixed 
method research methodology. International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp22-45.  
 
Kor, Yasemin Y. and Mahoney, Joseph T. (2004). Edith Penrose’s (1959) Contributions to 
the Resource-based View of Strategic Management. Journal of Management Studies, 
Vol. 41, No. 1, pp183-191. 
 
Kotter, J.P. (1990). A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs from Management. 
London. Free Press. 
 
Lado, Augustine A and Wilson, Mary A. (1994) Human Resource Systems and Sustained 
Competitive Advantage: A Competency Based Perspective. Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp699 – 727. 
 
Leitko, Thomas A., and Szczerbacki, David. (1987) Why Traditional OD Strategies Fail in 
Professional Bureaucracies. Organisational Dynamics, (Winter), Vol. 15, No. 3, 
pp52-65.   
 
Lekorwe, M. (1989) The Kgotla and the Freedom Square: One or two-way communication? 
In Holm, D. and Molutsi, P. (eds) Democracy in Botswana: The Proceedings of a 
Symposium Held in Gaborone. Gaborone. Macmillan, pp.  216-230.  
 
Lengnick-Hall, Cynthia A., and Lengnick-Hall, Mark L. (1999) Strategic Human Resource 
Management: a Review of the Literature and a Proposed Typology, in Susan E. 
Jackson, and Randall S. Schuler, (eds). Strategic Human Resource Management. 
Oxford and Massachusetts. Blackwell Publishers Ltd, pp29-48. 
 
Levy, Roger (2002) Modernisation, decentralisation and governance: A public management 
perspective. A paper presented at the PSA Annual Conference, University of 
Aberdeen, 4-6 April 2002. 
 
Liebowitz, S. J., and Margolis, Stephen E. (1995) Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organisation, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 205-226. Oxford 
Universiity Press. 
 
Lister, Stephen, and Betley, Mary. (1999) Approaches to Decentralisation in Developing 
Countries. Paper presented as background reading for the MEFMI/DFID workshop 
on Good Practice in Public Expenditure Management, Capetown June 1999. 




Maanen, John van., Peter K. Manning and Marc L. Miller. (1993) Editors’ Introduction. In 
Hamel, Jacques., Stéphane Dufour and Dominic Fortin. Case Study Methods. 
Qualitative Research Methods, Volume 32. Newbury Park, London, New Delhi. Sage 
Publications, Inc.  
 
Mabey, Christopher., Graeme Salaman and John Storey. (1998) Human Resource 
Management: A Strategic Introduction (2nd Edition). Blackwell Business. 
 
Mahoney, J. (2003) Long-Run Development and the Legacy of Colonialism in Spanish 
America.  The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 109, No.1, pp50-106. 
 
Mail & Guardian. (2006a) Cabinet condemns strike violence.  
 
Mail & Guardian (2006b). Khutsong: Life amid violent protests.  
 
Mail & Guardian (2006c) Screws tighten on municipal managers 
 
Mail & Guardian. (2005) Remedying racism. 
 
Mail & Guardian. (2002) Official fired for ‘kaffir’ slur.  
 
Manning, Nick. (2001) The Legacy of New public Management in Developing Countries. 
International Review of Administrative Sciences. Vol. 67, 297-312. 
 
Matthews, Judy., and Shulman, Arthur. (2005) Competitive advantage in Public Sector 
Organisations: Explaining the public good/sustainable competitive advantage 
paradox. Journal of Business Research, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp232-240. 
 
Maundeni, Zibani. (2005a) Civil Society and Democracy in Botswana, in Maundeni, Zibani 
(ed.). 40 Years of Democracy in Botswana: 1965-2005. Mmegi Publishing House. 
Gaborone. 
 
Maundeni, Zibani (ed.). (2005b) 40 Years of Democracy in Botswana: 1965-2005. Mmegi 
Publishing House. Gaborone. 
 
Maundeni, Zibani. (2001) State culture and development in Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 40, 1, pp. 105-132.  
 
Mawhood, Philip (ed.). (1983). Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of 
Tropical Africa. Chichester. John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
 
McCourt, W. (2006) The Human Factor in Governance: Managing Public Employees in 
Africa and Asia. New York. Palgrave McMillan. 
 
McCourt, W. (2005). Path Dependence and History and in the Malaysian Civil Service. 
Paper No. 12, Management in Development Working Paper Series. 
http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/publications/wp/mid/documents/mid





McCourt, W., and Eldridge, D. (2003) Global Human Resource Management: Managing 
People in Developing and Transitional Countries. Cheltenham. Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited. 
 
McCourt, W. (2003) Political Commitment to Reform: Civil Service Reform in Swaziland. 
World Development, Vol., 31, Issue 6, pp1015-31. 
 
McCourt, W. and Minogue (eds) (2001). The Internationalization of Public Management: 
Reinventing the Third World State. Cheltenham and Massachusetts. Edward and Elgar 
Publishing Ltd. 
 
McCourt, W. and Ramgutty-Wong, Anita. (2002). Limits to strategic HRM: The Case of 
Mauritius. Working Paper No. 4/2002. Institute for Development Policy Management. 
University of Manchester. http://idpm.man.ac.uk/publications/wp/mid/mid-
_wp04.shtml. Accessed May 2004. 
 
McGauhey, Sarah L. and De Ceiri, Helen. (1999) Reassessment of convergence and 
divergence dynamics: implications for international HRM. The International Journal 
of Human Resource Management, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp235-250.  
 
Melián-González, Santiago and Verano-Tacorante, Domingo. (2004) A new approach to the 
best practices debate: are best practices applied to all employees in the same way? 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol.15: 1; pp56 – 75.  
 
Meyer-Emerick, N., Mothusi, B. and Molaodi, Daniel K. (2004). Decentralisation of service 
delivery as adopted by the Central District Council in Botswana. Public 
Administration and Development, Vol. 24, Issue 3, pp225-233. 
 
Meyer-Stamer, Jörg, (1998) Path Dependence in Regional Development: Persistence and 
Change in Three Industrial Clusters in Santa Catarina, Brazil. World Development, 
Vol. 26, No. 8, pp1495-1511.  
 
Miles, R.H. and Snow, C.C. (1984). Designing Strategic Human Resource Systems. 
Organization Dynamics, 13(1), 36-52. 
 
Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., and Lampel, Joseph. (1998) Strategy Safari: The Complete 
Guide Through the Wilds of Strategic Management. London. Pearson Education 
Limited.  
 
Mintzberg, H. (1983) Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations. Engel Cliffs. 
Prentice Hall, Inc. 
 
Mintzberg, H. (1980) Structure in 5’S: Designing Effective Organizations. Management 
Science, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp322-341.  
 
Mmegi (2006a) Unpaid workers shock Gaborone mayor. July 2006. Vol. 23, No. 108. 
 




Mmegi. (2005). Economic diversification efforts not bearing fruit. Gaborone. 
 
Mmegi. (2005) Economic diversification efforts not bearing fruit. Vol. 19, No. 1.  
 
Mmegi (2005) GCC employees, Daisy Loo appear in court. Vol. 22, No. 191. 
 
Montiel, Lenni. (1998) Institutional Development of Local government in a Developing 
Country: the case of Venezuela. Unpublished Thesis. University of Birmingham. 
International Development Department. 
 
Morton, F. and Ramsay, J. (eds) (1987). The Birth of Botswana: A History of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate from 1910 to 1966. London. Longman. 
 
Moser, C.A., and Kalton, G. (1971). Survey Methods in Social Investigation (2nd Edition). 
London. Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. 
 
Mosley, Hugh. (2008) Decentralisation and Accountability in Labour Market Policy. A paper 
presented at the High-level conference organised by the Senate of the Republic, the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and the OECD LEED Programme, in 
collaboration with Isfol and Italia Lavoro, 17-19 April 2008, Venice, Italy. 
 
Mueller, Keith. (1983) Expectancy theory in developing nations: motivating Botswana public 
servants. Public Administration and Development, Vol. 3, Issue 3, pp265-274. 
 
Muukonen, M. (2005). Path Dependence and Hierarchical Inertia. A Presentation to the Path 
Dependency Work Group in the 37th World Conference of the International Institute 
of Sociology. Stockholm, 5-9 July.  
 
Ncholo, Paseka. (2000) Reforming the Public Service in South Africa: A Policy Framework. 
Public Administration and Development, 20, 87 – 102.  
 
Neuman, Lawrence W. (2003) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches, (5th Edition). Boston. Pearson Education, Inc. 
 
Nigro, Felix A. and Nigro, Lloyd G. (1986) The New Public Personnel Administration (3rd 
edition). Itasca, F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc. 
 
Nordås, Hildegunn Kyvik and Abdalla Gergis. (2000) Making Government Smaller and 
More Efficient: The Botswana Case. Evaluation Report 2000. Bergen, Norway. Chr. 
Michelsen Institute (CMI), Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis 
(BIDPA) and the Foundation for Research in Economics and Business 
Administration,  
 
Nordås, Hildegunn Kyvik, Sekgoma, Gilbert and Somolekae, Gloria. (1998) Managing Good 
Fortune: Macroeconomic management and the role of aid in Botswana. Norway. Chr. 
Michelsen Institute. 
 
North West Government. (2006) Mamusa gets a new financial expert/guru. 3 July 2006. 






Oliver, Christine. (1997) Sustainable Competitive Advantage: Combining Institutional and 
Resource Based Views. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 9, pp697-713. 
 
Olowu, Dele. (2003) Local Institutional and Political Structures and Processes: Recent 
Experiences in Africa. Journal of Public Administration and Development. Vol. 23, 
No. 1, pp 41-52.  
 
Olowu, Dele and Wunsch, James S. (eds). (2004) Local Governance in Africa: The 
Challenges of Democratic Decentralisation. Boulder. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc. 
 
 
Parnell, S., Pieterse, E., Swilling, M and Wooldridge, D. (eds). (2002) Democratising Local 
Government: the South African experiment. Cape Town. University of Cape Town 
Press.  
 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey. (1998) The Human Equation: Building Profits by Putting People First. 
Boston. Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Phirinyane, M and Kaboyakgosi, Gape. (2001) Analysis of Performance Management in the 
Local Authorities of Botswana. Gaborone. BIDPA. 
 
Picard, Louis A. and Morgan, Philip E. (1985). Policy Implementation and Local Institutions 
in Botswana, in Louis a. Picard (ed.) The Evolution of Botswana. London. pp125-156. 
 
Picard, Louis (1987). The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model for Success? 
Boulder and London. Lynne Reinner Publishers.  
  
Pierson, Paul. (2000a) Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. 
American Political Science Review, Vol., 94, No. 2, pp 251-67. 
 
Pierson, Paul (2000b). Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes. 
Studies in American Political Development, Vol., 14, pp 72-92 
 
Pointon, Julia and Ryan, Alan J. (2004) Reward and Performance Management. In 
Beardwell, I., Holden, L., and Claydon, T (eds). Human Resource Management: A 
Contemporary Approach (4th ed),  
 
Polidano, Charles. (2001) Why Civil Service Reforms Fail. IDPM Public Policy and 
Management Working Paper No. 16. http://www.man.ac.uk/idpm/idpm_dp.htm 
Accessed 2004. 
 
Porter, Michael E. (1991) Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy. Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 12, pp95 – 117. John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. 
 
Price, Alan. (2003) Human Resource Management in a Business Context (2nd Ed). London. 




Price, Alan. (1997) Human Resource Management in a Business Context. London. 
International Thomson Business Press. 
 
Puffert, Douglas. (2002). Path Dependence in Spatial Networks: The Standardization of 
Railway Track Gauge. Explorations in Economic History, Vol., 39, pp 282-314. 
 
Purcell, John and Ahlstrand, Bruce. (1994) Human Resource Management in the Multi-
Divisional Company. New York. Oxford University Press Inc. 
 
Purcell, John. (1999) Best practices and best fit: chimera or cul-de-sac? Human Resource 
Management Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 3, pp 26-41. 
 
Pycroft, Christopher. (1999). Restructuring non-metropolitan local government in South 
Africa. Public Administration and Development, 19, 179 – 192.  
 
Rainford, Allan. (2004). Cape of new hope. Features, http://www.cipfa.org.uk/publicfinance/ 
 
Ralston, D.A., Gustafson, D.J., Cheung, F., and Terpstra, R.H. (1993).Differences in 
managerial values: A study of U.S., Hong Kong and PRC managers. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol., 24, No. 2, pp 249-275. 
 
Ralston, D.A., Holt D.H., Terpstra R.H., and Kai-Cheng, Y. (1997). The Impact of National 
Culture and Economic Ideology on Managerial Work Values: A Study of the United 
Stated States, Russia, Japan and China. Journal of International Business Studies, 
Vol., 28, No. 1, pp 177-207. 
 
Read, James S. (1979) The New Constitution of Nigeria, 1979: ‘The Washington Model?’ 
Journal of African Law, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp131-174. 
 
Reddy, P.S., Moodley, S. and Maharajj, S. (2000). Human Resource Capacity-Building in 
Local Government: A Case Study of the Training and Development Scheme in 
Durban. Public Personnel Management, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp 293-304.   
 
Reddy, P.S. (1996) Local Government Restructuring in South Africa, in P.S. Reddy, (ed.) 
Readings in Local Government Management and Development: A Southern African 
Perspective. Kenwyn. Juta & Co, Ltd. 
 
Republic of South Africa. (2004) Project Consolidate: A hands-on Local Government 
Support and Engagement Programme. Pretoria. Department of Provincial and Local 
Government.  
 
Republic of South Africa. (2000) Local Government: Municipal Systems Act. Government 
Gazette, 20 November 200, Vol. 425, Cape Town. 
 
Republic of South Africa. (1999) Skills Development Levies Act. Government Gazette, 30 
April 1999, Vol. 406, Cape Town. 
 
Republic of South Africa. (1998) Local Government: Municipal Structures Act. Government 




Republic of South Africa. (1998) Skills Development Act. Government Gazette, 2 November 
1998, Vol. 401. Cape Town. 
 
Republic of South African. (1997) Batho Pele – ‘People First’ White Paper on Transforming 
Public Service Delivery. Government Gazette. Vol. 388, No 18340. Pretoria.  
 
Republic of South Africa. (1996) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Government 
Gazette, 18 December 1996. Vol. 378. Cape Town. 
 
Republic of South Africa. (1995) Labour Relations Act. Government Gazette, 13 December 
1995. Vol. 366. Cape Town. 
 
Reilly, Wyn. (1983). Decentralisation in Botswana – myth or reality? In Phillip Mawhood 
(ed) Local Government in the Third World: the Experiences of Tropical Africa. 
Chichester. John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Robinson, Mark. (2003) Participation, Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery. 
Paper prepared for a workshop on New Approaches to Decentralized Service 
Delivery, pp1-15. Santiago, Chile. 
 
Romeo, Leonardo G. (2003) The Role of External Assistance in Supporting Decentralisation 
Reform. Public Administration and Development, Vol. 23, pp89-96.  
 
Rose, R. and Davies, P.L. (1994). Inheritance in Public Policy: Change Without Choice in 
Britain. New Haven, CT. Yale University Press.  
 
Rugman, A.M. and Verbeke, A. (2002) Edith Penrose’s contribution to the resource-based 
view of strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, No. 8, pp769-
80. 
 
Rugman, A.M. and Verbeke, A. (2004) A final word on Edith Penrose. Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp205-217. 
 
Rugumyamheto, J.A. (2004) Innovative Approaches to Reforming Public Services in 
Tanzania. Public Administration and Development, Vol. 24, pp437-446.  
 
Schoeman, N.J. (2005). Rethinking fiscal decentralisation in South Africa. Biennal ESSA 
Conference. Durban, 7-9 September. 
 
Schuler, Randall S. (1992) Strategic Human Resource Management: Linking the People with 
the Strategic Needs of the Business. Organisational Dynamics, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 
pp18-32. 
 
Sharma, K.C. (1997). The Capacity, Autonomy and Accountability of Local Government in 
Local-Level Governance: The Case of Botswana. Regional Development Dialogue, 
Vol. 18, No. 2, pp61-77. 
 
Shim, Deok-Seob. (2001) Recent Human Resources Developments in OECD Member 




Sindane, Abakholwa Moses. (2004) Public administration versus public management: 
parallels, divergences, convergences and who benefits? International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, Vol. 70, (4), pp665-672. 
 
Smoke, Paul. (2003) Decentralisation in Africa: Goals Dimensions, Myths and Challenges. 
Journal of Public Administration and Development. Vol., 23, No. 1, pp 7 – 16.  
 
Smoke, Paul. (2004) Kenya: Erosion and reform from the Centre, in Dele Olowu and James 
S. Wunsch (eds), Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic 
Decentralization. Boulder and London. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Soeters, Joseph L and Tessema, Mussie Teclemichael. (2004) Public management in 
developing countries: some notes from Eritrea. International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, Vol. 70 (4), pp623-635. 
 
Steinmo, S.K., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F. (eds) (1992). Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stewart, Ranson., Jones, George., and Walsh, Kieron (eds). (1985) Between Centre and 
Locality: The Politics of Public Policy. London. George Allen and Unwin. 
 
Stoecker, Randy. (1991). Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study. The Sociological 
Review, 39: 88-112.  
 
Storey, John. (ed.), (1995) Human Resource Management: A Critical Text. London and New 
York. Routledge. 
 
Taylor, H. (2001) Human resource management and new public management: two sides of a 
coin that has a low value in developing countries? In McCourt, W. and Minogue, M. 
(eds). The Internationalization of public management: Reinventing the Third World 
State. Cheltenham. Edward Elgar Publishers. pp174-195. 
 
Teo, T.S.H., and Ranaganathan, C. (2003) Leveraging IT resources and capabilities at the 
housing and development board. Journal of Strategic Information Systems, Vol. 12, 
pp229-249. 
 
The Citizen (2006) Reverse appointment of municipal manager. 6 November. 
 
The World Bank Group. (2000). Botswana: An Example of Prudent Economic Policy and 
Growth. Africa Region Finding, No 161 June. 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find161.htm   
 
Thelen, K. (2004) How Institutions Evolve. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Thelen, Kathleen. (1999) Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics. Annual 
Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, 369-404. 
 




Thompson (1996) A History of South Africa, (Revised Edition). New Haven and London. 
Yale University Press.  
 
Tordoff, William. (1994) Decentralisation: Comparative Experience in Commonwealth 
Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 555-580. 
 
Tordoff, William. (1988). Local Administration in Botswana. Public Administration and 
development, Vol. 8, pp183-202. 
 
Torrington, Derek., Hall, Laura., and Taylor, Stephen. (2002) Human Resources Management 
(5th Edition). Harlow. Pearson Education Limited. 
 
Tompkins, Jonathan. (2002) Strategic Human Resource Management in Government: 
Unresolved Issues. Public Personnel Management, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp95-110. 
 
Tsie, Balefi, Heilemann Arne, Kaboyakgosi Gape, and Marope Mmantsetsa. (1998) 
Consolidating Local Democratic Governance in Botswana. Lessons from DDSS V: 
1994 – 1997. SIDA Evaluation Report. SIDA. 
 
United Nations Development Programme. (2004) Decentralised Governance for 
Development: A Combined Practice Note on Decentralisation, Local Governance and 
Urban/Rural Development. UNDP. 
 www.undp.org/policy/docs/practicenotes.dgdnintra.doc on 17 August 2005. 
 
United Nations Development Programme. (2001) Botswana: Towards National Prosperity. 
Common Country Assessment, (1st Edition). Gaborone. UNDP. 
 
Verschuren, Piet J.M. (2003) Case Study as a Research Strategy: Some Ambiguities and 
Opportunities. International Journal of Social Science Research Methodology. Vol. 6, 
No. 2, pp121-139. 
 
Wallis, Malcolm. (1996) Local Government and Development Planning in South Africa. In 
P.S. Reddy (ed) Readings in Local Government: A Southern African Perspective. 
Kenwyn. Juta & Co, Ltd.  
 
Wernefelt, (1984). A Resource-Based View of the Firm. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
5, Issue 2, pp171-180. 
 
Whittington, Richard. (1993) What is Strategy – and does it matter? London and New York, 
Routledge. 
 
Wilsford, David. (1994) Path Dependency, or Why History Makes It Difficult but Not 
Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a Big Way. Journal of Public Policy, 
Vol., 14, No. 3, pp251-283. 
 
Work, Robertson. (2002) Overview of Decentralisation Worldwide: A Stepping Stone to 
Improved Governance and Human Development. A paper presented at the 2nd 
International Conference on Decentralisation Federalism: The Future of 




worldwide-paper.pdf on 18/07/2005. 
 
Wright, Patrick M. and McMahan, Gary C. (1992) Theoretical Perspectives for Strategic 
Human Resource Management. Journal of Management. Vol. 18, No.  2, pp295-320. 
 
Wright, Patrick M. and Snell, Scott A. (1991) Toward An Integrative View of Strategic 
Human Resource Management. Human Resource Management Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
pp203 – 225.  
 
Wunsch, James S. (2001) Decentralization, Local Governance and ‘Recentralization’ in 
Africa. Public Administration and Development, 21, 277 – 288.  
 
Wunsch, James S. and Ottemoeller, Dan. (2004) Uganda: Multiple Levels of Local 
Governance. In Dele Olowu and James S. Wunsch, (eds.), Local Governance in 
Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization. Boulder and London. Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
 
www.ilo.org 
 
www.transparency.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
